NOTÍCIAS

[Loki]

Só tem um probleminha, antes das novas refinarias ficarem prontas, aquelas que muita gente critica por não serem necessárias, etc e tal, não tem gasolina suficiente para a demanda interna.

SEMPRE que falta álcool e o governo baixa a porcentagem da mistura, lá vamos nos comprando gasolina do Chavito, dos USA, e quem mais nos vender!

uma sugestão, não é melhor levar essa conversa animada para a"geopolitica energética"?

http://www.defesabrasil.com/forum/viewt ... 11&t=15207

Abraço

Loki

[Junker]

Pelo jeito, vão ter que reabrir a investigação do Arms Deal na África do Sul:

Saab admits R24-million bribe paid to clinch arms deal
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN - Jun 16 2011 19:07

Swedish defence group Saab on Thursday admitted that millions were paid to clinch a South African contract for fighter jets but said its erstwhile British partner BAE Systems had paid the bribes.

Saab said R24-million had been paid by BAE in the form of bonuses and salaries between 2003 and 2005 for the deal involving 26 JAS Gripen fighters.

The comments came after Sweden's TV4 television channel said it had evidence Saab had promised to pay Fana Hlongwane, then advisor to the South African defence minister and also serving as a consultant to the Swedish firm, millions of euros in bonuses if Pretoria did not back out of the Gripen deal.

Saab said R24-million had been paid by its South African subsidiary Sanip, which was then controlled by BAE Systems.

Saab president and chief executive Haakan Bushke denied responsibility, saying in a statement: "A person employed by BAE systems has without Saab's knowledge signed for us an unknown contract, signed for us up until now unknown transactions ..."

BAE Systems said last week it had sold its stake in Saab for £152-million.

The 1999 deal with South Africa provided for the sale of 28 jets for about R15.5-billion but this was later whittled down to 26. The last plane is due to be delivered next year. -- AFP

http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-16-s...nch-arms-deal/

Saab admits secret arms-deal payments
SAM SOLE & STEFAANS BRüMMER CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA - Jun 17 2011 00:00

In a disclosure likely to re-ignite controversy about the long-running arms-deal scandal, Swedish multinational Saab has disclosed that R24-million paid to defence consultant Fana Hlongwane was hidden from Saab by its partner in the deal, BAE Systems.

Hlongwane, an adviser to Defence Minister Joe Modise at the time the deals were negotiated, has received so-called "commission" payments of more than R200-million from entities controlled by BAE.

Until now, Saab, which bid to supply its Gripen fighter jet to South Africa in a joint venture with BAE, has denied knowledge of payments to Hlongwane, but Swedish media disclosures of a contract between Hlongwane Consulting and a company called Sanip prompted Saab to re-open its investigation.

Sanip, jointly controlled by BAE and Saab, was the vehicle for managing the industrial participation -- or offset -- obligations generated by the South African deal.

The Hlongwane contract purported to reward him for consultancy services in meeting those offset obligations.

On Thursday, Saab confirmed that the contract with Hlongwane was concluded without its knowledge, in spite of the company being in a joint venture.

"Our review revealed that about R24-million was paid from BAE Systems to Sanip. These payments were transferred to the South African consultant shortly thereafter.

"These transactions have never been entered into the accounts," said Saab’s president and chief executive, Håkan Buskhe.

"A person employed by BAE Systems has, without Saab's knowledge, signed transactions as well as signing the audited and apparently inaccurate financial statement for 2003."

The company denied there was a basis for the claim that the payments constituted a bribe, but said: "We are still highly critical … that the company's bank account was utilised as a payment tool."

The covert nature of the contract and the payments casts new doubt on national director of public prosecutions Menzi Simelane's decision to halt the investigation of Hlongwane.

Saab said all investigation material had been handed over to Sweden's chief -prosecutor, Gunnar Stetler, at the national Anti-Corruption Unit. Stetler is in the process of deciding whether to re-open a criminal investigation of the deal in Sweden.

In March 2010 Simelane ordered the Asset Forfeiture Unit to abandon its bid to freeze Hlongwane's assets, mostly held in offshore accounts. The unit had obtained an interim order and was preparing to make a case to seize the assets as the proceeds of crime.

