Página 2 de 2
Enviado: Dom Mar 05, 2006 10:57 pm
por Jet Crash®
jacquessantiago escreveu:O grande problema da Russia sao os limitados recursos disponiveis comparado com a epoca da exitinta URSS e com os EUA.
Tem muitos "if" no texto. "Se" os americanos derem sorte de encontrar todos os subs nos portos, se o sistema da alerta russo falhar.
O único "se" que pode ser dado como certeza e "se" os EUA atacarem vão levar um ferro de um tamanho no meio da bunda e vai ter todo seu território deixado inabitável pelos próximos mil anos.
A Rússia afunda mas leva os EUA junto com ela.
Enviado: Seg Mar 06, 2006 1:45 pm
por Penguin
Obvio que numa guerra nuclear entre EUA e Russia o mundo acabaria.
Este documento procura transmitir que a diferença entre a capacidade nuclear dos EUA e da Russia tem se ampliado significativamente desde o fim da URSS. Isso eh resultado da diferença brutal em investimentos em defesa entre ambos. E que essa diferença leva aos formuladores de politicas e estrategistas a considerar abordagens até então inviaveis.
Só um detalhe...isso é o que o texto diz. Não é o que eu penso!
A entidade que publicou esse texto é um dos principais "think-tanks" dos EUA na area internacional (economia internacional, relações internacionais, etc).
Enviado: Seg Mar 06, 2006 5:43 pm
por Carlos Mathias
A Rússia está onde sempre esteve e os que tentaram, tomaram bem fundo no fiofó. Quem tiver dois culhões que tente, eles ainda estão no mesmo lugar.
Enviado: Seg Mar 06, 2006 10:08 pm
por Penguin
Carlos Mathias escreveu:A Rússia está onde sempre esteve e os que tentaram, tomaram bem fundo no fiofó. Quem tiver dois culhões que tente, eles ainda estão no mesmo lugar.
O Afeganistao que o diga
Enviado: Ter Mar 07, 2006 8:09 am
por Einsamkeit
jacquessantiago escreveu:Carlos Mathias escreveu:A Rússia está onde sempre esteve e os que tentaram, tomaram bem fundo no fiofó. Quem tiver dois culhões que tente, eles ainda estão no mesmo lugar.
O Afeganistao que o diga
Engraçado os afegaos estavam perdendo, mas misteriosamente começaram a surgir misseis e dinheiro e armamento? da onde estariam vindo?
Enviado: Ter Mar 07, 2006 11:52 am
por Carlos Mathias
É como no Iraque de hoje, de onde surgiram os Kornet e RPG de última geração???
Enviado: Sex Mar 10, 2006 1:00 am
por Guillermo Muñoz
Suministrados por Irán!!!
Este país tiene mucho interés en que los gringos salgan derrotados de Irak.
Ahora bien, ¿quién se los suministra a Irán? ¡¡Adivinen!!
Enviado: Sáb Abr 01, 2006 10:19 am
por oraculobq
Russia.
Enviado: Sáb Jul 29, 2006 6:22 pm
por Einsamkeit
SS-27
Country: Russian Federation
Alternate Name: Topol-M, RS-12M1/M2
Class: ICBM
Basing: Silo based, road mobile
Payload: Single warhead
Warhead: Nuclear 550 kT
Length: 21.90 m
Diameter: 1.90 m
Launch Weight: 47,200 kg
Propulsion: 3-stage solid
Range: 10,500 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1997
Details
Russian Designation: RS-12M1/-12M2 Topol-M
The Russian SS-27, or Topol-M, is an intercontinental-range, ground-based, solid propellant ballistic missile. It represents the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology, incorporating modern fuel and warhead designs, as well as being capable of being launched from both missile silos and Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicles. Current Russian accounts stress that the SS-27 is invulnerable to any modern anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses. Yuriy Solomonov, director of the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology and designer-general of the Topol family of missiles, has stated that the SS-27 will be the foundation of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal by 2015.
The SS-27 is currently portrayed by Russian accounts as being immune to any ABM defense the United States can put into being. The missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it approaches its target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to decrease the chances of a successful targeting. The missile is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead within ten kilometers. This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of nuclear ground-based and orbital interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and maneuverability. While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, it remains protected. Hidden safely within missile silos and mobile launchers, a successful boost-phase interceptor would have to be fired from near or within Russian borders or from space. And the SS-27 is also designed to survive a strike from any laser technology available, rendering any current space-based laser useless. The missile highlights the need for considerably more research into missile defenses, as the United States is currently defenseless while Russia is protected by a functional defense system.
The SS-27 can strike any target within the continental United States. The deployment from hardened silos and hidden TEL vehicles makes it nearly impossible to successfully prevent launch and current ABM technology is insufficient to prevent its successful impact. As a solid propellant design, it can be maintained on alert for prolonged periods of time and can launch within minutes of being given the order. Its confirmed single 550 kT warhead is sufficient for the depopulation of cities, which combined with its survivability, makes it an ideal retaliatory weapon. The SS-27 enables Russia to guarantee a successful nuclear response.
