Marinha dos EUA

[jumentodonordeste]

The international law of the sea was no different. Three of the four
rising ‘‘BRIC’’ nations—Brazil, India and China—rejected the notion that U.S.
warships could freely operate within 200 miles off their coastline without their
permission. These nations did not accept the traditional understanding that
freedom of the high seas exists in the coastal zone, extending out to 200 miles
from the beach.9 For decades China asserted that both the quantity and quality
of navigational freedoms available to foreign warships and aircraft was very
different within 200 miles from the coast.10

Está no texto.

[P44]

Abaixo o link para um artigo que está causando intensa polêmica nos EUA, que trata de como os mesmos perderam a guerra naval de 2015 contra a China, com o afundamento do USS George Washington.
Se alguém conseguir uma tradução decente, seria um ótimo tema de debates aqui no DB.

http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5401/kraska.navalwar2015.pdf

Não entendi. Isso é um... o que?

The Shape Of Things To Come?

[P44]

Longer deployments due to ‘sub gap’

By Lance M. Bacon - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Jan 11, 2010 5:22:21 EST

Sailors aboard attack submarines can expect longer deployments and service-life extensions of their boats to compensate for an expected “submarine gap” in the years to come, according to Navy documents and congressional analysts.

Under the current 30-year procurement plan, the number of attack subs will fall below the required 48 boats in 2022 and will bottom out six years later at 41 boats. The shortfall will continue until 2034.

“[The Navy] doesn’t have a lot of choice in this gap,” said one congressional analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. “This is the result of decisions made in the past 20 years that are coming home to roost.”

The Navy plans to meet typical requirements with longer deployments and older boats. The service lives of 16 Los Angeles-class subs will be lengthened by as much as 24 months, and at least one month will be added to 40 deployments — about 25 percent of total deployments — over an eight-year period to provide the roughly 10 subs combatant commanders need on any given day. The typical attack sub deployment is six months; it was unclear when the longer deployments are expected to begin.

“There are concerns with this, such as how fast they use up the [nuclear] cores and the burden [longer deployments] will place on crews and families,” the congressional analyst said. “This is not palatable, politically or in the Pentagon. But there’s really no way around it.”

Even with those changes, the Navy will not be able to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 deployed SSNs, according to a July 2009 Congressional Research Service report. This would require the purchase of at least four additional attack subs, and the Navy has no such plans.

The pending 12-ship ballistic-missile submarine replacement adds to the dilemma. If the Navy doesn’t get an additional $80 billion from Congress, a request expected to be presented in the coming months, SSBN procurement could eat up to half of the annual shipbuilding budget for 14 years, according to the CRS report. This would result in even fewer attack subs being built, bringing the force to a low of 40 in 2028 and rising by only four boats through 2040.

A replacement for the Ohio-class SSBN is very likely. Though lawmakers, presidential advisers and former four-stars want to eliminate one leg of the nuclear arms “triad” in the Nuclear Posture Review, most analysts feel the cuts will come from land or air, not from the SSBN force. The review is expected to be released in early February.
No wiggle room

Given the time required for concept, design and construction, procurement of a new SSBN must happen now to ensure the mission is covered when Ohio-class subs start retiring in fiscal 2027. The Navy admits there’s no wiggle room, and it already has completed an analysis of alternatives and is expected to seek $500 million in fiscal 2011 for research and development.

“This is the Navy’s major cost issue of the 2020s,” the congressional analyst said.

While the Navy prepares to fight for funding in the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, its best chance to gain support is in Groton, Conn., and Newport News, Va. There, the Virginia class has become a study in building subs better, faster and cheaper.

The Navy is poised to trim sub production to 60 months, thanks largely to significant changes in the ship’s design and shipyard production process. For example, the Block II boats now in production are built in four sections instead of 10, and they are the first to be delivered with the hull coating installed. Such changes will enable delivery of two subs per year starting in 2011 and will cut the cost of each sub to $2 billion in fiscal 2005 dollars, said Capt. Michael Jabaley, Virginia-class program manager.

Two subs a year is not unprecedented. Three Los Angeles-class subs were produced annually during the Cold War, and some years saw twice that. But as that class is decommissioned over the next 15 years, the Navy will “have to ramp up to keep up,” Jabaley said.

Cutting cost does not always mean cutting capabilities. Block III subs — the final eight boats of the 18 approved in the Virginia class — will replace spherical array sonar with less expensive but equally capable large aperture bow array sonar.

Because the spherical array access trunk is no longer required, two large payload tubes similar to those found on cruise missile subs will replace 12 individual vertical launch tubes with all their electrical and hydraulic support apparatus.

“We still can shoot 12 missiles, but instead of 12 tubes, we have two larger tubes,” Jabaley said. “This means we also can pull canisters out and have large payloads such as [unmanned underwater vehicles] or additional kinetic payloads such as special operations gear or underwater launched anti-air weapons against [anti-submarine warfare] helos.”

The career submariner said he is keeping a watchful eye to ensure necessary bow modifications do not push the Block IIIs past the 60-month window. And he’s not the only one watching.
What’s at stake

Because the Block IV contract will come up in three years, lawmakers are closely monitoring the Virginia class to see whether the Navy can build subs as cheaply and quickly as it claims. The answer will have significant weight on future production.

“Achieving the goal of building subs that fast and at that cost may not give the Navy all the benefits it wants, but the sub force will be in great jeopardy if the Navy doesn’t pull it off,” the congressional analyst said.

But if the Navy can do it, future contracts are likely as Congress, and especially the House Armed Services Committee, has been supportive of procuring two attack subs annually. That would keep the sub gap contained in the 12-year window.

Jabaley is confident the Navy can meet that goal, pointing out that they will meet the 60-month window well ahead of schedule in the Block II contract. However, he does admit a slight increase to 66 months is likely during the transition into Block III.