Simelane invited representations from Hlongwane's attorneys and thereafter accepted that the consultancy agreements presented to him were above board, in spite of the fact that there was no evidence of legitimate services provided to account for the enormous sums paid. The revelation that BAE hid at least one agreement from its Swedish partner casts further doubt on Simelane’s decision.

http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-17-saab ... l-payments

'Hawks must probe new arms-deal bribery claims'
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA - Jun 17 2011 16:00

Opposition parties have urged the Hawks to re-open the probe into the multibillion-rand arms deal after new bribery claims emerged.

General Anwa Dramat, head of the directorate of priority crimes (the Hawks), should now re-open the investigation into the arms deal and investigate the claim that R24-million was transferred to a South African consultant by BAE Systems, Democratic Alliance spokesperson David Maynier said.

On Thursday, Saab chief executive officer Hakan Buskhe issued a press statement admitting that an internal investigation had revealed that about R24-million had been paid by BAE Systems to Sanip Pty Ltd, he said in a statement.

While the payments were then transferred from Sanip to a South African consultant, the transactions were never entered into Sanip's accounts, and the payments took place without the knowledge of Saab.

"The consultant who received the secret payments is reportedly Fana Hlongwana, who was an adviser to former Minister of Defence Joe Modise, and who was alleged to have received up to R200-million in commissions relating to the acquisition of 26 Gripen fighter jets from Saab/British Aerospace," Maynier said.

The information revealed by Buskhe was very serious, he said. It amounted to a prima facie case of bribery and/or corruption in respect of the arms deal and should be investigated.

"If the payments were above board, why was it necessary to launder the money through Sanip, a company which was reportedly set up by Saab/British Aerospace to manage the arms deal offsets?"

"The DA will therefore be writing to General Anwa Dramat, head of the Hawks, to confirm that the Hawks will be investigating the R24-million payment reportedly made to Fana Hlongwana by BAE Systems," Maynier said.

In another statement, Freedom Front Plus leader Pieter Groenewald said the "fact that Saab has now acknowledged that it had paid a bribe in the arms acquisition transaction with South Africa, and that names are being mentioned, should have the result of an immediate investigation by the Hawks".

Other investigations, such as that of the auditor general and the Public Protector, had earlier found that there had been no irregularities but that there had been a number of allegations of bribery which could not be proven.

"Now that proof has been found, the Hawks cannot but investigate the issue," he said.

The arms acquisition program had always been clouded in controversy due to allegations of corruption and bribery and there was an opportunity now to investigate the issue and bring it to a close which would be in the interest not only of the SA National Defence Force but also in the interest of the whole country, Groenewald said. --Sapa

http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-17-hawk ... ery-claims

[soultrain]

Sim, claro. A virgem arrependida não sabia de nada...

[marcelo l.]

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/busin ... nse21.html

No auge da Guerra Fria, a Paris e Shows Farnborough Air normalmente poderia ser invocada para produzir novos produtos militares a cada ano.Foi um período de bonança para os contratantes privilegiada no campo e para as suas legiões de fornecedores e fabricantes de peças.Um número de programas iniciados nesse período, como a Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, o Eurofighter Typhoon da EADS, Dassault Rafale eo Gripen da Saab, continuam a sair da linha de montagem.

Mas seus dias estão contados (F-22 de produção deve terminar dentro de um ano ou dois) e sucessores são pouco para ser visto fora da China e da Rússia.

Os EUA F-35 Joint Strike Fighter , também um Lockheed Martin produto, é uma exceção, mas seu desenvolvimento continua bem atrasado e os seus custos estão subindo.A projeção do Pentágono recente dos custos totais de propriedade mais de 50 anos de serviço de desenvolvimento, testes, fabricação e operacional chegou à cifra impressionante de um trilhão de dólares, causando apreensão sério mesmo entre os veteranos endurecidos de guerras orçamento militar.

Como o falecido senador dos EUA Everett Dirksen disse: Um bilhão aqui, um bilhão de lá, e logo você está falando de dinheiro real.O mesmo vale para trilhões.

O F-35 é um projeto multinacional com um número da NATO e EUA-friendly países entre seus clientes pretendidos e co-produtores, incluindo Austrália, Grã-Bretanha, Canadá, Dinamarca, Itália, Holanda, Noruega, Turquia, Israel e Cingapura.Os EUA planeja comprar 2.443 da aeronave, e as compras pelas outras nações vai trazer o total para mais de 3.100.

