Fórum Defesa Brasil

Quiron escreveu:Como o Brasil pode responder a esses submarinos? No curto e médio prazo ficaremos em desvantagem?

Dieneces escreveu:Mas e a tripulação russa...é só para tempos de paz ? Numa iminência de crise ou conflito , eles voltam pro porto ou se rendem incondicionalmente?

dron_pizdec escreveu:

Quiron escreveu:Como o Brasil pode responder a esses submarinos? No curto e médio prazo ficaremos em desvantagem?

Como o Brasil pode responder? E muito simples, voces precisam construir muitas acampamentos para os refugiados da republica bovina (quando os precos de petroleo irao baixo), e apos o Itamaraty precisa fazer um rascunho do acordo bilateral sobre o repatriacao dos refugiados da Venezuela com o novo governo... Como eu disse, e bastante simples


A tripulacao nao sera Russa, talvez so os instructores no inicio. E, se ha os Russos numa iminencia de crise ou conflito, so que voces precisam fazer e pagar um pouco mais que o Chavez...

Hugo Chávez quer submarinos russos para Marinha venezuelana
30 de Junho de 2007 @ 08:56 - Rutênio

Como já foi noticiado aqui no BlogNAVAL, o Governo do presidente da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, que se encontra em visita oficial à Rússia, negocia a compra de cinco modernos submarinos a diesel, informou hoje a empresa russa que detém o monopólio de exportação de armas, Rosoboronexport.
A aquisição de submarinos russos é uma “idéia” que “está em estudo” porque a Venezuela tem “um mar de mais de 500 mil quilômetros quadrados” que é preciso “guardar”, afirmou o governante venezuelano na sexta-feira passada.
Segundo funcionários venezuelanos, os submarinos convencionais deverão proteger as águas territoriais do país, que ocupam uma área maior que o seu território continental. Um dos objetivos é defender os campos marítimos de petróleo de um eventual bloqueio americano.
Fontes da indústria naval russa anunciaram que a Venezuela tinha apresentado à Rússia “um pedido para construir nove submarinos convencionais, sendo cinco do projeto 636 e quatro do novo projeto 677E Amur”.“Inicialmente, o interesse era por adquirir só os Amur. Mas nós convencemos os venezuelanos a comprar também os 636″, confirmou ao jornal um funcionário da Rosoboronexport.
Ele explicou que os novíssimos submarinos 677 nem sequer entraram em serviço na Marinha russa. Por isso, opinou que durante a visita de Chávez só seria estudado o contrato sobre os cinco navios 636, que a Rússia já vendeu à China e que agora vai fornecer à Argélia.
Nos últimos anos a Venezuela comprou da Rússia US$ 4 bilhões em armamentos. As compras incluem 24 caças Su-30MK, 50 helicópteros de combate e de transporte, sistemas de defesa aérea Tor-M1 e 100 mil fuzis automáticos Kalashnikov.
Além disso, a indústria naval russa oferece lanchas-patrulha Mirazh, lanchas de desembarque Murena-E, helicópteros Kamov e sistemas litorâneos de mísseis capazes de alcançar alvos a até 130 quilômetros.

Venezuela tem direito de se armar, diz comandante da Marinha

Denize Bacoccina

De Brasília

“A Venezuela está fazendo um programa de reaparelhamento. Como nós também aqui no Brasil estamos tentando fazer”, afirmou o almirante em entrevista a correspondentes estrangeiros.
“Eu acho que todos os países têm o direito de ter as Forças Armadas perfeitamente delineadas e equipadas de acordo com a sua visão estratégica, com sua visão de política de defesa”, disse ele.
O comandante disse que não vê a atuação da Venezuela como um risco para o Brasil. “Não me parece que seja um risco. A Venezuela mantém relações diplomáticas e cordiais com o Brasil. As Marinhas mantêm relações muito boas”, afirmou.
Mas ele admite que, se realmente comprar os novos equipamentos, o país do presidente Hugo Chávez ficará à frente de todos os países da América do Sul, papel hoje do Brasil.
Segundo o almirante, o submarino não é uma arma de ataque, mas de dissuasão de ataques inimigos. “É uma arma que indica: eu aqui tenho como me defender.”
O Brasil tem uma frota de cinco submarinos, mas o comandante da Marinha disse que eles precisam de renovação e de reforços.
“Se a compra deles for confirmada e nós não fizermos o mesmo, ficaremos com equipamentos mais atrasados”, afirmou.
Reaparelhamento
O Programa de Reaparelhamento da Marinha, elaborado em 2005, ainda depende da aprovação do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
O plano prevê investimentos de R$ 5,7 bilhões na primeira fase, até 2012, dos quais pouco mais de R$ 2 bilhões seriam destinados à construção de um novo submarino e à modernização dos cinco que o país já possui.
“Esta é a prioridade principal da Marinha”, afirmou o almirante. Os submarinos atualmente em operação têm idade média de 10 anos.
O programa prevê ainda a produção de novos navios patrulha oceânicos e fluviais, navios escolta e navios anfíbios.
Mas o principal projeto da Marinha é o submarino nuclear, com reator com tecnologia brasileira. O projeto ainda depende da aprovação do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, e da liberação de US$ 1 bilhão para sua conclusão.
“Estamos aptos a construir. Se vamos construir é uma decisão do governo”, afirmou.
Com o submarino nuclear o Brasil retomaria a liderança nos mares da região, mesmo se a Venezuela tiver uma frota maior.
“Os submarinos convencionais têm um poder de dissuasão enorme, mas eles têm uma limitação, andam relativamente devagar, de tempos em tempos têm que vir à superficie para carregar as baterias. O submarino nuclear tem total liberdade de navegar pelas águas brasileiras", disse o comandante. "O submarino nuclear seria um enorme fator de dissuasão favorável à Marinha e favorável ao país.”

