Fórum Defesa Brasil

Luís Henrique escreveu:

Hader escreveu:Por exemplo?

Capacidade de guerra em rede, com a fusão real de sensores e meios de todo o elemento de ataque e dos meios de suporte (real time).

O sistema datalink do Raptor não permite a transferência rápida e eficaz com outras aeronaves que não seja outro Raptor.
Ta ai uma deficiência que prejudica a utilização do Raptor em pacotes de ataque mistos.

Outras deficiências:
1) não possui sistema de pontaria montado no capacete (HMD), (algo que muitos criticam no Rafale, sendo que o Rafale F3 já virá com o HMD)
2) não possui o míssil AIM-9X integrado. Utiliza o AIM-9M. (O mesmo oferecido no pacote da Boeing para o Brasil, não sei porque, aliás, suspeito o porque, uma vez que o Super Hornet opera o AIM-9X sem problemas).
3) a capacidade de ataque do F-22 é limitada a 2 bombas JDAM. (alguns caças da 4ª geração levam cerca de 10T de armamento moderno para ataque)
4) o F-22 não consegue marcar seus próprios alvos (algo que muitos criticavam no Rafale, que precisava da bengala m2k, porém no Rafale já foi resolvido, no F-22 está em estudo.)

cb_lima escreveu:Acho que quando o assunto é F-22 (ou caças similares) um ponto a ser levado em consideração é o planejamento em torno das capacidade desses caças de receber atualizações ao longo do tempo.

Essas aeronaves normalmente não nascem "completas"... a filosofia já a algum tempo é expandir o envelope de funções e consequentemente os equipamentos utilizados "ao longo do tempo".

O F-22 é um caso interessante, pois foi criado para combater uma guerra totalmente diferente, e mesmo a tal capacidade de expandir o seu envelope e funções não vislumbrava os tipos de Guerra que os EUA vem travando a uns 10 anos pelo menos... para tanto que até aeronaves como o ST começam a ter cada vez mais um papel mais relevante, mas isso também pode ser temporário... em todo o caso é o que vale hoje dia.

Os tais misseis e algo como o HMD fazem parte do planejamento ao longo do tempo para o F-22, e no caso do Datalink na verdade é uma medida "defensiva" pois ao não se comunicar com determinados elementos do seu grupo o F-22 evita detecção mas se eu não me engano eles estão tratando desse "problema".

Enfim... excelente discussão.

[]s
CB_Lima

Hader escreveu:

Luís Henrique escreveu: Capacidade de guerra em rede, com a fusão real de sensores e meios de todo o elemento de ataque e dos meios de suporte (real time).

O sistema datalink do Raptor não permite a transferência rápida e eficaz com outras aeronaves que não seja outro Raptor.
Ta ai uma deficiência que prejudica a utilização do Raptor em pacotes de ataque mistos.

Outras deficiências:
1) não possui sistema de pontaria montado no capacete (HMD), (algo que muitos criticam no Rafale, sendo que o Rafale F3 já virá com o HMD)
2) não possui o míssil AIM-9X integrado. Utiliza o AIM-9M. (O mesmo oferecido no pacote da Boeing para o Brasil, não sei porque, aliás, suspeito o porque, uma vez que o Super Hornet opera o AIM-9X sem problemas).
3) a capacidade de ataque do F-22 é limitada a 2 bombas JDAM. (alguns caças da 4ª geração levam cerca de 10T de armamento moderno para ataque)
4) o F-22 não consegue marcar seus próprios alvos (algo que muitos criticavam no Rafale, que precisava da bengala m2k, porém no Rafale já foi resolvido, no F-22 está em estudo.)