“We knew this was probable, and we planned for it,” he said.

Quality control is essential to keeping a grip on unforeseen problems that could throw the 60-month build window out of whack.

New Mexico, the sixth Virginia-class sub, was delivered in December after 70 months. The good news: It was delivered four months early. The bad news: It was delayed five weeks — a delay that could be crippling in a 60-month window. It was caused by workmanship problems discovered in the weapons room handling system. Similar problems also were found on at least three other Virginia-class submarines.

“You don’t know the weakest link until it snaps,” Jabaley said. “But we have added and continue to add a myriad of reviews and supervisory oversights to ensure deliveries are not delayed.”

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/01/n ... p_010910w/

[P44]

Widespread Problems On LPDs, Other Ships: U.S. Navy
By philip ewing
Published: 21 Jan 2010 14:51


Faulty welds, lube-oil problems and engine issues continue to dog the San Antonio-class of amphibs, such as New Orleans, above, as well as other ships. (U.S. NAVY)

U.S. Navy engineers are tackling a raft of problems discovered aboard warships built at the Gulf Coast yards of defense giant Northrop Grumman - including faulty welds, lube-oil problems and a defective engine - in the latest installment of the ongoing saga between the Navy and its largest shipbuilder.

nspectors are rechecking every pipe weld aboard every ship built in the last several years at Avondale, La., or Pascagoula, Miss., including destroyers and small- and big-deck amphibs, after discovering so many problems that all pipe welders and Navy inspectors at both yards had to be decertified and then recertified to work on ships.


Navy officials didn't have information Jan. 21 about how many people had to requalify to work in the yards, or how many people couldn't requalify and were dismissed. The disbarring and reapplication took place last summer, when some of the problems were first discovered.

Defense News asked NavSea for comment from its senior leadership, but none had arrived as of Jan. 21. A major question was how or why NavSea's inspectors approved work that subsequent Navy inspections later found inadequate.

In most cases, the issues aren't urgent. The unsatisfactory pipe welds mean a seam doesn't meet the Navy's specifications to resist shock and last for the ship's full life. But in other cases, the problems could have immediate operational implications for the fleet. Inspectors are looking at the entire San Antonio class of amphibious transport docks to determine what has caused systemic lube oil problems in multiple ships, as well as damage to engine bearings that recently sidelined the newest ship, New York.

The third gator in the class, Mesa Verde, is at sea now with the Nassau Amphibious Ready Group, but the Navy said Mesa Verde has had all the latest inspections and repairs, and was ready to take its humanitarian mission to Haiti and then continue on its deployment to the Middle East.

In addition to class-wide problems with worn bearings, New York also has specific troubles with one of its main engines, which has a bowed crankshaft that will need to be replaced in a procedure Naval Sea Systems Command has never attempted before, said Jay Stefany, program manager for the LPD 17 class.

The fleets, NavSea, Northorp Grumman and its subcontractors are all dealing with the various engineering problems, Stefany said. In the case of New York, which is still under warranty, Northrop will pay for the assessments and repairs. As for the rest of the ships, Navy officials aren't sure yet which agencies will be responsible for which steps in assessing and resolving problems, how much it will cost or how long it will take.

"That's part of the investigation that's ongoing with this," Stefany said.

Northrop Grumman spokeswoman Margaret Mitchell-Jones issued this statement: "Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding is committed to building quality ships for our customers, and we'll be actively participating in a LPD review panel the Navy is developing to examine the design, construction, operations and maintenance segments of the LPD 17 program. The team will focus on identifying and understanding the root causes and implementing the appropriate corrective actions. In the meantime, we're proactively working in partnership with the Navy in all aspects of their analysis and efforts with regard to these ships."

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =AME&s=SEA

[P44]

USS George H.W. Bush Departs for Sea Trials


(Source: US Navy; issued Jan. 27, 2010)



NEWPORT NEWS, Va. --- USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) departed Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Va., for sea trials Jan. 27 after a seven-month maintenance period.

During Sea Trials, the ship's electronics, communication, navigation and other combat systems that were built or modified in the shipyard will be tested.

In addition, an inspection of the ship's catapults and jet blast deflectors will be conducted, as well as inspections of the ship's berthing spaces, demonstrations of search and rescue equipment firefighting capabilities, and an evaluation of food service facilities to determine the ship's overall mission readiness.

Bush's sea trials come after a highly successful Post Shakedown Availability/Selective Restrictive Availability that officially completed the construction of the Navy's newest aircraft carrier.

"In just seven months, the ship experienced an amount of depot and intermediate level work comparable to an 11-month planned incremental availability," said Bush's Chief Engineer, Cmdr. Shannon Terhune.

Work on the ship over the last seven months included finishing the air-wing spaces and combat systems suite, implementation of ship alterations to get the ship on the class maintenance plan, and the completion of the ship's force work package.

Ship's force work saved the Navy more than half a million dollars, according to Bush Engineering Department Leading Chief Petty Officer, Master Chief Machinist's Mate (SW) Al Fuller, and more than 60 percent of the overall ship's force work package fell to Engineering Department Sailors to complete.

One major undertaking was completed by Damage Control division, who exhausted more than 6,800 man hours upgrading the ship's 10 damage control repair stations and 27 damage control unit lockers, saving the Navy more than $680,000.

Another upgrade included Electric division converting the carrier's "77" island lights from incandescent bulbs to light emitting diode, saving the Navy 90 percent of the cost associated with light operation. Terhune credited the teamwork and cooperation between ship's force, Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Program Manager for Ships (In-Service Aircraft Carriers), Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (Maintenance and Material), Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (Newport News), and more than 20 separate contractor organizations for an unprecedented level of efficiency in the execution of production work on the ship. He said the ship's crew appreciated the professionalism of all maintenance providers.