Venezuela's Paper Army
Oct 06, 2004

Summary

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has announced the purchase of Russian attack helicopters at a cost of $40 million to reinforce army units deployed along his country's border with Colombia. However, the helicopters -- if they arrive -- will be too little, too late to make a difference. Venezuela's armed forces are a hollow shell, so weakened by years of defense spending cuts that soldiers patrolling the border region frequently lack uniforms, boots, helmets, body armor and ammunition for their assault rifles.

Analysis

Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel is in Moscow negotiating the purchase of Russian attack helicopters to reinforce Venezuelan army units deployed along the border with Colombia. President Hugo Chavez announced the $40 million deal after five Venezuelan army soldiers and a woman engineer with state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) were killed in a Sept. 17 ambush by rebels with the 10th Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

The ambush occurred in the Venezuelan border state of Apure in a sector called Mata de Cana between the towns of La Charca and La Victoria, less than 15 miles from the border with Colombia. Colombian rebel groups, cross-border drug traffickers and other smuggling organizations have long overrun the area.

Although the Chavez government immediately imposed an information blackout on the incident, Venezuelan military sources say it appears the FARC killed the soldiers by mistake. The soldiers were traveling in a curiara, or indigenous canoe, and were so poorly dressed that from a distance of 50 to 100 yards they likely appeared to be civilians, possibly criminal smugglers. From the FARC's perspective, this would make them competitors for control of criminal enterprises along the border, and therefore legitimate targets.

If the FARC unit had identified the soldiers as members of Venezuela's military, it is likely the rebels never would have fired at the canoe. The FARC has a tacit non-aggression pact with the Chavez government, and the rebels would not have violated that pact consciously.

Chavez has maintained for several years that Venezuela's side of the border is heavily defended by some 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers reinforced with armor, air and ground transport and electronic surveillance systems designed to locate and identify potential enemies, including Colombian rebels. This claim is inaccurate. The truth is, operational readiness levels within the Venezuelan army, air force and navy are so critically low that if war with Colombia were to break out today the Colombian army could easily capture and hold large swathes of Venezuelan territory, such as the state of Zulia, which accounts for close to 40 percent of Venezuela's total crude oil production.

Venezuela's armed forces (FAN) are among the poorest, least prepared military institutions in Latin America, despite the country's substantial oil revenues. The FAN is tactically and operationally incapable of keeping Colombian rebel groups outside Venezuelan territory. On paper, the army has close to 70,000 soldiers, but actual troop strength is closer to 40,000.

The army's troubles did not begin when Chavez assumed the presidency in early 1999. For example, in 1990 a 150-man company was commanded by one captain, two lieutenants, three sub-lieutenants and 10 sergeants. However, by the time Chavez became president the same 150-man company was commanded by one captain, one sub-lieutenant and two sergeants. Moreover, in 1999 the average frontier battalion had 740 soldiers on paper, but actual troop strength was only 320 men commanded by one lieutenant colonel, 10 officers and 10 sergeants. These ratios have grown much worse since Chavez assumed the presidency and slashed defense spending by more than 40 percent in order to weaken the FAN and dilute its capacity to launch a successful coup.

According to a classified study done in mid-2001 by the army's military intelligence division and obtained recently by Stratfor, the army was a hollow shell three years ago. International defense standards for developing countries state that operational readiness levels for 11 key measures of military offense and defense capabilities should never drop below 70 percent. In Venezuela's case, however, the army's capabilities in nine of 11 key measures of operational readiness levels were far below that 70 percent floor in 2001. The situation today is far more critical, sources say.

For example, in terms of troop strength the Venezuelan army's operational readiness levels in 2001 were only 56.69 percent. In terms of food supplies, its readiness levels were only 40.25 percent, and weapons capabilities were only 23.22 percent. Several lower-ranking officers who have commanded army forces on the border during the past three years say their soldiers lacked uniforms, boots, helmets and body armor. They also say their troops were sent on combat patrols without sufficient ammunition to engage hostile forces such as the FARC, drug traffickers, paramilitary groups and other border bandits. The officers add that border unit commanders frequently had to rent privately owned commercial vehicles from local residents to transport patrol troops into high-risk border areas.