O alarme entre todas as partes sobre os custos continua a monte e é cada vez mais vocal, levantando preocupações sobre o número de aeronaves que serão realmente produzidos.

Alexandra Ashbourne, um consultor militar baseada em Londres, sugeriu que os efeitos combinados de atrasos, aumento dos custos e do rápido aumento na capacidade de drones e mais sofisticados veículos aéreos não tripulados podem levar à rescisão do F-35 compras antes do planejado.Sua visão é apoiada por recentes discussões de um possível sistema de ataques estratégicos dos EUA - ainda em fase inicial de planejamento - incluindo um "opcionalmente tripulada" plataforma de entrega não-nucleares, capazes de permanecer no ar, na estação, para até 100 horas.

A partir de janeiro de 2011, os EUA do Departamento de Defesa estava olhando para uma compra de 175 aeronaves com um custo do programa de US $ 40 bilhões a US $ 50 bilhões, eo primeiro vôo tão cedo quanto 2016.

O F-35 oferece alguns paralelos infeliz com programas anteriores EUA aeronaves militares.

Em 1961, Robert McNamara, no início de seu período como secretário de Defesa, dirigiu o início do programa F-111, destinado a servir a Força Aérea e Marinha.A Marinha retirou-se do programa em 1968, embora a Força Aérea passou a usar o F-111 tanto como um caça-bombardeiro e, como um bombardeiro com armas nucleares estratégicas.

Em 1981, no início do governo Reagan, a força aérea planejava comprar 132 bombardeiros B-2 stealth, mas as restrições orçamentais cortar a compra de 21 (dos quais um foi perdido em um acidente de formação).O F-22 foi cortado a 187 aeronaves em 2005, contra um 648 planejados.

Praticamente todas as armas principais nações compra, além do petro-poder e, provavelmente, China, estão enfrentando restrições orçamentárias cada vez mais rigorosas.

Grã-Bretanha, por exemplo, teria cancelado as ordens definitivas para dois da Marinha Real Queen Elizabeth classe porta-aviões convencionais até que o governo de entrada o primeiro-ministro David Cameron descobriu que o cancelamento custaria quase tanto como completar os vasos.Após a conclusão, o segundo navio será colocado imediatamente ou vendido para outro país.

Índia, preocupado com seu vizinho, a China, poderia ser um comprador lógica.O governo indiano está engajado em um programa de avaliação para a nova aeronave de combate, em que os competidores só restantes estão o Eurofighter Typhoon eo Rafale Dassault.

[faterra]

... Grã-Bretanha, por exemplo, teria cancelado as ordens definitivas para dois da Marinha Real Queen Elizabeth classe porta-aviões convencionais até que o governo de entrada o primeiro-ministro David Cameron descobriu que o cancelamento custaria quase tanto como completar os vasos.Após a conclusão, o segundo navio será colocado imediatamente ou vendido para outro país. ...

Xiiiiii! Deixem o Fábio ler isto! Vai virar uma sarna prá cima dos marinheiros do DB. E este vai ser novinho.

[AlbertoRJ]

China's 5G fighter 'a showoff'
Topic: 49th International Paris Air Show in Le Bourget

China's fifth-generation fighter program is more for effect than substance, Russia's leading aircraft maker said on Monday.
China carried out its first test-flight of a fifth-generation stealth fighter in January.
"It was more a demonstration than a real program," Mikhail Pogosyan, head of United Aircraft Corporation, said.
The Chinese aircraft industry is developing successfully but it lacks what is required for a breakthrough, he said.
"There will be no breakthroughs here. Great scale and great experience are needed to carry out such programs," Pogosyan said.
Russia is testing its own fifth-generation aircraft T-50 PAK FA developed by the Sukhoi design bureau. The aircraft is expected to become operational in 2015.
China's prototype Black Silk J-20 stealth fighter is thought to be similar to the U.S. F-22 Raptor and the Russo-Indian T-50 jets, although imagery and video footage appearing on the internet suggested the Chinese model is larger. This means it could be capable of flying a longer range and carrying a heavier load.
China has been working on a future fighter program since the mid-1990s, and the J-20 is notionally anticipated to enter service around 2018-2020.

http://en.rian.ru/world/20110620/164727664.html

[AlbertoRJ]

