Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qui Nov 15, 2018 7:54 am
Página 12 de 13
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sex Nov 16, 2018 6:34 am
Para a história, dias antes de afundar, junto com a Corte Real
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sáb Nov 24, 2018 2:25 pm
KNM Helge Ingstad mayday call with english subtitles
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sáb Dez 01, 2018 1:19 pm
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sáb Dez 01, 2018 1:58 pm
É um cemitério de navios?
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sáb Dez 01, 2018 5:44 pm
Os caras arranjaram briga com os x-man?P44 escreveu: ↑Sáb Dez 01, 2018 1:19 pm Pelos vistos já é tradição
https://m.facebook.com/navywarshipswar/ ... =bookmarks
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Seg Dez 03, 2018 5:15 pm
Sinking Edit
On 24 January 1994, Oslo ran aground near the lighthouse on Marstein Island. The frigate had suffered a boiler feed pump failure and drifted in heavy seas before running aground. On 25 January, the tugboat Lars began to tow the frigate. However, as the frigate's situation deteriorated and it was believed that Oslo would not make port, Lars released the tow and the frigate sank.[3]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/HNoMS_O ... 0)#Sinking
On 24 January 1994, Oslo ran aground near the lighthouse on Marstein Island. The frigate had suffered a boiler feed pump failure and drifted in heavy seas before running aground. On 25 January, the tugboat Lars began to tow the frigate. However, as the frigate's situation deteriorated and it was believed that Oslo would not make port, Lars released the tow and the frigate sank.[3]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/HNoMS_O ... 0)#Sinking
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Ter Dez 04, 2018 7:34 pm
https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2018/12/0 ... e-projeto/
Que foi uma tremenda barbeiragem da tripulação, isso não há a menor duvida. Agora, vendo as fotos e o infográfico, dá para ver que a maior parte do rasgo no casco foi acima da linha d'agua. Não sou engenheiro naval, mas a impressão que fica é que o navio não devia ter afundado. Que os noruegueses estão tentando passar a batata quente para o fabricante, não tenho duvidas. Mas só fazem isso porque há evidencias onde se apoiar. Ou seja, vai sobrar merda pra todo mundo.
Que foi uma tremenda barbeiragem da tripulação, isso não há a menor duvida. Agora, vendo as fotos e o infográfico, dá para ver que a maior parte do rasgo no casco foi acima da linha d'agua. Não sou engenheiro naval, mas a impressão que fica é que o navio não devia ter afundado. Que os noruegueses estão tentando passar a batata quente para o fabricante, não tenho duvidas. Mas só fazem isso porque há evidencias onde se apoiar. Ou seja, vai sobrar merda pra todo mundo.
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qua Dez 05, 2018 5:41 am
vplemes escreveu: ↑Ter Dez 04, 2018 7:34 pm https://www.naval.com.br/blog/2018/12/0 ... e-projeto/
Que foi uma tremenda barbeiragem da tripulação, isso não há a menor duvida. Agora, vendo as fotos e o infográfico, dá para ver que a maior parte do rasgo no casco foi acima da linha d'agua. Não sou engenheiro naval, mas a impressão que fica é que o navio não devia ter afundado. Que os noruegueses estão tentando passar a batata quente para o fabricante, não tenho duvidas. Mas só fazem isso porque há evidencias onde se apoiar. Ou seja, vai sobrar merda pra todo mundo.
Antes de sair este relatório observando o video que foi feito pouco depois do acidente, da para perceber que o navio não afundou rápido e pela pequena inclinação se todos os compartimentos estiverem devidamente selados o navio não deveria ter afundado.
Depois observando as fotos da para ver que tem varis saídas abertas dai em pensei que os marinheiros ficaram tão apavorados que abandonaram o navio com todos os compartimentos abertos, mas se eles lacaram tudo e mesmo assim entrou água em vários compartimentos então deve ter algum problema no projeto.
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qua Dez 05, 2018 8:08 am
Norwegian report blames shipbuilder for frigate sinking, watchstanders for collision
Photo: Norwegian Navy
Leaks in HNoMS Helge Ingstad’s watertight compartments could be responsible for the frigate’s sinking following a collision in the Hjeltefjorden fjord, a preliminary report from the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board (AIBN) suggests.
In addition to blaming the vessel’s lack of watertight integrity for the sinking, the report points to the two ships’ watchstanders as the main factors in the collision itself.
Released on November 29, 21 days after HNoMS Helge Ingstad collided with the tanker Sola TS in the Hjeltefjorden fjord near Bergen, the report points to flooding in the aft generator room, crew quarters, and the stores room.
While there was some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aftmost compartment, was also filling up with water, the report states that the crew definitely found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast.
From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads.