Upon completion of sea trials, Bush will return to its homeport of Naval Station Norfolk, Va., to begin the work-up cycle towards deployment and prepare for sustained flight operations at sea.

-ends-

[Hader]

'We Thought We Had It Licked'
LPD-17 Woes Vex U.S. Navy, Northrop
By christopher p. cavas
Published: 25 January 2010 Print | Email

A fresh set of problems with the long-troubled LPD 17 San Antonio-class amphibious ships has sidelined two of the vessels, led the U.S. Navy and its largest shipbuilder into a passionate game of finger-pointing, and raised questions about Northrop Grumman's ability to deliver quality work and the Navy's ability to carry out proper shipyard oversight.

LPD 17 Program Concerns: Statements

Related Topics
Europe
Americas
Middle East & Africa
The larger issues are coming from two core problems discovered aboard the LPD 17s, five of which are in service with four still to come.

Of more immediate importance is a problem that, left untreated, could wreck the four large diesel engines that drive the ships. The problem is not new but, having once thought a solution was at hand, the Navy and Northrop are once again trying to figure out why a fix hasn't been found.

Another issue, affecting all the ships in the class and other ships built at Northrop's Gulf Coast shipyards, could - unless it's fixed - shorten the service lives of all the ships. But how and why that problem arose could drive closer to the competence of Northrop and the Navy's inspectors to properly inspect weld work.


The Lube Oil Problem

Engineers are trying to figure out how debris - "contaminants" in engineer-speak - is getting into lube oil in the large diesel engines that drive the ships. The contaminants cause excessive wear on bearings that support a crankshaft at the bottom of each engine. If the problem isn't treated, the crankshaft will be thrown out of line and the engine could suffer serious damage or even be wrecked.

The problem isn't new, the Navy said, and showed up about a year ago in the third and fourth ships of the class.

"We thought we had it licked," Jay Stefany, the Navy's program manager for the LPD 17 program, told reporters Jan. 21. "And that's where we were until right before Christmas."

That's when the newest ship in the class, the USS New York (LPD 21), reported a bent crankshaft in one of the four diesel engines that drive the ship. Engineers found that the shaft was thrown out of alignment by scratches being made in the inner ring of the nine bearings that support the shaft - scratches that caused enough of a difference in the thickness of the bearings to make the shaft wobble.

The scratches are caused by particles too small to see - much of them between 20 and 40 microns wide, or about .00118 of an inch, according to Stefany.

Such particles are found in all engines, but there are unofficial reports that the particles causing the latest problems are coming from shipyard work: slag from welding waste and grit from sand blasting.

The problems on the New York showed up in late November, after the ship returned to its base at Norfolk, Va. The ship, commissioned on Nov. 7 during an emotional and highly publicized ceremony at New York City, was widely proclaimed by Northrop as one of the best ships it had ever built, particularly because of its symbolism of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center - steel from which was used in forging the ship's prow.

Stefany said the problems were a recurrence of similar issues discovered about a year ago on the Mesa Verde (LPD 19) and Green Bay (LPD 20).

"The ships were down for a number of months," he said, and stainless steel shavings were discovered in the lube oil. The problem was not with the Colt-Pielstick PC2.5 STC engines made by Fairbanks Morse Engine, he said, but changes were made in the piping between the engine and a strainer meant to catch contaminants. A new process to flush out the engines was also created and made standard.

The ships subsequently reported no problems. The two earlier ships of the class, San Antonio (LPD 17) and New Orleans (LPD 18), also reported their engines were fine.


More Examinations

But with the new problems on the New York, the ships were examined again. Three of the ships were OK, but the San Antonio found contaminants in three of the four engines. The amphib is now at a shipyard in Norfolk awaiting repairs. The New York is also at Norfolk, where repairs are being made to the crankshaft bearings. Replacement of the bent crankshaft, however, will have to wait for a more extensive shipyard period this spring.

Engineers working for the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Northrop Grumman and Fairbanks Morse are deeply perplexed by the problem, and a design review meeting is to begin Jan. 26 in New Orleans, bringing together all the principals along with the fleet to discover the cause and come up with a permanent solution.

The fleet also is looking into the problem. Early in December, Adm. John Harvey, commander of Fleet Forces Command, ordered Rear Adm. Michelle Howard, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Two, to begin a Manual of the Judge Advocate General investigation, or JAGMAN, of the problem. The effort reportedly is being led by NAVSEA's Rear Adm. Tom Eccles, the Navy's chief engineer. The investigation is focused primarily on the San Antonio and not the New York, which has yet to transfer to fleet operational control.

The lube oil problem is the latest embarrassment to hit the LPD 17 program, which has suffered a string of well-publicized snags and setbacks almost since the initial construction contract was awarded in 1998. Workmanship problems and bad luck have followed some of the ships even after they entered service - on its long-delayed first deployment in fall 2008, the San Antonio was forced to remain at Bahrain for more than a month to repair weld leaks in the main propulsion lube oil system.

The vexing lube oil problem on the ships is causing nerves to be frayed all around. The engines themselves are slightly modified versions of a tried-and-true model that is in wide use on ships and ashore, and has powered the Navy's LSD 41 Whidbey Island-class amphibious ships since the 1980s. Unsubstantiated charges range from shipyard sloppiness by Northrop Grumman or smaller yards that carry out overhauls to inadequate training of sailors who oversee the operation of the automated engine rooms. There is also the possibility that the fixes identified a year ago simply haven't all been made, said one key engineer.

"Replacing that section of piping from the filter to the intake, that was the main fix," said Lee Graeber, vice president of engineering at Fairbanks Morse and a former NAVSEA engineer. That effort, he said, "is still going on."