PARIS: Russia's PAK-FA fighter shows promise
By Alan Dron

Russia's Sukhoi PAK-FA stealthy fifth-generation fighter is showing promise in its test-flight programme and will probably fly at Moscow's MAKS air show in August, says United Aircraft chief Mikhail Pogosyan.
"There is no aircraft in the world that doesn't undergo certain modifications based on the test [programme] results. The most successful only require minor modifications to support systems. Our experience so far gives us confidence that we will avoid significant problems. The past year gives us sound grounds to say we are moving in the right direction.
"We're quite happy and pleased with the course of testing."
Two prototypes are now flying at the Gromov flight test centre at Zhukovsky, a suburb southeast of Moscow.

Russia has a requirement for 150 or more of the aircraft, which carries the internal Sukhoi designation of T-50, to enter service from 2015-16. India plans to buy between 200 and 250 of a modified design under the designation Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft.
Pogosyan denies that New Delhi is simply providing funding for Russian designers to produce a modified aircraft for the Indian air force's requirements.
He says India is bringing its own engineering input to the joint variant, although he declines to detail New Delhi's contribution beyond saying it covers aspects of airframe design, software development and other systems.
Pogosyan points to previous co-operation between the two countries in which Indian engineers helped to develop the capabilities of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI in Indian service as evidence of India's engineering expertise.
Asked for his professional opinion on China's J-20 stealth fighter unveiled in January, Pogosyan says: "You'd better ask the Chinese."
Pressed on whether he feels the aircraft is a genuine prototype or merely a technology demonstrator, he says: "China's aviation industry has achieved really significant progress. But on the other hand, to create a really competitive product is time-consuming, demands significant experience in the engineering field and experienced human resources."
All the latest news, video and images from the 2011 Paris air show

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... omise.html

[AlbertoRJ]

PARIS: Interview: United Aircraft president Mikhail Pogosyan

By Alan Dron

Managing a huge aerospace conglomerate is never an easy job at the best of times. Doing so when the president and prime minister of your country take a close personal interest in its progress is positively unnerving. Especially when you know that the president fired your predecessor.
That is the situation facing Mikhail Pogosyan, president of Russia's United Aircraft.
Previously the general director of Sukhoi, responsible for military aircraft such as the Su-27 family of fighters, he retained that position and also remained chief executive officer of RSK MiG when he stepped up to the top UAC job earlier this year.
Both president Dmitry Medvedev and prime minister Vladimir Putin see the aerospace sector as an industry that can help diversify the Russian economy away from its bias towards natural resources such as oil, gas and rare metals. They also see its potential as a valuable earner of foreign currency.
Pogosyan puts the most positive interpretation on being the subject of close government attention. Commenting that success in the commercial aviation market relies on the combined efforts of manufacturers, the supply chain and governmental assistance, he says: "Certainly, we rely on the government's support."
His priority, he says, is to replicate UAC's leadership in the military sector in the commercial arena. He believes the Sukhoi SJ100 Superjet regional airliner - now entering service - and the Irkut MS-21 150- to -210 seat airliner have real potential in international markets. UAC is in talks with Aeroflot over both types and is also talking to other Russian carriers, including major players such as Transaero and UT Air, about the types.
With this in mind, the Superjet will be in the Le Bourget flying display. "It's very important to demonstrate the aircraft in flight," says Pogosyan.
His goal at UAC is not to develop a new strategy but to consolidate its resources, fully harness its intellectual potential and increase innovation within the company.
One way of doing this is to build international alliances. UAC already co-operates closely with Italy's Alenia in marketing the Superjet, uses western European manufacturers such as Thales and Liebherr as suppliers and in April signed a joint venture agreement with Ukrainian company Antonov.
Pogosyan places considerable importance on the last of these. The new UAC-Antonov joint venture will market and provide after-sales support for civil airliners such as the An-148/158 regional jet and the An-70 military transport.
"To rely on the traditional co-operative ties that Russia has with Antonov makes sense when you're aiming at a renovation of serial production of transport aircraft," he says. "One of the top priorities for UAC is entry into the [military] transport aircraft market."
Uniting the two companies' "intellectual potential" will create synergies that will allow them to move forward much more quickly than if the two companies attempted to operate separately in the military transport sector.
With this in mind, UAC and Antonov are still studying the possible production relaunch of the Antonov An-124 ultra-heavy transport, but in the short term are looking at modernising existing examples.
There is also renewed stress on the Antonov An-70 medium transport, the development of which has languished in recent years. In April, Russian defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov visited Antonov's Kiev plant. The Ukrainian company reported him as saying: "We really need this aircraft," citing a Russian defence ministry order for 60 of the type.
Pogosyan confirms that "several dozen" An-70s are under discussion, and adds that talks are under way with Antonov on a schedule to launch serial production.
Meanwhile, production of the Ilyushin Il-476, a major update of the Il-76 strategic transport with improvements including more fuel-efficient Aviadvigatel PS90A2 engines and a glass cockpit, is under way at the Aviastar-SP plant at Ulyanovsk, with service entry expected in 2013 and an estimated 50 aircraft required by the Russian air force by 2020.
In total, the defence ministry intends to buy around 200 transport aircraft of various types by the end of the decade, adds Pogosyan.
As one of the best-known and longest-serving members of Russia's aerospace industry, Pogosyan has a background of success. He kept Sukhoi's military aviation interests afloat through the difficult times of the 1990s and early 2000s through exports of substantial numbers of the Sukhoi Su-27 family at a time when sales of Russian civil aircraft shrivelled.
When his appointment to his current position was announced early this year, former Flightglobal executive editor and now trenchant blogger Kieran Daly described Pogosyan's new role as "the world's worst aerospace exec job". Possibly so, but if anyone can bring success to UAC, it's Mikhail Pogosyan.
All the latest news, video and images from the 2011 Paris air show

