Devia estar fazendo a rampa errada, achando que ja estava na pista. Se fosse de outro fabricante do outro lado do mar, eu falaria que era erro de soft, mas como é Boeing...
737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
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joao fernando
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Ele pousou gente, não caiu
Devia estar fazendo a rampa errada, achando que ja estava na pista. Se fosse de outro fabricante do outro lado do mar, eu falaria que era erro de soft, mas como é Boeing...
Devia estar fazendo a rampa errada, achando que ja estava na pista. Se fosse de outro fabricante do outro lado do mar, eu falaria que era erro de soft, mas como é Boeing...
Obrigado Lulinha por melar o Gripen-NG
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Slip Junior
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Não li em nenhum lugar que "o avião teria pousado"; o avião "caiu" e as investigações estão em curso para se determinar as causas que levaram a tal resultado.
Além disso, ao contrário do que você parece sugerir, nunca vi ninguém falar que a Boeing (ou a Airbus) é infálivel; também nunca vi ninguém com um mínimo de convivência com a aviação declarar que os produtos da Embraer (cujos jatos, por sinal, nunca tiveram nenhum acidente com fatalidades) teriam qualidade inferior.
E uma última coisinha: Boeing e Embraer estão do mesmo lado do mar.
Abraços
Além disso, ao contrário do que você parece sugerir, nunca vi ninguém falar que a Boeing (ou a Airbus) é infálivel; também nunca vi ninguém com um mínimo de convivência com a aviação declarar que os produtos da Embraer (cujos jatos, por sinal, nunca tiveram nenhum acidente com fatalidades) teriam qualidade inferior.
E uma última coisinha: Boeing e Embraer estão do mesmo lado do mar.
Abraços
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
olÁ, joão!joao fernando escreveu:Ele pousou gente, não caiu
Devia estar fazendo a rampa errada, achando que ja estava na pista. Se fosse de outro fabricante do outro lado do mar, eu falaria que era erro de soft, mas como é Boeing...
Caiu, pousou...é só questão de chamar, mas o fato é que quebrou...
Não se tratou de rampa, pois essa é baseada em instrumentos de transmissao do solo, na maioria das vezes (exceto RNAV) e estes e os receptores do avião não tiveram reportes de mal funcionamento. Entaõ, sobra as hipoteses que estao sendo faladas...
Abs!
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Valeu, Slip!Slip Junior escreveu:Alcmartin, eu acho que a notícia abaixo tira várias das suas dúvidas (mas ainda tem muitaaaaa coisa mal-explicada nessa história...)
DATE:04/03/09
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence
...
Abraços
É, já começa a clarear...toda a linha de aviões comerciais vem com automatismo que a principio leva em consideração que os pilotos farão tudo no automático, desde que algumas coisas tenham sido atendidas(tudo funcionando, acionamento de comandos corretos, etc).
Mas, para isso acontecer, há toda uma sequencia, cujos passos sao acompanhados pelos pilotos através do FMA, uma "barrinha" na parte de cima do PFD, do EFIS, que vai mostrando aos pilotos essas fases. Qualquer coisa errada, os caras interrompem e levam na mão ou arremetem. Tipo, antes de reduzir o motor, o avião arredondaria, lá no FMA mostra "FLARE" e aí o aviaõ reduz. Isso tudo é acompanhado pelos pilotos e há os "call outs", aquela "fraseologia tecnica", um alerta, que se pode ver em filmes, de um piloto alertando o outro.
Mas, claro, com falha não há lógica e de repente não houve nada disso e o avião reduziu de uma só vez e aí...
Vamos aguardar...
abs!
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joao fernando
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Com toda a razão. Mas eu ainda não entendo o que poderia ter ocorrido. Como um motor a reação demora para tracionar, até o avião ganhar velocidade e sair de uma situação critica demora alguns segundos, ai...Mesmo com aviso, o avião ja esta no chão. E o pior, pertinho da pista, o que é mais estranho.alcmartin escreveu:olÁ, joão!joao fernando escreveu:Ele pousou gente, não caiu
Devia estar fazendo a rampa errada, achando que ja estava na pista. Se fosse de outro fabricante do outro lado do mar, eu falaria que era erro de soft, mas como é Boeing...