Bueno Luis, a única limitação efetiva do F-22 em relação à lista que coloquei é sua sabida incompatibilidade com os sistemas de link em uso na USAF. Isto já era previsto em projeto por conta da furtividade e por simplesmente não haver tecnologia que torne possível este enlace de dados de forma discreta. É uma opção consciente. O HMD esta no roadmap do projeto, mas a explosão de alguns custos acabou por retardar o processo, sendo o esforço redirecionado para outras questões. Temos que ter em mente que o F-22 é o primeiro de sua espécie e, por conta disso, não poderia nascer com tudo Ok. O 9X estava na prancheta quando os sistemas do Raptor estavam sendo finalizados.
Sobre os demais pontos eu tenho que fazer uma observação: ele foi pensado como um caça puro, de superioridade aérea. Ataque nunca foi seu foco. Para isso há o pesadelo chamado F-35.
É exatamente por isso que meu pensamento e o do Túlio vão na mesma direção. A quinta geração, de fato, ainda está pera se tornar full. O resto é 4G, e não há demérito algum nisso. O FX tem que ser um 4G que permita um bom horizonte de desenvolvimento de aviônica. É este recheio que fará dele o celeiro de conceitos e tecnologias para um futuro 5G nacional. Vide SU-35.

É um prazer manter papos deste nível!

Abraços!

P.S. - Assino em baixo de tudo que o cb_lima disse, só para variar...

Luís Henrique escreveu:

cb_lima escreveu:Acho que quando o assunto é F-22 (ou caças similares) um ponto a ser levado em consideração é o planejamento em torno das capacidade desses caças de receber atualizações ao longo do tempo.

Essas aeronaves normalmente não nascem "completas"... a filosofia já a algum tempo é expandir o envelope de funções e consequentemente os equipamentos utilizados "ao longo do tempo".

O F-22 é um caso interessante, pois foi criado para combater uma guerra totalmente diferente, e mesmo a tal capacidade de expandir o seu envelope e funções não vislumbrava os tipos de Guerra que os EUA vem travando a uns 10 anos pelo menos... para tanto que até aeronaves como o ST começam a ter cada vez mais um papel mais relevante, mas isso também pode ser temporário... em todo o caso é o que vale hoje dia.

Os tais misseis e algo como o HMD fazem parte do planejamento ao longo do tempo para o F-22, e no caso do Datalink na verdade é uma medida "defensiva" pois ao não se comunicar com determinados elementos do seu grupo o F-22 evita detecção mas se eu não me engano eles estão tratando desse "problema".

Enfim... excelente discussão.

[]s
CB_Lima

Ótima discussão mesmo.
A maioria das limitações do Raptor serão sanadas. Só não sei quando.
Existe estudo para incluir o HMD.
Existe estudo para alterar o radar APG-77 e incluir um datalink que permita comunicação com outros meios.
E as Small Diameter Bombs estão sendo integradas. O que vai ampliar a capacidade de ataque do Raptor também.

Da mesma forma o Rafale, o Eurofighter e outros seguem o mesmo caminho.
Engraçado é que alguns que defendem os americanos, massacram o Rafale.

Em uma discussão recente onde eu afirmei que foi divulgado que o Rafale F2 SEM HMD venceu o Super Hornet com HMD e AIM-9X em combate dogfight, um forista me disse que é pura bobagem. Que um caça sem HMD não pode vencer outro com HMD.
Só que o engraçado é que NINGUÉM vence o Raptor. E o Raptor também não possui HMD.....
Bom, eu entendo, para mim o Corinthians é melhor que o Barcelona....

Fighter Tactics
29/05/2001
Jane's Military Aerospace

New-generation aircraft such as the Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, and F-22 Raptor are in-service now
or under-test. Most attention is naturally focused on airframe-related advances -- stealth, supersonic
maneuverability, and so on. But it is smaller, often overlooked details that may bring about a revolution
in air combat and some of the most important changes since the advent of the missile-armed supersonic
fighter in the 1960s.

Within 10 years, many in-service fighters will be armed with new and much more lethal air-to-air
missiles (AAMs). They will be carrying more advanced radars and other technologies which make it
much less difficult to declare a target as 'hostile' well beyond-visual-range (BVR). They will also be
operating with tactical datalinks which allow several aircraft to share tactical information in a manner
which is simply impossible for most aircraft today. Individual and formation tactics will change, but the
implications of new technology are such that nobody knows exactly how that will happen.