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... khail.html

[Luiz Bastos]

SE JOBIM SAIR, COMO FICA A DEFESA? -
Carlos Chagas

Volta e meia ressurge o boato: Nelson Jobim pediu para sair, aliás, já tinha pedido quando Dilma o nomeou para continuar no ministério da Defesa. Se for verdade, eis mais um problema para a presidente da República: quem designar para o ministério?
Dificuldades, propriamente, Dilma não encontrou para substituir Antônio Palocci e Luiz Sérgio. Como não encontrará para trocar a maioria dos outros auxiliares. Na Defesa, porém, é diferente. Trata-se de uma pasta delicada, daquelas exigindo não apenas competência, mas muito jogo de cintura para lidar com as forças armadas.
O Lula enfrentou situação similar e precisou apelar para o então vice-presidente José Alencar, que agüentou o tranco e fez o sacrifício, sendo afinal sucedido por Nelson Jobim. Só que agora não seria o caso de pensar em Michel Temer. Antes de ser vice-presidente, ele é chefe do maior partido nacional, não se misturando as quantidades. José Genoíno, feito auxiliar principal do ainda ministro não se coaduna com a função, menos por ter sido guerrilheiro,coisa que Dilma também foi, mais por desconhecimento das questões castrenses. Nome senão ideal, mas palatável, seria o ex-presidente José Sarney, mas suas funções no Senado tornam a hipótese inviável. Seria sonho de noite de verão imaginar uma mulher ministra da Defesa. Sendo assim, melhor para todos parece mesmo receber como boato e possibilidade inverossímil a saída de Nelson Jobim.

[wagnerm25]

Olha, com todo respeito a família dos mortos no acidente da Bahia, mas não dá para a FAB ficar transportando corpo de quem não tem nada a ver com função pública. Ser namorada da filha do governador não é motivo suficiente, lamento.

[cvn73]

OrbiSat, da Embraer, desenvolve radar para avião não tripulado
Sistema é alternativa aos satélites e radares para aviões de grande porte, e pode ser usado, por exemplo, para vigilância em áreas de mata fechada
22 de junho de 2011 | 23h 00



Roberto Godoy, de O Estado de S. Paulo

PARIS - A OrbiSat, empresa de alta tecnologia aeroespacial, está lançando no Salão de Aeronáutica de Le Bourget, em Paris, o primeiro radar de sensoriamento remoto embarcado em um veículo aéreo não tripulado (Vant) de pequeno porte.

Segundo o presidente da OrbiSat, Maurício Aveiro, o sistema é o primeiro do mercado internacional a operar na banda P - isso significa que, em voo sobre áreas de mata fechada, o equipamento "enxerga" eletronicamente debaixo da copa das árvores. Assim, a leitura permite saber a altura da cobertura vegetal, o desenho do relevo e a constituição do solo. O mapeamento envolve a coleta de outras informações, como o perfil geológico e do microclima.