Caiu, pousou...é só questão de chamar, mas o fato é que quebrou...
Não se tratou de rampa, pois essa é baseada em instrumentos de transmissao do solo, na maioria das vezes (exceto RNAV) e estes e os receptores do avião não tiveram reportes de mal funcionamento. Entaõ, sobra as hipoteses que estao sendo faladas...
Abs!
Eu tenho minhas teorias de que a automação as vezes dão a falsa sensação de segurança, e tais sistemas as vezes fazem uma coisa totalmente diferente do comando do piloto.
Eu acredito que o acidente em Congonhas ocorreu por defeito de soft, computador não recebe sinal de reverso aberto (pois estava travado fechado), entende que esta arremetendo, e desativa o freio.
Na minha cabeça é isso...
Obrigado Lulinha por melar o Gripen-NG
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Slip Junior
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Alcmartin e demais, aqui vai o documento liberado pelo Dutch Safety Board contendo as primeiras descobertas sobre o acidente (é basicamente o que está na notícia que eu postei anteriormente mas com alguns detalhes a mais): http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rappo ... art_GB.pdf
O que eu achei mais estranho é o relatório mencionar a situação de stall sem mencionar qualquer coisa relativa a atuação do sistema anti-stall... Além disso, existem as questões relativas tanto aos alarmes associados ao radar-altimetro quanto aos procedimentos previstos no AFM que ainda precisam ser melhor esclarecidas.
Bom, vamos esperar para ver o que vem pela frente (tanto em relação a descobertas quanto a recomendações)...
Abraços
O que eu achei mais estranho é o relatório mencionar a situação de stall sem mencionar qualquer coisa relativa a atuação do sistema anti-stall... Além disso, existem as questões relativas tanto aos alarmes associados ao radar-altimetro quanto aos procedimentos previstos no AFM que ainda precisam ser melhor esclarecidas.
Bom, vamos esperar para ver o que vem pela frente (tanto em relação a descobertas quanto a recomendações)...
João, até onde eu saiba, o sistema do A320 acidentado em CGH se comportou exatamente do modo que era esperado. O problema é que toda filosofia de projeto tem "furos" (se você se interessar por segurança de vôo, dá uma lida sobre James Reason e sua teoria do queijo suiço) que quando alinhados com outros furos relacionados a condições de operação, ambientais, etc., podem levar a ocorrência de um acidente e foi isso que exatamente aconteceu no acidente com a aeronave da TAM e é o que ocorre muito perto de 100% de todos os acidentes na aviação moderna. Mas isso é conversa para um outro tópico...joao fernando escreveu:Eu acredito que o acidente em Congonhas ocorreu por defeito de soft, computador não recebe sinal de reverso aberto (pois estava travado fechado), entende que esta arremetendo, e desativa o freio.
Na minha cabeça é isso...
Abraços
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joao fernando
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Perfeito Slip. Eu me interesso sim por segurança. Inclusive o outro acidente (acho que um ATR que criou gelo na asa) desconfio que criou-se gelo, o piloto automatico foi compensando, até o limite critico de perder sustentação.
Obrigado Lulinha por melar o Gripen-NG
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
RELATÓRIO PRELIMINAR TURKISH IN AMSTERDAM
Today <4 March 2009>, the Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning for airline manufacturer
Boeing and presents its initial findings regarding the terrible accident involving the Boeing
737/800, Turkish Airlines flight.
This accident claimed the lives on nine people (5 passengers and 4 crew) and 80 passengers were
injured. Twenty eight of those injured are still hospitalised.
The Boeing was en route from Istanbul to Schiphol (on Wednesday 25 February 2009) and was due
to land at Schiphol at 10.40.
The Boeing had had a regular flight and no problems had been experienced until just before the
approach.
There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the
right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had
all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit.