AAM technology defines the depth of the air battle. "Whoever has the longest reach controls the
engagement," comments fighter analyst Ben Lambeth of the Rand Corporation. Lambeth recalls flying
out of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. F-15s armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range AAM
(AMRAAM) took on four F-15s simulating MiG-29s armed with R-27 Alamo MRAAMs and R-73
Archer SRAAMs (Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile). "I never had a tally on any of the bad guys. I rarely
saw our wingman. We never put more than 3g on the airplane and we never got inverted. There were
missiles and people dying everywhere."

This result reflects today's level of technology, in which the within-visual-range (WVR) and
beyond-visual-range (BVR) envelopes are separate. A BAE Systems paper from 1996 -- reflecting the
UK thinking that led to the adoption of the BAE Systems Meteor AAM for the Typhoon -- points out
that a target beyond 40km range "can feel free to maneuver without fear of engagement". This is echoed
by Robert Shaw, former US Navy fighter pilot and author of Fighter Combat Tactics. "There is virtually
no missile that you can't outmaneuver at maximum range."

With today's weapons -- the BAE paper notes -- most MRAMM engagements will take place
between 15-40 km range. Older short-range AAMs "lack not only total energy but also missile speed"
and are most lethal at ranges under 8 km, according to BAE. Between 8-and-15 km, therefore, there is a
"commit zone" where the target can still avoid a merge into close combat if the odds are unfavorable.

The key to the next generation of MRAAMs -- such as the Meteor -- is greater range and (more
importantly) greater energy at range. The result is a much larger "no-escape zone". This zone
surrounds a target and defines the maximum range at which the target cannot outmaneuver a missile
shot. The missile's kill probability may be almost constant from its minimum range out to 80 km. (One
issue here, observes Shaw, is that it may be difficult to confirm that the missile has found its target,
particularly in poor visibility. This may be one reason why Meteor has a 2-way datalink.)

Boeing has joined the Meteor program with the intention of marketing the missile in the U.S. The
situation is complicated by the fact that the F-22 needs it less than other fighters. Earlier this year, F-22
chief test pilot Paul Metz confirmed that the F-22's speed and altitude capability acts as a booster stage
for the common-or-garden AMRAAM. At Mach-1.5 and at greater altitude than the target (the F-22 has
a very fast climb rate and a service ceiling well above 50,000 feet), AMRAAM's range is 50% greater
than is the case in a subsonic, same-altitude launch.

New SRAAMs are faster than the AIM-9 Sidewinder (due to larger motors or smaller wings) and
have new infrared (IR) dome materials which do not blind the seeker when they are heated by air
friction. With imaging infrared (IIR) seekers, they are just as effective against a non-afterburning target
as against a full-reheat target. Under some circumstances, a modern SRAAM is [even] a BVR missile,
capable of being cued-on to the target by aircraft sensors and locking-on to it at an extreme range of 12-
20km. "You can expect to be engaged from about 80 km inbound and enter a MRAAM no-escape zone
shortly thereafter," notes the BAE paper. The 'commit' decision must be made sooner and if the target
pilot commits, the target will enter a SRAAM no-escape zone [also].

Once the fighters "merge" -- that is, their momentum takes them with SRAAM range of each other,
so that the first fighter to attempt to escape will offer his opponent an open tail-on shot -- improved
SRAAMs and helmet-mounted display (HMD) technology multiply the opportunities for WVR shots.

It is no longer necessary to point the aircraft towards the adversary. Any target within the field of
regard of the missile seeker can be engaged instantly.

According to one source, US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets from the Balkans theater recently
engaged in mock combat with Israeli Air Force fighters. The Hornets were armed with AIM-9s, and the
Israeli fighters carried Python-3 and Python-4 missiles and Elbit DASH helmet sights. IDR's source
describes the results as "more than ugly" with the Israelis prevailing in 220 out of 240 engagements.