And while "dirty lube oil is still the prime suspect for the bearing failures," Graeber feels the bent shaft "was due to engine operation while the bearing on that engine was failing or in the process of failing." Turning off the engine, he said, would avoid such damage.

Contaminants are found in all diesel engines, Graeber said. "They can be created by the combustion process in the engine itself - part of the lube oil filter process is to wash them out. Normally a diesel plant would have several lube oil purifiers that would take these out, and that also is being investigated - whether there are enough purifiers and they are of sufficient size and capacity."

Virtually everything having to do with the engine and the design of the oil lubrication system will be examined at the design review, sources said, including design, welding, construction and maintenance procedures and other equipment.

"They're trying to figure out what's wrong with the damn system," said one exasperated official. "Everybody could raise their hand."

And while the New York is undergoing repairs, work on the San Antonio is on hold pending conclusion of the JAGMAN investigation.


The Weld Problem

A more widespread problem that came to light during the 2008 Bahrain repairs on the San Antonio has to do with substandard welds on pipe joints on ships delivered by Northrop's Gulf Coast yards at Avondale, New Orleans, and Ingalls, Pascagoula, Miss. The thickness of many welds, Stefany said, is too thin, meeting commercial but not military specifications. A design that featured too few hangars that hold pipes in place led to excessive vibration of the pipes on the San Antonio, causing the welds to fail.

The welds would not have failed were there enough hangars, Stefany pointed out. Changes were made to the ship's design and more hangars were added in all the ships. The next ship to be commissioned, the San Diego (LPD 22), will "have the right hangaring from the beginning," he said.

As a result of the problems, all Navy ships under construction at Northrop Grumman were reinspected for weld problems.

"We found a higher-than-expected failure rate on quality of the thickness of the welds," Stefany said. The issue was not that, properly hangared, the welds would soon fail in service. Rather, Stefany said, the welds are "critical for shock survivability and for service life. You need [the thicker weld] dimensions to guarantee that." As a result, he said, a ship designed for a service life of 40 years might only make it to 30.

"It's not as catastrophic [as the lube oil problem] but we're working it," Stefany said. "It's not as in-your-face as the engines are - basically it's just putting more welding material on."

Throughout the summer of 2009, Northrop Grumman and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) at Pascagoula reinspected all welds on all ships. All pipe welders were de-certified and forced to go through retraining, Stefany said. "At the same time we retrained the shipbuilders, we retrained the SUPSHIP guys," he added. Delivery of the destroyer Dewey was delayed so fixes could be made, and Northrop sent a contingent of engineers to California aboard the new assault ship Makin Island to ensure the quality of repair work and carry out repairs if needed.

While pipe weld problems were found on all the Navy ships under construction at Ingalls and Avondale, the Coast Guard's National Security Cutters (NSC) being built at Ingalls apparently evaded the worst of the issue.

"The Coast Guard has not experienced any significant piping issues on its National Security Cutters," spokeswoman Laura Williams said Jan. 22. Some "piping discrepancies" were found and corrected on the second NSC, she said, adding that the first NSC, the Bertholf, "has not experienced any problems, but we are finishing follow up welding inspections to make sure any potential discrepancies are addressed."

The ability of Northrop Grumman and SUPSHIP to properly carry out weld inspections has also come into question because of the pipe weld problem. Reversing a chronic shortage of oversight personnel has been a major pledge of Navy officials over the past three years.

"Last year we saw a marked improvement in the ability of SUPSHIP to hire people," said a Navy official. "But we're going to have issues that come to light. The issues we're talking about go back long before we were able to hire people."


E-mail: ccavas@defensenews.com.

[P44]

Repair cost for sub Hartford nearly $87M

By Lance M. Bacon - Staff writer
Posted : Tuesday Apr 6, 2010 13:47:52 EDT



The Los Angeles-class attack submarine Hartford pulls into Mina Salman pier in Bahrain after colliding with the amphibious transport dock New Orleans in March 2009

The Navy will pay another $36.6 million to repair the fast attack submarine Hartford after a collision March 20, 2009, with the amphibious transport dock New Orleans. This will bring the total repair cost to $86.9 million.

General Dynamics Electric Boat was awarded the contract April 1. It will cover the final fabrication and installation of the hull patch, bridge access trunk, port retractable bow plane and the sail. The work, which will be performed primarily in Groton, Conn., is scheduled to wrap up by November.

This is the fourth contract awarded for Hartford’s repair work. Though the contracts total $139.2 million, the company was able to do the work for less than estimated, according to Bob Hamilton, Electric Boat spokesman. The previous three contracts totaled $102.6 million, but most of those funds expired Oct. 1, the start of the new fiscal year.

The Los Angeles-class sub collided with New Orleans in the Strait of Hormuz. New Orleans, which was on its maiden deployment, suffered a 16-by-18-foot gash in its hull that ripped open a fuel tank and two ballast tanks and required $2.3 million in repairs.

Cmdr. Ryan Brookhart was relieved of command of Hartford on April 14, 2009, due to loss of confidence. A Judge Advocate General Manual investigation found an informal atmosphere, crew complacency, a “weak” command and inferior submariner skills led to the “avoidable” accident. Specifically, the navigator was listening to his iPod during a critical evolution, watchstanders were known to sleep on the job, and stereo speakers were rigged for music in the radio room.

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/04/n ... d_040610w/

[Marino]

Is The Era Of U.S. Global Naval Dominance Ending?

(Source: Lexington Institute; issued April 14, 2010)


A new report by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is warning that
the U.S. Navy is reaching a “tipping point” after which it will no
longer be able to exercise global dominance. According to this
analysis, “current strategies based on combat-credible forward
presence are unsustainable.”