Based on the findings, AIBN has recommended Spanish shipbuilder Navantia, the vessel’s designer, to look into the issues identified during the investigation and to determine whether this was also an issue with other vessels.
Who is responsible for the collision between HNoMS Helge Ingstad and Sola TS?
Noting the fact that this was a preliminary report, AIBN did not explicitly identify who is responsible for the collision, adding that it was not caused by any single act or event, but can be explained by a series of interacting complex factors and circumstances.
What is certain is that the investigation board is treating the bridge crews aboard the frigate and the tanker and the Fedje Vessel Traffic Service Centre as the three main entities in this investigation.
Based on initial findings, AIBN said it was a clear night when HNoMS Helge Ingstad sailed southwards along Hjeltefjorden, and the lights from the Sture terminal must have been visible from afar. When the terminal first became visible from Helge Ingstad, Sola TS was alongside at the terminal.
While the deck of the tanker was well-lit ahead of its departure, the report says it would be difficult to separate the lights on the tanker from the lights at the terminal, which means that it is likely that the frigate crew thought the lights belonged to a stationary object.
After the watch change at around 03:40–03:45, this was the basis for the bridge crew’s understanding of the situation. Even though Sola TS left the quay at around that time, there continued to be little relative movement of the lights as the tanker turned from a southerly to a northerly course.
The tanker’s use of deck lights after departure also meant that the frigate crew were unable to spot the navigation lights on Sola TS. When ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ at approximately 04:00 stated that they could not turn to starboard, it was based on a continued perception of the lights as being stationary and that a turn to starboard would send them straight into the lit object. They also believed that they were communicating with one of the three northbound vessels that they were monitoring on the radar. It was not until just after this that the crew on HNoMS Helge Ingstad became aware that they were on collision course, at which time it was impossible to avoid a collision.
An operation to raise the frigate and transport it to the Haakonsvern base is currently underway after water ingress caused the frigate to slip almost completely below the water’s surface.
https://navaltoday.com/2018/11/30/norwe ... collision/
Photo: Norwegian Navy
Leaks in HNoMS Helge Ingstad’s watertight compartments could be responsible for the frigate’s sinking following a collision in the Hjeltefjorden fjord, a preliminary report from the Norwegian Accident Investigation Board (AIBN) suggests.
In addition to blaming the vessel’s lack of watertight integrity for the sinking, the report points to the two ships’ watchstanders as the main factors in the collision itself.
Released on November 29, 21 days after HNoMS Helge Ingstad collided with the tanker Sola TS in the Hjeltefjorden fjord near Bergen, the report points to flooding in the aft generator room, crew quarters, and the stores room.
While there was some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aftmost compartment, was also filling up with water, the report states that the crew definitely found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast.
From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads.
Based on the findings, AIBN has recommended Spanish shipbuilder Navantia, the vessel’s designer, to look into the issues identified during the investigation and to determine whether this was also an issue with other vessels.
Who is responsible for the collision between HNoMS Helge Ingstad and Sola TS?
Noting the fact that this was a preliminary report, AIBN did not explicitly identify who is responsible for the collision, adding that it was not caused by any single act or event, but can be explained by a series of interacting complex factors and circumstances.
What is certain is that the investigation board is treating the bridge crews aboard the frigate and the tanker and the Fedje Vessel Traffic Service Centre as the three main entities in this investigation.
Based on initial findings, AIBN said it was a clear night when HNoMS Helge Ingstad sailed southwards along Hjeltefjorden, and the lights from the Sture terminal must have been visible from afar. When the terminal first became visible from Helge Ingstad, Sola TS was alongside at the terminal.
While the deck of the tanker was well-lit ahead of its departure, the report says it would be difficult to separate the lights on the tanker from the lights at the terminal, which means that it is likely that the frigate crew thought the lights belonged to a stationary object.
After the watch change at around 03:40–03:45, this was the basis for the bridge crew’s understanding of the situation. Even though Sola TS left the quay at around that time, there continued to be little relative movement of the lights as the tanker turned from a southerly to a northerly course.
The tanker’s use of deck lights after departure also meant that the frigate crew were unable to spot the navigation lights on Sola TS. When ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ at approximately 04:00 stated that they could not turn to starboard, it was based on a continued perception of the lights as being stationary and that a turn to starboard would send them straight into the lit object. They also believed that they were communicating with one of the three northbound vessels that they were monitoring on the radar. It was not until just after this that the crew on HNoMS Helge Ingstad became aware that they were on collision course, at which time it was impossible to avoid a collision.
An operation to raise the frigate and transport it to the Haakonsvern base is currently underway after water ingress caused the frigate to slip almost completely below the water’s surface.
https://navaltoday.com/2018/11/30/norwe ... collision/
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qua Dez 05, 2018 8:48 am
https://www.defensa.com/otan-y-europa/f ... ia-noruega
Saú2.