There are lessons to be learned from this engagement and other tests which have shown similar
results. One is that modern HMDs and SRAAMs are essential. A second lesson is that WVR combat is
extremely dangerous and will become even more so. "We'll see less dogfighting once we get the ability
to engage targets 90-degrees off the nose," says Shaw. "Somebody's going to get a shot. And if the
missile is lethal, you're going to get hit." Even the recent history of engagements suggests that the
"furball" of fighter combat -- with multiple engagements spread across miles of sky -- is on its way out.
"We don't see a history of high-g maneuvering in recent engagements," says one industry analyst. "It's
fun to practice, but unwise to pursue."

A third lesson is that WVR is an equalizer. "An F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high off-boresight missile
and HMD is as capable in a 1-versus-1 engagement as an F-22," comments a former Navy fighter pilot,
now a civilian program manager. "In visual combat (WVR), everybody dies at the same rate," says
RAND's Lambeth. Indeed, he says that a larger fighter like the F-22 may be at a disadvantage. In the
early 1980s force-on-force exercises at the Navy's Top Gun fighter school, F-14s were routinely seen
and shot down by smaller F-5s flown by the Navy's Aggressor units. [note: rules-of-engagement
negated the larger planes' radar advantage and forced visual identity of targets which brought the
friendly fighters in too close -- the argument being in case of no AWACS support and enemy
compromising of the IFF systems] An F-22 which slows down to enter a WVR combat also gives up
the advantage of supersonic maneuverability.

Nevertheless, the experts consulted by IDR agreed that the fighter still needs to have the ability to
fight at close-range. Including having a gun. The current state of the debate on this highly
controversial piece of equipment is that the F-22 has a gun -- indeed, its M61A2 installation, complete
with a neat power-actuated door over the muzzle, is one of the most complex ever seen -- as does the
U.S. Air Force version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The U.S. Navy had apparently decided at one
point to forego the gun on the JSF -- which is primarily intended as a deep-strike aircraft -- but Boeing
program managers now say that there is an "ongoing debate" on the subject. The Marines -- concerned
about vertical landing weight -- have settled on a "missionized" gun, installed in a packaged that
replaces an internal bomb station. Both JSF competitors have selected a Boeing-developed version of
the Mauser BK 27m cannon, fitted with a linkless feed system by Western Design. The UK Royal Air
Force has considered eliminating the gun from its second trance of Typhoons, not so much to save
weight as to eliminate training and support costs.

Fonte: http://www.stealthskater.com/Documents/Fighter_1.pdf

Note: because important websites are frequently "here today but gone tomorrow", the following was
archived from Jane's Military Aerospace
http://www.janes.com/aerospace/military ... _1_n.shtml on 05/29/2001 .
This is NOT an attempt to divert readers from the aforementioned website. Indeed, the reader
should only read this back-up copy if the updated original cannot be found at the original
author's site.

Túlio escreveu:

O que eu acho que está faltando e jamais será sanado no Raptor é uma capacidade muito mais prosaica, comum a qualquer caça de linha de frente de qualquer geração: a capacidade de voar constantemente em várias missões numa guerra de verdade. E isso sem exaurir rapidamente o orçamento do País que o estiver empregando. Teria que mexer tanto no projeto que o acabaria desfigurando. De que adianta HMD, SDB, data-link ultradiscreto, AIM-9X & quetales num avião que só pode voar de vez em quando e em condições ótimas? Iria a USAF entregar toda a sua capacidade aérea a uma aeronave assim? Lembremos que o F-22 era para ser o substituto do F-15. Acho que vão ter que arranjar outro. Um que possa voar sempre...

Eis aí a razão pela qual não chamo o Raptor de 5G e sim de Caça para Operações Especiais. Um F-117 com capacidade ar-ar. É isso que ele me parece ser. FFEE são imensamente úteis mas de pouco valem sem o Infante comum, que lhes completa o serviço e assume a maioria das missões mais 'comuns'. Assim na terra como no céu...

Penguin escreveu:

Luís Henrique escreveu: Ótima discussão mesmo.
A maioria das limitações do Raptor serão sanadas. Só não sei quando.
Existe estudo para incluir o HMD.
Existe estudo para alterar o radar APG-77 e incluir um datalink que permita comunicação com outros meios.
E as Small Diameter Bombs estão sendo integradas. O que vai ampliar a capacidade de ataque do Raptor também.

