Lockheed F-35 Still Raises ‘Concerns,’ Pentagon Says (excerpt)
(Source: Bloomberg; issued Oct. 29, 2009)
Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
still poses a risk of cost increases, according to an independent study of the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons program, the Defense Department spokesman said today.
The new cost estimate is “pessimistic and continues to raise concerns about the course the program is on,” Geoff Morrell, the department’s spokesman, said at a news conference. Ash Carter, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer, has been briefed on the analysis by the Joint Estimate Team, Morrell said.
“If the Joint Estimate Team provided especially good news, we would be trumpeting it,” Morrell said. “It provides us a worst-case assessment of how the program will likely develop.”
The Pentagon will weigh the team’s analysis against the Joint Strike Fighter program office, “which is generally much more optimistic,” he said.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has bet the Pentagon’s long- term fighter-jet modernization on the F-35 after canceling additional production of the F-22. U.S. lawmakers and international partners such as the U.K. have a stake in the cost of the $298 billion program because of its implications for future budgets.
The cost assessment of the fighter is an update to one completed a year ago. The earlier study estimated the program may need as much as $16.6 billion more than planned through 2015 for research and production. Morrell declined to give precise figures from the latest assessment.
‘Modest Risks’
Lockheed “acknowledges that modest risks to our cost and schedule baselines exist, but we envision no scenario that would justify a substantial delay to completion of development or transition to production milestones,” spokesman John Kent in an e-mailed statement. (end of excerpt)
Click here for the full article, on the Bloomberg website. (ends)
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Transcript of Oct. 30 News Briefing with Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell (excerpt)
(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Oct. 30, 2009)
Q: May I ask you about another assessment that's forward- looking? This is on the Pentagon's largest weapons program, the Joint Strike Fighter. I understand that this Joint Estimating Team assessment that reviewed last year's numbers has been recirculated to senior-level officials, including the secretary, Mr. -- and Ashton Carter, and it basically comes to the conclusion that it came last year -- that this program, it all went poorly, with -- based on historic patterns, could need another $16.6 billion through fiscal 2015. Can you shed some light on where it's at and broadly what your conclusions are?
MR. MORRELL: Sure. Sure. Just to clarify a couple things, the Joint Estimating Team's most recent analysis is still a work in progress. The analysis continues. So I'm not going to get into numbers, because numbers could change.
As for the state of its -- it being briefed to senior leaders, I can tell you that it -- that Undersecretary Carter has begun to be briefed on the JET. I think he's completed the first of what will be three briefings on it.
It has not yet gone to Secretary Gates or Deputy Secretary Lynn, although I'm sure Secretary Carter will share it with them at the appropriate time.
What I can tell you is, obviously the JET is a very important tool in the budget process. It provides us a worst-case assessment of how the program will likely develop.
And that is balanced against, on the other extreme, the Program Office's assessment of it, which is generally much more optimistic.
And so what we need to do, what the secretary tries to do, is to sort of figure out the sweet spot, if you will, between those. What's the appropriate balance between the JET's sort of sky-is-falling assessment and the Program Office perhaps rosier view of things?
And just by way of example, in the fiscal year '10 budget, the secretary clearly took a much more conservative approach, to the F-35 program, investing heavily in -- hundreds of millions of additional dollars, in the testing program, trying to buy down some of the risk that had been identified by the JET, in their -- in their -- hundreds of millions of dollars in the last JET.
So the new JET will clearly play a very important role, as we go about figuring out what levels to fund the Joint Strike Fighter program at, going into FY '11 and throughout the Five Year Defense Plan.
Q (Off mike.) This current edition is as pessimistic as last years, although you don't want to talk about the numbers. But you mentioned sky is falling. I mean, that's one extreme. But is it an accurate depiction though that this is still a relatively pessimistic look at the program?
MR. MORRELL: I think that's an accurate depiction, that it still does -- that the JET clearly raises concerns about the course the program is on. And so you know, this is something -- listen, this is -- this is the biggest, most expensive and arguably most complicated program this department has ever pursued. We have a great deal riding on the success of this program.