Aparentemente, éste accidente, causado pola mala praxe dos pilotos noruegueses, tampouco foi adecuadamente tratado polas autoridades locais. Durante os anos da construcción das F-310 en Ferrol estiveron vivindo en Ferrol un grupo grande de enxeñeiros e militares noruegueses, que modificaron amplamente o deseño inicial das fragatas para acomodalo ás súas necesidades. Non había mamparo, equipo ou pintura que non se puxese nos buques sen a súa aprobación. É por tanto incrible pensar que Navantia teña responsabilidade no afundemento dunha unidade dun producto que leva producidos máis dunha ducia de buques para varios países do mundo.El hundimiento de la fragata “KMN Helge Ingstad” que sufrió el pasado 8 de noviembre una importante colisión con el petrolero Sola TS se debió a un cúmulo de incompetencias por parte tanto de los marinos noruegos como de los encargados de mantenerla a flote una vez se produjo el accidente.
El propio informe, un documento preliminar al que ha tenido acceso defensa.comse encarga de recordar en varias ocasiones que “la investigación aún está en una fase temprana y que las circunstancias están sujetas a nuevas investigaciones (…) El accidente fue complejo, involucrando a varias personas, tripulaciones de puentes, embarcaciones, un VTS (Vessel Traffic System) y la interacción entre ellos. Por lo tanto, la investigación es exigente en términos de tiempo y recursos. La AIBN subraya que este es un informe preliminar y que, por lo tanto, puede contener algunos errores e imprecisiones. Debido a consideraciones relacionadas con el deber de confidencialidad, el material clasificado y el proceso de investigación, la AIBN no publica toda su información en este momento.”
La fragata noruega navegaba con el Sistema de Identificación Automática apagado, lo hacía a una gran velocidad, entre 18 y 20 nudos, en un fiordo, incumpliendo la norma de navegación internacional que dice que en caso de que dos buques se enfrenten, cada uno debe variar el rumbo a estribor, con preferencia el navío de menor maniobrabilidad. De las últimas entrevistas filtradas a medios noruegos se llega a desprender que la tripulación en el puente de la fragata interpretó incluso las luces de navegación del petrolero como si fueran fijas de una instalación en la costa.
Ante esta situación, según expertos consultados por defensa.com, el impacto debió hacer saltar de sus asientos los ejes de la transmisión, lugar por donde se rompió la estanqueidad longitudinal del buque. La rotura del casco a lo largo de nada menos que 45 metros de los 132 metros fue el remate que hizo perder la estabilidad al buque, siendo insuficiente la capacidad de achique cuando quedó inundada parte de la sala de máquinas.
Incluso es posible ver en algunos de los vídeos difundidos como la fragata es empujada contra la costa por remolcadores noruegos, con algunas puertas abiertas, lo que impide la estanqueidad.
El cúmulo de despropósitos siguió puesto que se emplearon cables de acero en lugar de cadenas para intentar mantener el buque sujeto a la costa, algo que no se consiguió cuando algunos de estos se soltaron, comprobándose además que algunas uniones estaban incorrectamente elaboradas
Cabe preguntarse si de existir el supuesto fallo de diseño, por qué este no fue detectado por las autoridades noruegas durante la construcción, la revisión crítica del diseño o durante su operación. Hay que recordar que tanto la Armada española como la Royal Australian Navy (RAN) operan fragatas de moderno diseño concebidas y construidas en parte por Navantia, y que ninguno de estos usuarios ha encontrado similares fallos.
Saú2.
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qua Dez 05, 2018 8:50 am
Era para arejar. Assim não ficou o interior a cheirar a bafío e a criar bolores...
https://www.ejercitos.org/2018/12/02/so ... tad-f-313/
Já agora, uma leitura interessante acompanhado dos vídeos.
Cumprimentos
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qui Dez 20, 2018 1:14 pm
https://www.wearethemighty.com/news/nor ... lxIPUKP_Z8
The $400 million, 442-foot-long warship was returning from NATO's massive, multinational Trident Juncture military exercise when it collided with the 820-foot-long tanker.
A Norwegian rescue official said at the time of the collision that the frigate was "taking in more water than they can pump out. There is no control over the leak and the stern is heavily in the sea."
According to a preliminary report released at the end of November 2018, control of the frigate's rudder and propulsion systems was lost, which caused the ship to drift toward the shore, where it ran aground about 10 minutes after the collision.
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Qua Fev 27, 2019 9:49 am
acaban de reflotarla, el impacto contra el petrolero debio ser brutal
Re: Marinha da Noruega
Enviado: Sex Mar 01, 2019 4:23 am