Da mesma forma o Rafale, o Eurofighter e outros seguem o mesmo caminho.
Engraçado é que alguns que defendem os americanos, massacram o Rafale.

Em uma discussão recente onde eu afirmei que foi divulgado que o Rafale F2 SEM HMD venceu o Super Hornet com HMD e AIM-9X em combate dogfight, um forista me disse que é pura bobagem. Que um caça sem HMD não pode vencer outro com HMD.
Só que o engraçado é que NINGUÉM vence o Raptor. E o Raptor também não possui HMD.....
Bom, eu entendo, para mim o Corinthians é melhor que o Barcelona....

O F-22 possui capacidades não presentes em caças de 4a geração: stealth + supercruise operacional + empuxo vetorado. Além de sistemas eletronicos revolucionários (AESA, ALR-94, etc). Tb possui um envelope de vôo acima da média. Ele combaterá prioritariamente a distância. Por esse motivo, e falta de grana, se deixou para depois a integração do HMD e AIM-9X.

Quanto aos datalinks, a idéia é equipar os F-22 tb com o Multifunction Advanced Data Link [MADL], de características stealth e que equipará o F-35, B-2 e UAVs: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/ ... For%20F-22

Na JFTEX, Rafales da Marinha Francesa estiveram baseados em porta-aviões da USN. Foram realizados DACT de curta distância com os SH. Embora aliados, ambos esconderam suas capacidades uns dos outros. No caso do SH, foi dito em artigo da revista AFM que as potencialidades da combinação AIM-9X+JHMCS não foram mostradas nesses encontros.

Deste exercício, nada se disse além do que saiu na revista AFM. Nada de scores. Adicionalmente alguns videos divulgados por algum gabador piloto francês.

Eu disse sim, que chegar a conclusões baseadas em filmetes é pura bobagem. Serve apenas para tirar sarro em fóruns.

Sobre táticas de combate aéreo e novas tecnologias, postei recentemente um texto muito interessante, embora meio decepcionante para os amantes do top gun com canhões, a la Guerra da Coréia:

Fighter Tactics
29/05/2001
Jane's Military Aerospace

New-generation aircraft such as the Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, and F-22 Raptor are in-service now
or under-test. Most attention is naturally focused on airframe-related advances -- stealth, supersonic
maneuverability, and so on. But it is smaller, often overlooked details that may bring about a revolution
in air combat and some of the most important changes since the advent of the missile-armed supersonic
fighter in the 1960s.

Within 10 years, many in-service fighters will be armed with new and much more lethal air-to-air
missiles (AAMs). They will be carrying more advanced radars and other technologies which make it
much less difficult to declare a target as 'hostile' well beyond-visual-range (BVR). They will also be
operating with tactical datalinks which allow several aircraft to share tactical information in a manner
which is simply impossible for most aircraft today. Individual and formation tactics will change, but the
implications of new technology are such that nobody knows exactly how that will happen.

AAM technology defines the depth of the air battle. "Whoever has the longest reach controls the
engagement," comments fighter analyst Ben Lambeth of the Rand Corporation. Lambeth recalls flying
out of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. F-15s armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range AAM
(AMRAAM) took on four F-15s simulating MiG-29s armed with R-27 Alamo MRAAMs and R-73
Archer SRAAMs (Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile). "I never had a tally on any of the bad guys. I rarely
saw our wingman. We never put more than 3g on the airplane and we never got inverted. There were
missiles and people dying everywhere."

This result reflects today's level of technology, in which the within-visual-range (WVR) and
beyond-visual-range (BVR) envelopes are separate. A BAE Systems paper from 1996 -- reflecting the
UK thinking that led to the adoption of the BAE Systems Meteor AAM for the Typhoon -- points out
that a target beyond 40km range "can feel free to maneuver without fear of engagement". This is echoed
by Robert Shaw, former US Navy fighter pilot and author of Fighter Combat Tactics. "There is virtually
no missile that you can't outmaneuver at maximum range."