The basic message behind this classic piece of military-speak is that
as the size of the U.S. Navy continues to decline, the costs of
operating the Fleet increase and threats proliferate, the United
States will not be able to dominate the world’s oceans as it has for
decades. This is particularly interesting because the defense of the
world’s oceans and the conduct of strategic operations from the sea
(under the catchy bumper sticker of AirSea battle) are central
elements of the Obama Administration’s new defense strategy.


Based on current shipbuilding plans and the expected life spans of
existing ships, the Navy is on a glide path that will reduce its size
from nearly 300 ships to around 240. At the same time, the costs of
maintaining older ships continues to go up, as does the slice of the
Navy’s budget that must be devoted to personnel costs.


New ships are never cheaper than the ones they replace, although the
next generation of combatants -- the CVN -21, the DDG-1000, the new
variants of the DDG-51, the Virginia-class attack submarines and the
Littoral Combat Ship -- will be more capable. Ironically, the demands
on the Navy have not declined since the end of the Cold War.


As a result, the CNA study concluded that “the Navy battle force has
shrunk by 20 percent in the last decade, while the number of ships on
deployment has remained relatively steady. In a period of constant
demand, resources to meet those demands, pay for needed future
structure, and meet growing demands for spending on people and health
care have shrunk. They will not grow in the future. There is a gap
that must be addressed.”


Even at 240 ships the U.S. Navy will be able to deploy overwhelming
power in any one theater. But as the threat continues to evolve,
including new anti-access capabilities such as ship-killing ballistic
missiles, ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarines and advanced sea
mines, it will become more difficult and potentially costly. Also,
even with the planned deployments of new aerial capabilities such as
the E-2D surveillance and command and control platform, the F-35 and
possibly unmanned combat systems, air defense and strike will be a
challenge in the face of more capable defenses.


The central question raised by the study is: can the United States
continue to maintain its role as the provider of security for the
entire Free World as its military shrinks in size? The situation CNA
projects for the Navy also applies to the other Services. Costs are
rising, the equipment pools are shrinking and also aging and the
demands are going up.


If, as the CNA study suggests, the Navy will have to be more judicious
in its deployments and the nation overall more selective in its
interventions, how will this affect the peace and stability of the
world?


Click here>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [www.cna.org/documents/D0022262.A3.pdf]


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the study (The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime


Dominance at Stake? An evaluation of the characteristics of a
"globally influential navy” (50 pages in PDF format) on the CAN
website.

[P44]

Life-Cycle Costs of Selected Navy Ships (excerpt)


(Source: Congressional Budget Office; issued April 28, 2010)



The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has analyzed the impact of operation and support (O&S) and other types of costs on the total life-cycle costs of four classes of Navy ships. The analysis—which aims to provide context for assessing the costs of the new littoral combat ship (LCS)—focuses on the following ship programs:

-- MCM-1 Avenger class mine countermeasures ships,
-- FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates,
-- DDG-51 Flight IIA Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers, and
-- CG-47 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers.

CBO chose those four classes because they have been in the fleet for decades, data for them are readily available, and they all conduct at least one mission that the LCS is also expected to perform. Using the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) definitions of cost categories, CBO calculated costs over the life of each type of ship in the following six categories:

-- Research and development,
-- Procurement,
-- Personnel,
-- Fuel,
-- Other operations and support, and
-- Disposal.

The resulting total life-cycle cost is smaller than the total ownership cost of a ship, which would also include indirect personnel costs (such as for recruiting, training, and medical support) and long-term infrastructure costs (for changes in bases, housing, and other infrastructure associated with a large-scale change in the size of the Navy). CBO does not have a reliable method to estimate those additional costs, however, so it limited its analysis to a ship’s life-cycle cost.

CBO’s analysis indicates that O&S costs—for personnel, fuel, and other items— make up 49 percent to 56 percent of the life-cycle costs of the four types of ships listed above (see Table 1). Personnel is the largest single element of O&S costs.

For a small vessel with a relatively large crew, such as the MCM-1 class mine countermeasures ship, personnel costs represent 38 percent of the ship’s life-cycle cost, compared with 29 percent for a CG-47 class cruiser, which is seven times bigger but has only four times as large a crew. Fuel costs account for a much smaller share of the life-cycle cost: 8 percent to 11 percent in the case of the frigate, destroyer, and cruiser. For the mine countermeasures ship, fuel costs make up only 1 percent of the life-cycle cost, largely because that ship travels at very slow speeds during mine-clearing operations.

Procurement costs account for most of the rest of those four ships’ life-cycle costs, ranging from 43 percent to 50 percent. Disposal costs for destroyers and cruisers have averaged a little less than $1 million per ship. In the case of FFG-7 frigates, the Navy has often sold retired ships or given them away to other countries. The Navy has not disposed of MCM-1 ships yet. But when it removed 12 MHC-51 coastal mine hunters, which are similar to the MCM-1s, from the fleet several years ago, it sold one and gave three to other nations. (The remaining eight are awaiting disposal.) (end of excerpt)


Click here for the full report (8 pages in PDF format) on the CBO website. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc114 ... Letter.pdf

-ends-

[P44]

a falta de $$$$$$$$$$ a entrar em cena....

Gates: Sea Services Must Question Embedded Thinking


(Source: U.S Department of Defense; issued May 3, 2010)


(Emphasis added in bold type below)





The Pentagon’s Robert Gates may have opened a Pandora’s box by questioning whether the US still needs as large a Navy and as capable a Marine Corps. (US Navy photo)

NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. --- The Navy and Marine Corps are going to have to question some embedded thinking, such as whether the Navy needs 11 carrier battle groups or whether the Marines ever will launch another amphibious landing, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said here today.

Gates spoke at the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space Convention at the Gaylord National Convention Center.

The world is changing, and the sea services must be on the leading edges of those changes, Gates said to an auditorium full of Navy and Marine Corps officers and defense contractors that was just a bit smaller than an aircraft carrier’s hangar deck.