The crew made contact with air traffic control (Amsterdam Radar) at 10.04 and was transferred to
the tower at Schiphol - for the landing – at 10.14. The tower then gave the Boeing permission to
land on the Polderbaan 18R.
The Polderbaan was approached according to fixed procedures, without any delay, and the Boeing
was then given permission to decrease its altitude to 2000 feet (about 700 meters) and begin its
descent to the Polderbaan.
This descent takes place with the help of the automatic pilot, as is normal with Turkish Airlines
(this method can be utilised by everybody, as can a manual landing).
The voice recorder and the black box, both of which are in the hands of the Safety Board, show
that an irregularity occurred during the descent, at 1950 feet.
At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude – from 1950
feet to - 8 feet - and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact
upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power.
The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately
and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very
significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing.
A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one.
The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter.
The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not
working correctly (via the warning signal “landing gear must go down”).
Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem.
In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few
meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced.
It seems that the automatic system – with its engines at reduced power – assumed it was in the
final stages of the flight.
As a result, the aircraft lost speed.
Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand.
2
As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft's speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling
situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were
given.
The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately.
However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the
Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway.
The black box – which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights
- showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.
The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed.
The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact.
An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.
The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up
of boggy clay.
The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off
and the aircraft’s hull ruptured at business class.
The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design.
This also applied to the two engines.
The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further
250 meters.
Most of the fatally wounded victims were located near the rupture, in business class, and the three
crew members in the cockpit died as a result of the enormous braking forces, partially caused by
the embedded nose-wheel and the forward movement of the aircraft.
The section that remained most intact was situated around the wings.
On board the plane there were 127 passengers and 7 crew, of whom 28 are still hospitalised.
The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the
connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system).
Weather conditions, particularly visibility through the low cloud base and the mist, probably meant
that the Polderbaan was not yet visible at the height at which the descent was commenced.
The Safety Board board will be assisted in its investigation and its attempts to ensure lessons are
learnt by the following organisations:
• the National Transportation Safety Board
• Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyse (BEA)
• Aviation Accident Investigation Branche (AAIB)
• Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkse Rijksluchtvaartdienst, DGCA)
• Boeing
• Turkish Airlines
• The engine manufacturer, CFM
3
• Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW) [Traffic and Waterways Inspectorate]
• Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, American Civil Aviation Authority)
• Vereniging van Nederlandse verkeersvliegers [Association of Dutch Commercial Pilots]
• Nederlandse vereniging voor cabinepersoneel [Dutch Association for Cabin Personnel]
Internationally, both the ICAO and the EU stipulate that involved parties may take part in the
Board’s investigation (party system).
The investigation itself, however, is supervised by and remains the Board’s responsibility.
The Board has also received a great deal of data from the Public Prosecutor for its investigation.
Furthermore, there have been content-based contributions from a great many police organisations.
The National Police Force, particularly all staff from the National Team of Forensic Investigation
who are responsible for the forensic work at the location itself, the Aviation Police, who took all the
aviation photographs, and the National Traffic Assistance team who helped the Board to measure
the location of the accident.
The Public Prosecutor took possession of the aircraft and, as a result, responsibility for guarding it
lay entirely with them.
Police officers from all over the country were drafted in for this purpose.
We are extremely grateful for their outstanding and meticulous work and for guarding the aircraft.
There was a misunderstanding regarding the use of the data from the cockpit voice recorder and
the flight recorder (black box).
It is established, in Dutch law, that the Public Prosecutor may only have access to this data if there
is a question of abduction, terrorism, murder or manslaughter.
In such a situation, the Safety Board is also legally obliged to hand over this data to the Public
Prosecutor.
In principle, there are two investigations being carried out into the accident.
• The judicial investigation.
The search for punishable facts and the use of these to hold those responsible to account.
• The independent investigation.
This investigation focuses fully on finding out what happened so that lessons can be learnt.
There is always some tension between the two investigations.
Within criminal law you may be silent.
Nobody needs to contribute to his or her sentence.