The classified study done in 2001 also rated the army's communications capabilities at only 20.90 percent, combat medevac capabilities at 44.48 percent, ground transport capabilities at 39.36 percent and armored vehicle capabilities (including tanks) at only 48.92 percent.

On paper, Venezuela's armored offensive capabilities are significantly more substantial than Colombia's. For example, Venezuela's army as of May 2003 had an armored component that included 81 AMX-30 main battle tanks, 36 AMX-13 light tanks, 80 British-made Scorpion-90 light tanks, 75 M18 Hellcat tank destroyers and nearly 300 U.S.-, French- and Brazilian-made personnel carriers. The Venezuelan army also was equipped with more than 100 105-mm and 155-mm self-propelled and towed artillery howitzers, 175 106-mm recoilless rifles and more than 220 Brandt 120 mm and 81 mm mortars.

The classified army readiness study obtained by Stratfor states that as of mid-2001, the army's armored operational readiness levels were only 48.92 percent overall. Of 528 armored vehicles, including main battle tanks such as the AMX-30 and light tanks such as the Dragoon 300 and the Scorpion, 336 were operational and 189 were inoperative. Individual weapons systems readiness levels on paper looked good for systems such as the AMX-30 battle tank (71.76 percent) and the Dragoon 300 and Scorpion tanks (97.03 percent and 97.62 percent, respectively). However, these averages do not tell the full story.

Army sources say retrofitting work done in recent years on the AMX-30 battle tanks by Metalurgica Van Dam, a Venezuelan metallurgical firm with no prior experience in modifying tanks, effectively destroyed the combat capabilities of these systems. A battle tank's turret must rotate 360-degrees, but Van Dam's "retrofitting" work made it impossible for the tank turrets to rotate more than 80 degrees in either direction.

This means in combat the tanks can be flanked and destroyed easily from the sides and rear by infantry units armed with light anti-tank rockets. Van Dam also cut through the armor of the AMX-30 tanks in such a way that the tanks were split completely in two. As a result, the armor of these tanks can now be penetrated by ammunition as light as a .30-caliber machine gun bullet, according to military sources. This means an infantry soldier armed with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) can penetrate the turrets of these tanks and kill the crews inside with as much ease as a hot knife slicing through butter if the rocket impacts directly on the welding seam.

In addition, the Dragoon 300 and Scorpion light tanks might show adequate operational readiness levels on paper, but they lack munitions. These tanks can be deployed, as some were deployed in April 2002 to protect Chavez in Miraflores from the 900,000 unarmed protesters who marched to the presidential palace demanding his resignation. However, in an armed engagement these tanks would quickly run out of ammunition, which in effect would make them useless.

The only two measures where the army exceeded the 70 percent floor were air transport (73.91 percent) and electronic warfare (80.05 percent). However, more than half of the army's helicopters are not equipped with weapons systems capable of providing close air-ground support. In effect, the army's air transport command is used mainly to ferry generals around the country on official and personal missions.

Moreover, the army's electronic warfare systems have been withdrawn from border regions and redeployed mainly to Caracas and central Venezuela, where they are used to conduct electronic surveillance of all communications inside Fort Tiuna, Palo Negro and other bases. Instead of intercepting Colombian communications, the Chavez government is using its electronic surveillance systems to spy on Venezuelan army units in a permanent effort to locate and identify officers that could be conspiring against him.




Copyright 2007 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

cicloneprojekt escreveu:Senhores , confesso que estou bastante aliviado qto. ao assunto arma submarina bovina. A MB chegará a termo brevemente para "equacionar" os nove submarinos bovinos.

A Solução será tão trivial, que vai parecer desafio mesmo. Fico até curioso para saber a reação do Bovino Chavez qdo. souber da história(se é que já não sabe)

Não é bom ter a MB como adversária(...), principalmente qdo. a Marinha de Tamandaré consegue fazer os políticos brasileiros(e o ministério do Planejamento) não atrapalharem (...)

Aguardem e endenderão.

Em breve em um Arsenal de marinha perto de Você.

sds

Walter

cicloneprojekt escreveu:Senhores , confesso que estou bastante aliviado qto. ao assunto arma submarina bovina. A MB chegará a termo brevemente para "equacionar" os nove submarinos bovinos.

A Solução será tão trivial, que vai parecer desafio mesmo. Fico até curioso para saber a reação do Bovino Chavez qdo. souber da história(se é que já não sabe)

Não é bom ter a MB como adversária(...), principalmente qdo. a Marinha de Tamandaré consegue fazer os políticos brasileiros(e o ministério do Planejamento) não atrapalharem (...)

Aguardem e endenderão.

Em breve em um Arsenal de marinha perto de Você.

sds

Walter