Gates made a case for examining the bedrocks of naval strategy, noting that carrier battle groups have been the Navy’s main fleet formation since 1942.

“Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040,” Gates said. But a look at the facts is warranted, he added. The United States now has 11 large, nuclear-powered carriers, and there is nothing comparable anywhere else in the world.

“The U.S. Navy has 10 large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets,” he said. “No other navy has more than three, and all of those navies belong to allies or friends.”

The U.S. Navy can carry twice as many aircraft at sea as the rest of the world combined, Gates said. Under the sea, he told the group, the United States has 57 nuclear-powered attack and cruise-missile submarines – more than the rest of the world combined, and 79 Aegis-equipped surface ships that carry about 8,000 vertical-launch missile cells.

“In terms of total-missile firepower, the U.S. arguably outmatches the next 20 largest navies,” Gates said. “All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet – a proxy for overall fleet capabilities – exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next 13 navies combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.”

The United States must be able to project power overseas, Gates said. “But, consider the massive overmatch the U.S. already enjoys,” he added. “Consider, too, the growing anti-ship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?”

The Marine Corps is now 202,000 strong. It is the largest force of its type in the world, and exceeds in size most nations’ armies. Between the world wars, the Marine Corps developed amphibious warfare doctrine and used it to great effect against the Japanese during World War II. Whether that capability still is needed, however, is worthy of thought, the secretary said.

“We have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again – especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore,” Gates said. “On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?”

The sea services must be designed to meet new challenges, new technologies and new missions, Gates said.

Nations and terror groups are not going to challenge the conventional might of the United States, he noted. Rather, they are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet.

“At the low end, Hezbollah, a non-state actor, used anti-ship missiles against the Israeli navy in 2006,” Gates said. “And Iran is combining ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats in order to challenge our naval power in that region.”

A bit farther up the scale, the virtual monopoly the United States has had with precision-guided weapons is eroding, the secretary said, especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon.

“This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially $15 billion to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk,” Gates said. “The U.S. will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems – including numbers of stealthy subs – all of which could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades.”

The sea services already are addressing many of the challenges of the 21st century, the secretary said. The Navy, for example, is building partnership capacity through the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea. Sailors are training with friends and allies to secure vital shipping lanes in Southeast Asia. Seabees and other sailors are digging wells and building schools in Djibouti. Naval officers lead the multinational efforts to counter the piracy around the Horn of Africa. Naval doctors, nurses and corpsmen that treated those injured in the Haitian earthquake and sailors also are helping with crises like the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Gates said.

“Then, there are the wars,” he said. “With roughly 25 ships – and more than 20,000 sailors – in the [U.S. Central Command] area of operations, there is no doubt that this is a Navy at war.”

Tens of thousands of sailors also have served on the ground alongside soldiers and Marines. The sailors serve on provincial reconstruction teams, as finance clerks, on riverine crews, as Seabees, as SEALs and as medical corpsmen. “These men and women are vital to the mission and helping to ease the strain on our ground forces – and doing so without fail and without complaint,” Gates said.

The secretary said the Marines have been “game-changers” in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan. “In March, I had a chance to meet with Marines at the tip of the spear in a town called Now Zad – a place that had been, for nearly four years, a ghost town under the jackboot of the Taliban,” Gates said. “Then came a battalion of Marines, who, after months of hard work and sacrifice, have slowly brought the town back to life – creating a model for operations elsewhere.”

The military needs more innovative strategies and joint approaches, the secretary said. He called the agreement by the Navy and Air Force to develop an Air-Sea Battle Concept encouraging. It has “the potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what Air-Land Battle did near the end of the 20th,” he said.

But the military also must shift investments toward systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict, Gates said.

“This means, among other things, extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike, with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities,” he explained.

It also means new sea-based missile defenses and a submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. “We will also have to increase submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned underwater platforms,” Gates said.

The secretary acknowledged talk that his push to rebalance the force to provide more resources to fight today’s wars has gone too far.

“In reality,” he said, “in this fiscal year, the Department of Defense requested nearly $190 billion for total procurement, research, and development – an almost 90 percent increase over the last decade. At most, 10 percent of that $190 billion is dedicated exclusively to equipment optimized for counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian operations or other so-called low-end capabilities.

“In these last two budget cycles,” Gates continued, “I have directed a needed and noticeable shift – but hardly a dramatic one, especially in light of the significant naval overmatch.”

Resource discussions always foster debates about gaps in military capabilities, Gates said, and the solution usually offered is “either more of what we already have or modernized versions of pre-existing capabilities.”

“This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways,” he continued. “The more relevant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.”

Gates said the sea services must remember that as the wars draw down, money will be required to reset the Army and Marine Corps – the services that have borne the brunt of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“And there will continue to be long-term – and inviolable – costs associated with taking care of our troops and their families,” he said. “In other words, I do not foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 [billion] to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.”


(EDITOR’S NOTE: In a single speech, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has managed to question, in clearer terms than ever before by a senior government official, two of the most long-lived tenets of US naval power: the absolute need for a dozen carrier air groups and the continuing requirement for a huge Marine Corps amphibious capability.
His mention of “naval overmatch” and of enormous shipbuilding costs sound like a warning for the Navy and Marine Corps to prepare for large, across-the-board cuts in manpower, size and funding.)

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... rkill.html

Gates suggests big changes coming for Navy

By ANNE FLAHERTY (AP) – 17 hours ago

WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday called into question the Navy's heavy and expensive arsenal of ships and subs.

In a speech before naval officers and contractors, Gates did not say he was planning to cut any programs or its budget.

But he did say the military must rethink whether it can afford such a massive naval fleet at a time when the Army and Marine Corps need more money to take care of troops and their families.

"Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?" Gates asked.

He noted that the Navy's most expensive resources aren't on the front lines when it comes to countering many modern threats, such as piracy.

"As we learned last year, you don't necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s" and rocket-propelled grenades, Gates said.

John Pike, director of the GlobalSecurity.org defense website based in Alexandria, Va., said this is the first time, as far as he knows, that Gates has addressed the cost of maintaining the roughly 300-ship Navy.

Pike said that Gates, by raising the issue of the size and composition of the fleet with the Navy league, had entered "the Lion's den" — a reference to the pushback he's likely to get from Congress. Many lawmakers protect the Navy shipbuilding industry because it means jobs in their districts.

Gates said the military still has a way to go to develop capabilities useful in places such as Afghanistan, where small insurgent groups are the primary threat, and Haiti, where the military is aiding humanitarian workers.

This year, the Defense Department requested nearly $190 billion to buy and develop weapons, but only 10 percent of that is dedicated toward counterinsurgency, humanitarian and similar missions.

"This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways," he said.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/art ... QD9FFIDMG3

[P44]

End of missile program may force LCS overhaul



By Philip Ewing - Staff writer
Posted : Monday May 3, 2010 16:12:00 EDT

An Army plan to cancel an over-budget, poorly performing missile would cost the Navy’s littoral combat ship one of its main weapons, leaving the surface fleet scrambling for something to take its place.

Top Army acquisition officials want to cancel the Non-Line-Of-Sight missile, a small, short-range surface-to-surface weapon that was planned for use by soldiers on land and the LCS at sea. The missiles are too expensive and missed several targets in early tests, so the Army wants to cut its losses and has asked the Pentagon to kill the program.

Where does that leave the Navy?

Fleet planners counted on NLOS to help LCS crews fight off the swarms of small-boat attacks that planners fear are the threats of tomorrow, especially in the Persian Gulf. Both LCS designs included enclosures specifically for NLOS launchers, and officials with Naval Sea Systems Command counted on the weapon being finished in time for LCS to become operational.

Now that it hasn’t — and may disappear altogether — it isn’t clear what happens next.

http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/ ... s_050310w/

[P44]

SECNAV Announces Five New Principles for Navy Acquisitions


(Source: U.S Navy; issued May 10, 2010)



NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. --- Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced five governing principles for Navy and Marine Corps acquisitions at the Navy League's annual Sea, Air, Space symposium May 5.

Designed to address the affordability of procurement programs, these principles are also intended to empower program managers to seek cost-savings, establish baseline performance parameters for Navy and Marine Corps programs, and support development of the acquisition workforce.

Similar to the Navy and Marine Corps' five energy goals outlined in October, Mabus outlined the acquisition principles the Navy plans to execute:
-- clearly identify the requirements;
-- raise the bar on performance;
-- rebuild the acquisition workforce;
-- support the industrial base; and
-- "make every dollar count."

Mabus did, however, draw a clear distinction between the five energy goals and the acquisition principles, stating "These are not goals, these are imperatives, these are “have-tos”. In order to build the fleet that we need – the Navy, the Marine Corps and our industry partners – we have to do all these things."

Discussing the first principle, Mabus said the Navy would put all programs through a formal Gate Review Process. This process will allow acquisition teams to properly analyze the requirements before granting a contract. "We're going to be doing this analysis on everything," the Secretary said, including the future SSBN, the Ohio-class replacement submarine and other initiatives.

Turning to the second principle, Mabus vowed to raise the bar on performance by holding both industry and the Navy - Marine Corps acquisition team more accountable for what they do. "Quality has to improve, man hours have to come down, and budgets and milestones have to be met. That's the bar," he said.

In line with the second principle, Mabus also announced a new aviation and shipbuilding change-order policy that requires leadership review "to ensure that both unit cost and total ownership costs are considered before a change-order is approved." He said the Navy would redefine acquisition standards to allow for more industry collaboration.

Citing the third principle and current education programs in place, Mabus said, "the Navy and Marine Corps are creating wonderful opportunities for the future of America [that] will bring some very lasting benefits to our country." The secretary challenged his acquisition team to enhance these efforts with a plan "to double the Department of Navy's science, technology and engineering outreach" by 2015.

Mabus addressed the fourth principle by announcing establishment of an Industrial Base Council that will begin meeting later this year. The Council is intended to bring together representatives from major shipbuilding and aircraft firms and will be "an opportunity for [the Navy and Marine Corps] to be more informed about industry concerns," he said.

Mabus also encouraged top performing companies to improve performance so that they will qualify to join a Preferred Provider Program, expected to be released for comment in the Federal Register later this month. Through this program, the Navy would reward contractors with favorable contract terms, conditions and payment schedules "in return for consistent and exemplary contract performance." Mabus mentioned that energy efficient products and manufacturing capabilities would be part of entry criteria.

Mabus also said the Navy will turn to fixed-price contracts to "make every dollar count." Cost-plus contracts will only be used for high risk, first-of-class ships and other high-risk systems.

Mabus closed by saying "The Navy and the Marine Corps are the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known. There has never been a force like the fleet we put to sea and the Marines that ride with that fleet and fight ashore. Building an effective partnership between industry and the Navy will reduce costs and will lead us to the fleet that we need. We owe that to America and we owe that to the generations that will follow us."

-ends-

[Marino]

Naval Operations Concept 2010
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf

[P44]

Study says Aegis radar systems on the decline

By Philip Ewing - Staff writer
Posted : Wednesday Jul 7, 2010 14:18:58 EDT


The Balisle report includes a sample of eight cruisers, whose scores on Aegis readiness form a distinct downward trend. The cruiser Monterey, shown here, was one of four that got grades that would have earned ratings of "degraded" or "unsat." The other three were Chancellorsville, San Jacinto and Normandy.