With the independent investigation, however, you want to ensure that everything is said.
For this reason, the reports from the Board may not be used as evidence in lawsuits.
From today onwards, the investigation by the Board will concentrate on two subjects:
The technical investigation will focus on the role of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle
system and the connection to the radio altimeter. <This will take place with the same involved
parties>.
4
Alongside the aforementioned technical investigation, the focus will also be on the management of
the crisis.
How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from this.
This investigation will also focus on the passenger list.
The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week.
The aircraft will be taken to another location for – possible – further investigation.
The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when
using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for
Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated
that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that
are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to
consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight.
With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch
Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities.
Today <4 March 2009>, the Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning for airline manufacturer
Boeing and presents its initial findings regarding the terrible accident involving the Boeing
737/800, Turkish Airlines flight.
This accident claimed the lives on nine people (5 passengers and 4 crew) and 80 passengers were
injured. Twenty eight of those injured are still hospitalised.
The Boeing was en route from Istanbul to Schiphol (on Wednesday 25 February 2009) and was due
to land at Schiphol at 10.40.
The Boeing had had a regular flight and no problems had been experienced until just before the
approach.
There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the
right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had
all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit.
The crew made contact with air traffic control (Amsterdam Radar) at 10.04 and was transferred to
the tower at Schiphol - for the landing – at 10.14. The tower then gave the Boeing permission to
land on the Polderbaan 18R.
The Polderbaan was approached according to fixed procedures, without any delay, and the Boeing
was then given permission to decrease its altitude to 2000 feet (about 700 meters) and begin its
descent to the Polderbaan.
This descent takes place with the help of the automatic pilot, as is normal with Turkish Airlines
(this method can be utilised by everybody, as can a manual landing).
The voice recorder and the black box, both of which are in the hands of the Safety Board, show
that an irregularity occurred during the descent, at 1950 feet.
At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude – from 1950
feet to - 8 feet - and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact
upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power.
The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately
and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very
significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing.
A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one.
The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter.
The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not
working correctly (via the warning signal “landing gear must go down”).
Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem.
In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few
meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced.
It seems that the automatic system – with its engines at reduced power – assumed it was in the
final stages of the flight.
As a result, the aircraft lost speed.
Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand.
2
As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft's speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling
situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were
given.
The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately.
However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the
Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway.
The black box – which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights
- showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.
The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed.
The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact.
An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.
The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up
of boggy clay.
The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off
and the aircraft’s hull ruptured at business class.
The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design.
This also applied to the two engines.
The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further
250 meters.
Most of the fatally wounded victims were located near the rupture, in business class, and the three
crew members in the cockpit died as a result of the enormous braking forces, partially caused by
the embedded nose-wheel and the forward movement of the aircraft.
The section that remained most intact was situated around the wings.
On board the plane there were 127 passengers and 7 crew, of whom 28 are still hospitalised.
The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the
connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system).
Weather conditions, particularly visibility through the low cloud base and the mist, probably meant
that the Polderbaan was not yet visible at the height at which the descent was commenced.
The Safety Board board will be assisted in its investigation and its attempts to ensure lessons are
learnt by the following organisations:
• the National Transportation Safety Board
• Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyse (BEA)
• Aviation Accident Investigation Branche (AAIB)
• Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkse Rijksluchtvaartdienst, DGCA)
• Boeing
• Turkish Airlines
• The engine manufacturer, CFM
3
• Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW) [Traffic and Waterways Inspectorate]
• Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, American Civil Aviation Authority)
• Vereniging van Nederlandse verkeersvliegers [Association of Dutch Commercial Pilots]
• Nederlandse vereniging voor cabinepersoneel [Dutch Association for Cabin Personnel]
Internationally, both the ICAO and the EU stipulate that involved parties may take part in the
Board’s investigation (party system).
The investigation itself, however, is supervised by and remains the Board’s responsibility.
The Board has also received a great deal of data from the Public Prosecutor for its investigation.
Furthermore, there have been content-based contributions from a great many police organisations.