The SS-27 also has considerable utility as a first strike weapon. A successful first strike hinges upon the destruction of the enemy nuclear force, and the SS-27 should be capable of that task. Though its reported accuracy is insufficient for this, current guidance technology could easily be used to develop this capacity. The accuracy of 350 m CEP reported is strangely low given previous US and Russian missile designs with considerably higher accuracy. With a higher accuracy, the single warhead load would be easily sufficient to destroy a missile silo, but the placement of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) would allow for the destruction of entire missile groups. The SS-27 design is easily compatible for MIRV warheads, though it must sacrifice its ability to penetrate ABM defense systems. Solomonov has stated openly that the TEL launched SS-27 will carry four to six warheads along with decoys, which implies the same capability for the silo-launched version.
The SS-27 has a range of 10,500 km (6,524 miles) and is reported to typically be equipped with a 550 kT yield nuclear warhead. Unconfirmed reports suggest a yield of 1 MT has been achieved, as well as the placement of up to six MIRV warheads. These enhancements likely come at the cost of reducing the shielding around the warhead and removing the decoys, rendering the missile vulnerable to ABM defenses. It uses a Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV) system to deploy its warhead(s) using a digital inertial navigation system with a GLOSNASS (equivalent to Global Position Satellite) receiver. This achieves a reported accuracy of 350 m CEP, but this accuracy is lower than is reasonable to believe, given modern guidance systems and previous US and Russian missiles. It has a launch weight of 47,200 kg with a length of 21.9 m and a maximum width of 1.9 m. It uses a three-stage solid propellant engine.
The development of the SS-27 began in the late 1980s, though it was redesigned in 1992 as the first totally Russian designed and built missile. The first test launch occurred in December 1994 with the first testing of the TEL vehicle version nearly six years later. The first two SS-27 missiles entered service in 1997 in modified SS-19 silos. The first silo-based missile regiment was declared operational in 1998, with a second in 1999, a third in 2000 and a fourth in 2003. The first TEL versions entered service in 2001. It was originally planned to build 350 missiles, but this has been amended to the construction of 50 missiles by 2005. A sea-based version is under development under the name Bulava.
Enviado: Sáb Jul 29, 2006 6:39 pm
por FinkenHeinle
Einsamkeit escreveu:jacquessantiago escreveu:Carlos Mathias escreveu:A Rússia está onde sempre esteve e os que tentaram, tomaram bem fundo no fiofó. Quem tiver dois culhões que tente, eles ainda estão no mesmo lugar.
O Afeganistao que o diga
Engraçado os afegaos estavam perdendo, mas misteriosamente começaram a surgir misseis e dinheiro e armamento? da onde estariam vindo?
Então... Eles também só gostam de bater em bêbado, que nem dizem dos americanos...
O mesmo ocorreu na Guerra do Vietnã, e não vemos ninguém aqui abonar o que houve porque o Vietnã teve apoio material de vizinhos mais fortes...
Enviado: Sáb Jul 29, 2006 7:42 pm
por faterra
SS-NX-30 Bulava
Alternate Name: Bulava
Class: SLBM
Basing: Submarine launched
Propulsion: 3-stage solid
Range: 10,000 km
Status: Development
The SS-27 has a launch weight of 47,200 kg with a length of 21.9 m and a maximum width of 1.9 m.
The Russian SS-NX-30, or Bulava, is an intercontinental-range, submarine launched, solid propellant ballistic missile. It is a submarine launched version of the SS-27, which represents the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology and is currently under development.
The SS-27 is currently portrayed as being immune to any ABM defense the United States can put into being. The missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it approaches the target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to increase the chances of its success. The warhead is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead within ten kilometers (6 miles). This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of nuclear ground-based interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and maneuverability. While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, it remains protected.
The SS-NX-30 is identical to the SS-27 except for a slight decrease in range resulting from the conversion for submarine launch. It has a range of 10,000 km (6214 miles) and is reported to be equipped with a 550 kT yield nuclear warheads. It is reported that up to six MIRVs can be placed at the cost of removing warhead shielding and decoys, reducing its ability to penetrate ABM defenses. It uses a Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV) system to deploy its warhead(s) using a digital inertial navigation system with a GLOSNASS (equivalent to Global Position Satellite) receiver. This achieves a reported accuracy of 350 m CEP, but this accuracy is lower than is reasonable to believe, given modern guidance systems and previous US and Russian missiles.
The SS-NX-30 is currently under development and is expected to enter test launches upon a converted type 941 Akula (‘Typhoon’) class nuclear submarine. The Bulava will be fitted aboard the ‘Borey’ class nuclear submarines, the first of which is expected to be commissioned in 2006.
[missilethreat.com]
October 9, 2005: first successful launch from refitted 941 class SSBN.
Dec 21, 2005: 2nd successful launch from submerged position on move (!).
Fonte:
http://warfare.ru/?linkid=1715&catid=265
Warfare.RU
Russian Military Analysis
Foto:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulava_(missile)