The advanced radar systems aboard cruisers and destroyers are in their worst shape ever, according to an independent probe into Navy readiness, raising questions about the surface fleet’s ability to take on its high-profile new mission next year defending Europe from ballistic missiles.

Poor training, impenetrable bureaucracy and cultural resignation have caused a spike in the number of technical problems and a dip in the operational performance of the Aegis system, considered the crown jewel of the U.S. surface force, according to members of a “fleet review panel” tasked with assessing the surface fleet. And if that’s the situation with Aegis — which includes warships’ iconic, hexagonal SPY-1 radar arrays — the panel wondered what that could mean for other, lower-profile equipment.

“The SPY radar has historically been the best supported system in the surface Navy, and coincidentally supports one of the most critical Navy missions today: ballistic-missile defense. Yet SPY manpower, parts, training and performance are in decline.” If that’s the case, the report said, “it can be assumed that less important systems could well be in worse material condition.”

The panel was convened last September by Adm. John Harvey, head of Fleet Forces Command. The seven-member panel, which was chaired by retired Vice Adm. Phillip Balisle and included two serving admirals, produced a comprehensive indictment of Navy decision-making since the late 1990s: Admirals’ preoccupation with saving money, which prompted them to cut crews and “streamline” training and maintenance, led to a force that can’t keep ships in fighting shape.

The panel’s report was obtained by Navy Times. Navy officials in the Pentagon deferred questions about Aegis problems to Naval Sea Systems Command, which had not responded as of late last week.
The mighty Aegis has fallen

Although sailors and other observers have said before that cuts in crew sizes hurt readiness, Balisle’s report is the first to detail so many problems with Aegis, widely considered the world’s finest seagoing radar and combat system. It is so powerful and adaptable, in fact, the Obama administration is banking on it to become a permanent BMD shield for Europe next year, taking the place of ground-based sensors and weapons as U.S. warships make standing patrols in the Mediterranean.

But the report said Aegis, like the rest of the fleet, has become a victim of personnel cuts and the Navy’s labyrinthine internal organization. Casualty reports are up 41 percent from fiscal 2004, and those requiring technical assistance are up 45 percent. Over the same period, SPY radar performance, as observed by the Board of Inspection and Survey, has steadily worsened for cruisers and destroyers.

The report includes a sample of eight cruisers visited in the past several months by InSurv, whose scores on Aegis readiness form a distinct downward trend. The best performers were Cape St. George and Lake Erie, each of which got the maximum score of 1.0, which earns a rating of “satisfactory”; Cowpens and Chosin, with scores between 0.8 and 1.0, also earned “sat.” The worst were Monterey, Chancellorsville, San Jacinto and Normandy, all of which got grades that would have earned them ratings of “degraded” or “unsat.”

What’s causing it? The panel cited many reasons:

• There aren’t enough qualified people in the right jobs: 39 of 58 destroyers have a second class fire controlman in a first class SPY maintenance billet. Seven of 22 cruisers don’t even have enough sailors to meet the minimum number of authorized billets.

• Sailors aren’t fully trained on maintaining the radars.

• It’s too much work navigating the Navy bureaucracy to order replacement parts, and, as such, crews have grown to accept “degradation,” Balisle’s panel found. For example, ships are not ordering replacement voltage regulators, the report said, which SPY radars need to help manage their prodigious power consumption. Crews aren’t ordering them because technicians can’t get the money to buy spares, so commanders are knowingly taking a risk in operating their systems without replacements.

“The technicians can’t get the money to buy spare parts,” the report said. “They haven’t been trained to the requirement. They can’t go to their supervisor because, in the case of the DDGs, they likely are the supervisor. They can’t repair the radar through no fault of their own, but over time, the nonresponsiveness of the Navy system, the acceptance of the SPY degradation by the Navy system and their seniors, officers and chiefs alike, will breed [if not already] a culture that tolerates poor system performance.

“The fact that requests for technical assistance are up Navy-wide suggests there is a diminished self-sufficiency in the surface force. Sailors are losing their sense of ownership of their equipment and are more apt to want others to fix it.”

Naval expert A.D. Baker III, a retired Office of Naval Intelligence analyst and longtime editor of “Combat Fleets of the World,” called the Balisle findings “utterly damning.”

“The Aegis readiness shortfall is just one of a vast number of problems related to pushing people too far and not giving them the training or funding resources to carry out their duties properly,” Baker said. He said the report’s findings showed the Defense Department’s priorities for European BMD had been misplaced.

“This will significantly affect our putative BMD capability. The [Pentagon’s] money is going to missile development and procurement, not to maintenance of the detection and tracking system — without which the best missiles in the world won’t be of much use.”

Balisle’s report has few specific recommendations for improving the health of Aegis, although it would likely benefit from the review panel’s broader suggestions for adding more sailors to sea and shore assignments. The panel does call for Big Navy to create a “SPY Readiness Program” and to “restore all aspects of SPY performance as a matter of priority, to include manning, training, equipping and maintenance.”

The Balisle commission does warn of the dangers of an “it’s not my problem” ethos in the surface force, which it said will make the Navy’s troubles, from Aegis to corrosion, all the more difficult to fix:

“From the most senior officers to the most junior petty officer, the culture reveals itself in personal attitudes ranging from resignation to frustration to toleration. The downward spiral of the culture is seen throughout the ship, in the longstanding acceptance of poor housekeeping, preservation and corrosion control. Over time, the ignored standard now becomes the norm. Sailors watching their commanding officer, department head, division officer and chief petty officer step over running rust, peeling non-skid or severe structure damage long enough associate this activity as the standard.”

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/07/n ... s_070510w/

[Grifon]

vídeo de um F18 sendo lançado por uma catapulta eletromagnética ( EMALS = Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System )