The National Police Force, particularly all staff from the National Team of Forensic Investigation
who are responsible for the forensic work at the location itself, the Aviation Police, who took all the
aviation photographs, and the National Traffic Assistance team who helped the Board to measure
the location of the accident.
The Public Prosecutor took possession of the aircraft and, as a result, responsibility for guarding it
lay entirely with them.
Police officers from all over the country were drafted in for this purpose.
We are extremely grateful for their outstanding and meticulous work and for guarding the aircraft.
There was a misunderstanding regarding the use of the data from the cockpit voice recorder and
the flight recorder (black box).
It is established, in Dutch law, that the Public Prosecutor may only have access to this data if there
is a question of abduction, terrorism, murder or manslaughter.
In such a situation, the Safety Board is also legally obliged to hand over this data to the Public
Prosecutor.
In principle, there are two investigations being carried out into the accident.
• The judicial investigation.
The search for punishable facts and the use of these to hold those responsible to account.
• The independent investigation.
This investigation focuses fully on finding out what happened so that lessons can be learnt.
There is always some tension between the two investigations.
Within criminal law you may be silent.
Nobody needs to contribute to his or her sentence.
With the independent investigation, however, you want to ensure that everything is said.
For this reason, the reports from the Board may not be used as evidence in lawsuits.
From today onwards, the investigation by the Board will concentrate on two subjects:
The technical investigation will focus on the role of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle
system and the connection to the radio altimeter. <This will take place with the same involved
parties>.
4
Alongside the aforementioned technical investigation, the focus will also be on the management of
the crisis.
How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from this.
This investigation will also focus on the passenger list.
The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week.
The aircraft will be taken to another location for – possible – further investigation.
The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when
using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for
Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated
that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that
are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to
consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight.
With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch
Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities.
"O comunismo é a filosofia do fracasso, o credo da ignorância e o evangelho da inveja. Sua virtude inerente é a distribuição equitativa da miséria".
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Carojoao fernando escreveu:Com toda a razão. Mas eu ainda não entendo o que poderia ter ocorrido. Como um motor a reação demora para tracionar, até o avião ganhar velocidade e sair de uma situação critica demora alguns segundos, ai...Mesmo com aviso, o avião ja esta no chão. E o pior, pertinho da pista, o que é mais estranho.alcmartin escreveu: olÁ, joão!
Caiu, pousou...é só questão de chamar, mas o fato é que quebrou...
Não se tratou de rampa, pois essa é baseada em instrumentos de transmissao do solo, na maioria das vezes (exceto RNAV) e estes e os receptores do avião não tiveram reportes de mal funcionamento. Entaõ, sobra as hipoteses que estao sendo faladas...
Abs!
Eu tenho minhas teorias de que a automação as vezes dão a falsa sensação de segurança, e tais sistemas as vezes fazem uma coisa totalmente diferente do comando do piloto.
Eu acredito que o acidente em Congonhas ocorreu por defeito de soft, computador não recebe sinal de reverso aberto (pois estava travado fechado), entende que esta arremetendo, e desativa o freio.
Na minha cabeça é isso...
A automação foi desenvolvida para reduzir a carga de trabalho no cockpit , está cada vez mais desenvolvida mas não é infalivel. Por isso requer muita atenção e treinamento , constante vigilancia principalmente nas fases de aproximação e pouso . Os pilotos podem e devem interfirir sempre que necessário .
Os motores a reação tem um retardo para tracionar , os mais antigos , da geração passada demoravam 8 segundos pra reagir , os atuais menos , mas mesmo assim tem um grande retardo . Baseado nisso as empresas aéreas modernas estipularam que em ipótese alguma pode-se completar uma aproximação em power off ( marcha lenta ). Hoje existe equipamentos eletrônicos que controlam (vigiam) a atuação do piloto , por exemplo : uma aproximação é considerada estabilizada quando a 1000' (300m) voce esta no profile (angulo de aproximação) na configuração de pouso (flaps e trem)e com os motores tracionando ( spool up) . Se não estiver cumprindo esses requisitos é obrigatoria a arremetida caso contrário o comandante tem que esplicar o ocorrido e pode sofrer punição da administração da CIA , como disse tudo isso é controlado (vigiado) eletrônicamente .