You saw Secretary Gates go down to Fort Worth and tell Lockheed Martin's president and CEO -- chairman and CEO that he is going to hold their feet to the fire on this, that there are -- that there are timelines and that there are budgets that are going to have to be met, the most immediate being the initial operation -- the IOC [Initial Operational Capability] for the Marine -- for frankly the testing squadron and then the Marine Corps.
And those, despite whatever the JET says, the secretary expects to be met on time. So we will continue to watch this program like a hawk and, if necessary, make adjustments in our budgeting to buy down some of the risks that the JET identifies.
Q: May I ask one follow-up?
MR. MORRELL: Yeah.
Q: Lockheed today put out a statement to us that said, "We acknowledge that moderate risks to our cost and schedule baseline exist." It -- do you agree with that, that the JET said moderate risk, or --
MR. MORRELL: I -- I'm not in a position to characterize it as moderate or -- moderate or serious or minimal. All I know is that we take the JET very seriously, but it is one input into the budgeting process. And as the secretary moves forward with the FY '11 budget, I am sure he will be weighing the view of the JET in how much we fund for the --
Q: It doesn't paint a rosy picture, though, going forward. Is that an accurate --
MR. MORRELL: Listen, if I -- if -- (chuckles) -- I think it's fair to say that if the JET had provided some especially good news, we would be trumpeting it.
Q (Off mike.)
MR. MORRELL: So obviously -- but the JET I don't think ever provides good news. I think that's its job, to be pessimistic, and we appreciate that. And we will -- we will work with their -- with their team and the program office to try to figure out the best way ahead. But there is a lot of pressure on Lockheed. There is a lot of pressure on this building to make sure we get this right. And the secretary is determined to do it. (ends)
What Now, Icarus? Is Western Combat Aviation Falling Out of the Sky? (excerpt)
(Source: The Huffington Post; issued Oct. 30, 2009)
The future of Western combat aviation today rests largely on one airplane: The Pentagon's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
The Defense Department currently plans to buy 2,456 of these Lockheed aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. As a "multi-role" fighter-bomber, it will ultimately replace almost all tactical aircraft now in our inventory, except for the F-22, for which production beyond 187 aircraft was canceled this past summer. Major allies, including Britain and much of the rest of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Israel, plan to buy the aircraft. Sales to many others are postulated, and those who do not intend to buy the F-35 plan to copy it to the extent their treasuries, government bureaucracies, and technological development permit.
There are, however, a few problems. The F-35 is unaffordable. It is a technological kluge that will be less effective than airplanes it replaces. And it will increase our own combat losses.
That is not the consensus now; many will vociferously dispute each of the assertions stated above, and below. But, in time the finger pointing will start. That's when someone will have to pick up the pieces to give our pilots a war winning aircraft. The road between here and there will be neither smooth nor pretty, but it is time to take the first step.
A financial disaster? How can that be? Visiting the F-35 plant in Fort Worth, Texas last August, Secretary of D Robert Gates assured us that the F-35 will be "less than half the price ... of the F-22."
In a narrow sense, Gates is right. At a breathtaking $65 billion for 187 aircraft, the F-22 consumes $350 million for each plane. At $299 billion for 2,456, the F-35 would seem a bargain at just $122 million each.
F-35 unit cost will ultimately be much higher. In 2001, the Pentagon had planned to buy 2,866 aircraft for $226.5 billion - $79 million per airplane. It was in 2007 that the expense increased and the quantity went down; resulting in the current - $122 million - unit cost.
In the next few weeks, the program will have to admit to another increase. Gates and his Deputy Secretary, William Lynn, have re-convened a "Joint Estimating Team" (JET) to reassess F-35 cost and schedule. Last year, while a part of the Bush administration, Gates basically ignored the Team's recommendations, but the new JET is about to reconfirm them: the F-35 program will cost up to $15 billion more, and it will be delivered about two years late. (end of excerpt)
Click here for the full article, on the Huffington Post website. (ends)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t ... 37564.html
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