With today's weapons -- the BAE paper notes -- most MRAMM engagements will take place
between 15-40 km range. Older short-range AAMs "lack not only total energy but also missile speed"
and are most lethal at ranges under 8 km, according to BAE. Between 8-and-15 km, therefore, there is a
"commit zone" where the target can still avoid a merge into close combat if the odds are unfavorable.

The key to the next generation of MRAAMs -- such as the Meteor -- is greater range and (more
importantly) greater energy at range. The result is a much larger "no-escape zone". This zone
surrounds a target and defines the maximum range at which the target cannot outmaneuver a missile
shot. The missile's kill probability may be almost constant from its minimum range out to 80 km. (One
issue here, observes Shaw, is that it may be difficult to confirm that the missile has found its target,
particularly in poor visibility. This may be one reason why Meteor has a 2-way datalink.)

Boeing has joined the Meteor program with the intention of marketing the missile in the U.S. The
situation is complicated by the fact that the F-22 needs it less than other fighters. Earlier this year, F-22
chief test pilot Paul Metz confirmed that the F-22's speed and altitude capability acts as a booster stage
for the common-or-garden AMRAAM. At Mach-1.5 and at greater altitude than the target (the F-22 has
a very fast climb rate and a service ceiling well above 50,000 feet), AMRAAM's range is 50% greater
than is the case in a subsonic, same-altitude launch.

New SRAAMs are faster than the AIM-9 Sidewinder (due to larger motors or smaller wings) and
have new infrared (IR) dome materials which do not blind the seeker when they are heated by air
friction. With imaging infrared (IIR) seekers, they are just as effective against a non-afterburning target
as against a full-reheat target. Under some circumstances, a modern SRAAM is [even] a BVR missile,
capable of being cued-on to the target by aircraft sensors and locking-on to it at an extreme range of 12-
20km. "You can expect to be engaged from about 80 km inbound and enter a MRAAM no-escape zone
shortly thereafter," notes the BAE paper. The 'commit' decision must be made sooner and if the target
pilot commits, the target will enter a SRAAM no-escape zone [also].

Once the fighters "merge" -- that is, their momentum takes them with SRAAM range of each other,
so that the first fighter to attempt to escape will offer his opponent an open tail-on shot -- improved
SRAAMs and helmet-mounted display (HMD) technology multiply the opportunities for WVR shots.

It is no longer necessary to point the aircraft towards the adversary. Any target within the field of
regard of the missile seeker can be engaged instantly.

According to one source, US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets from the Balkans theater recently
engaged in mock combat with Israeli Air Force fighters. The Hornets were armed with AIM-9s, and the
Israeli fighters carried Python-3 and Python-4 missiles and Elbit DASH helmet sights. IDR's source
describes the results as "more than ugly" with the Israelis prevailing in 220 out of 240 engagements.

There are lessons to be learned from this engagement and other tests which have shown similar
results. One is that modern HMDs and SRAAMs are essential. A second lesson is that WVR combat is
extremely dangerous and will become even more so. "We'll see less dogfighting once we get the ability
to engage targets 90-degrees off the nose," says Shaw. "Somebody's going to get a shot. And if the
missile is lethal, you're going to get hit." Even the recent history of engagements suggests that the
"furball" of fighter combat -- with multiple engagements spread across miles of sky -- is on its way out.
"We don't see a history of high-g maneuvering in recent engagements," says one industry analyst. "It's
fun to practice, but unwise to pursue."

A third lesson is that WVR is an equalizer. "An F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high off-boresight missile
and HMD is as capable in a 1-versus-1 engagement as an F-22," comments a former Navy fighter pilot,
now a civilian program manager. "In visual combat (WVR), everybody dies at the same rate," says
RAND's Lambeth. Indeed, he says that a larger fighter like the F-22 may be at a disadvantage. In the
early 1980s force-on-force exercises at the Navy's Top Gun fighter school, F-14s were routinely seen
and shot down by smaller F-5s flown by the Navy's Aggressor units. [note: rules-of-engagement
negated the larger planes' radar advantage and forced visual identity of targets which brought the
friendly fighters in too close -- the argument being in case of no AWACS support and enemy
compromising of the IFF systems] An F-22 which slows down to enter a WVR combat also gives up
the advantage of supersonic maneuverability.