"O comunismo é a filosofia do fracasso, o credo da ignorância e o evangelho da inveja. Sua virtude inerente é a distribuição equitativa da miséria".
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Fala, cmte!!
Já começaram as teorias de conspiraçào na AFA...alguém falou que viu, ouviu, leu, uma declaraçào da Boeing que a lógica do sistema não permite esta falha e que provavelmente o que ocorreu é que o órgào ATC não proveu separação com o tráfego anterior, um...757
, com aquela maravilhosa esteira carateristica e aí...chão!
Vixe...
abs!!
Já começaram as teorias de conspiraçào na AFA...alguém falou que viu, ouviu, leu, uma declaraçào da Boeing que a lógica do sistema não permite esta falha e que provavelmente o que ocorreu é que o órgào ATC não proveu separação com o tráfego anterior, um...757
, com aquela maravilhosa esteira carateristica e aí...chão! Vixe...
abs!!
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Esse 757 produz mais esteira que qualquer outro avião , na América eles separam com 1 distancia maior para os 757 . Parece que é principalmente devido ao desenho dos flaps que são inteiros , integrando toda a asa sem os "splits" caracteristicos dos aviões normais .
Bons voos .
Bons voos .
"O comunismo é a filosofia do fracasso, o credo da ignorância e o evangelho da inveja. Sua virtude inerente é a distribuição equitativa da miséria".
Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill
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Slip Junior
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Essa versão sobre a wake turbulance do 757 saiu antes da divulgação do relatório preliminar na semana passada. Eu acho que vai ficar apenas como teoria da AFA mesmo, mas com certeza devem estar levando isso em conta...
Abraços
Abraços
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Voce também ouviu, Slip? É...o poder da AFA é phodas...
Quanto ao 757, é o revo ideal p/dar de presente...aos inimigos!!
abs!
É...o poder da AFA é phodas... Quanto ao 757, é o revo ideal p/dar de presente...aos inimigos!!
abs!
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Slip Junior
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Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Alcmartin, essa eu peguei na internet mesmo: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/ ... ld_4835778
Meu contato com a AFA não é dos maiores pois não trabalho em aeroporto, mas sempre fico na escuta pois pode não ser a fonte mais confiável, mas com certeza é a mais completa.
Aliás, como você pode ler no link que coloquei acima, essa versão aparentemente se originou na surcusal turca da AFA...
Abraços
Meu contato com a AFA não é dos maiores pois não trabalho em aeroporto, mas sempre fico na escuta pois pode não ser a fonte mais confiável, mas com certeza é a mais completa.
Aliás, como você pode ler no link que coloquei acima, essa versão aparentemente se originou na surcusal turca da AFA...
Abraços
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Slip Junior
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- Mensagens: 3291
- Registrado em: Seg Fev 17, 2003 6:00 pm
- Agradeceram: 1 vez
Re: 737-800 Turkish Airlines cai em Amsterdã
Esqueci de comentar outra coisa... Não conheço o projeto da Boeing, mas acho pouquíssimo provável que a coisa seja tão simples como colocaram no relatório preliminar; até mesmo por requisito, é inadmissível que uma falha simples (como a falha de um único radalt) possa resultar em um evento catastrófico e mesmo que esse evento tivesse outra classificação, seria uma péssima prática de engenharia deixar o sistema sem nenhuma proteção tipo miscompare contra algo desse tipo (afinal pra que teriam 2 equipamentos se o sistema falha com a falha de apenas um?!).
Com certeza esse mal-funcionamento foi um fator contribuinte, mas não tenho dúvidas que esse acidente ainda vai render uma longa discussão...
Abraços
Com certeza esse mal-funcionamento foi um fator contribuinte, mas não tenho dúvidas que esse acidente ainda vai render uma longa discussão...
Abraços