Nevertheless, the experts consulted by IDR agreed that the fighter still needs to have the ability to
fight at close-range. Including having a gun. The current state of the debate on this highly
controversial piece of equipment is that the F-22 has a gun -- indeed, its M61A2 installation, complete
with a neat power-actuated door over the muzzle, is one of the most complex ever seen -- as does the
U.S. Air Force version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The U.S. Navy had apparently decided at one
point to forego the gun on the JSF -- which is primarily intended as a deep-strike aircraft -- but Boeing
program managers now say that there is an "ongoing debate" on the subject. The Marines -- concerned
about vertical landing weight -- have settled on a "missionized" gun, installed in a packaged that
replaces an internal bomb station. Both JSF competitors have selected a Boeing-developed version of
the Mauser BK 27m cannon, fitted with a linkless feed system by Western Design. The UK Royal Air
Force has considered eliminating the gun from its second trance of Typhoons, not so much to save
weight as to eliminate training and support costs.

Fonte: http://www.stealthskater.com/Documents/Fighter_1.pdf

Note: because important websites are frequently "here today but gone tomorrow", the following was
archived from Jane's Military Aerospace
http://www.janes.com/aerospace/military ... _1_n.shtml on 05/29/2001 .
This is NOT an attempt to divert readers from the aforementioned website. Indeed, the reader
should only read this back-up copy if the updated original cannot be found at the original
author's site.

[]s

Sobre táticas de combate aéreo e novas tecnologias, postei recentemente um texto muito interessante, embora meio decepcionante para os amantes do top gun com canhões, a la Guerra da Coréia:

"stealth + supercruise operacional + empuxo vetorado."

Carlos Mathias escreveu:

Sobre táticas de combate aéreo e novas tecnologias, postei recentemente um texto muito interessante, embora meio decepcionante para os amantes do top gun com canhões, a la Guerra da Coréia:

É mesmo, mister BVR?
Então prá quê isso aqui ó?

"stealth + supercruise operacional + empuxo vetorado."

Se tudo se resolve com os BVR, prá quê supermanobrabilidade e altas velocidades?
Energia cinética pros mísseis... Sei...
Mas isso já existe hoje faz um tempão aliás.

Você colocou um texto em que tudo funciona 100% o tempo e todas as vezes para quem quer defender o BVR como a solução de todos os problemas.

Não é.
A prova?
HMD e mísseis de 4/5ºG, que estão colocando nos F-22.

There are lessons to be learned from this engagement and other tests which have shown similar
results. One is that modern HMDs and SRAAMs are essential. A second lesson is that WVR combat is
extremely dangerous and will become even more so. "We'll see less dogfighting once we get the ability
to engage targets 90-degrees off the nose," says Shaw. "Somebody's going to get a shot. And if the
missile is lethal, you're going to get hit." Even the recent history of engagements suggests that the
"furball" of fighter combat -- with multiple engagements spread across miles of sky -- is on its way out.
"We don't see a history of high-g maneuvering in recent engagements," says one industry analyst. "It's
fun to practice, but unwise to pursue."

A third lesson is that WVR is an equalizer. "An F-5 or a MiG-21 with a high off-boresight missile
and HMD is as capable in a 1-versus-1 engagement as an F-22," comments a former Navy fighter pilot,
now a civilian program manager. "In visual combat (WVR), everybody dies at the same rate," says
RAND's Lambeth. Indeed, he says that a larger fighter like the F-22 may be at a disadvantage. In the
early 1980s force-on-force exercises at the Navy's Top Gun fighter school, F-14s were routinely seen
and shot down by smaller F-5s flown by the Navy's Aggressor units. [note: rules-of-engagement
negated the larger planes' radar advantage and forced visual identity of targets which brought the
friendly fighters in too close -- the argument being in case of no AWACS support and enemy
compromising of the IFF systems] An F-22 which slows down to enter a WVR combat also gives up
the advantage of supersonic maneuverability.