A empresa vai oferecer inicialmente apenas os serviços, usando um Vant, turboélice, construído pela Aeroalcool, de Franca, a 400 km de São Paulo. O conjunto aviônico é da AGX, de São Carlos, 233 km distante da capital. A OrbiSat faz parte da Embraer Defesa e Segurança.

Maurício Aveiro estima o mercado interno imediato em cerca de R$ 25 milhões. "A demanda externa, todavia, é bem maior, pode chegar a R$ 100 milhões", afirma. Ainda assim, a operação é de baixo custo, "significativamente inferior à contratação do mesmo levantamento por meio de satélites especializados", sustenta Aveiro.

De olho na selva. A empresa está acumulando experiência na operação por sensoriamento remoto. Contratada pelo Comando do Exército, executa o projeto Cartografia da Amazônia, que implica na produção de imagens e dados em uma área equivalente à da Europa Ocidental.

O conjunto do Sarvant vai trabalhar em espaços menores - fazendas, hidrelétricas, reservatórios, reservas ambientais, glebas agrícolas, campos de mineração, plataformas de petróleo e pontos de interesse estratégico para a Defesa. "Em outro viés, o radar será útil em missões pontuais de patrulha, ou ainda, de busca e salvamento em florestas", diz.

A aeronave tem autonomia de 10 horas e pode mapear 500 km², na escala 1:5.000, em um só voo.

O Sarvant, pronto para decolagem, pesa pouco mais de 140 quilos. A fuselagem, compacta, não passa de 3,2 metros de comprimento. A asa é extensa, tem seis metros de envergadura. Velocidade: 200 km/hora.

Embraer no comando. A Embraer Defesa e Segurança assumiu, em março, o controle da OrbiSat da Amazônia S/A. Pagou R$ 28,5 milhões por 64,7% do capital social da divisão de radares da companhia, que tem previsão de faturamento estimada em R$ 50 milhões até dezembro, acredita Luis Carlos Aguiar, presidente da Embraer Defesa. Criada em 1998, a OrbiSat mantém instalações em Manaus, São José dos Campos e Campinas. No total, as fábricas nas três praças empregam 250 técnicos.

A organização desenvolveu e está construindo para o Exército nove radares digitais de campo M60 Saber. O Comando da Aeronáutica está estudando a aquisição de mais quatro. O equipamento permite detectar e seguir, simultaneamente, 40 alvos aéreos em um raio de 60 quilômetros, na altitude de até 5,2 mil metros. Cheio de possibilidades, o M60 é capaz de apontar helicópteros pairando no ar , caças em voo rasante e objetos em deslocamento lento, na faixa de 32 km/ hora.

O radar pode trabalhar integrado a uma rede de 12 diferentes armas. Exigência do projeto, o Saber precisa de três soldados para ser montado e de 15 minutos para entrar em operação.

Funciona assim: identificados os alvos, as informações são levadas por um programa do Sistema de Defesa Aeroespacial Brasileiro, o Sisdabra. Os dados, transmitidos em tempo real, abrangem a localização dos veículos aéreos inimigos, diferenciados por tipo - helicópteros, aviões, mísseis ou foguetes. Da mesma família, a OrbiSat projeta o M200, com alcance de 200 km.R

[brisa]

EXCELENTE

[akivrx78]

Japan’s Stealth Fighter Gambit
June 23, 2011

Tokyo seems poised to spend billions developing the country’s first homegrown stealth warplane. But is the Shinshin really meant for military service?


It’s an arms race Beijing claims it doesn’t want, Russia can’t afford, the United States believes it can’t afford and Japan probably isn’t prepared for on its own.

All the same, the intensifying competition to build radar-evading jet fighters has had a powerful effect on the politics, industry and military forces of the Pacific's four greatest powers – and none more so than Japan’s.

The most recent chapter in a tale that began in 2005 opened with a grainy photograph of a black-painted warplane, published on an Internet forum six months ago. On Christmas Day, Chinese government Internet censors allowed the first amateur photo of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s new J-20 stealth-fighter demonstrator to linger online.

The J-20, a product of the Chengdu design bureau, is a visually impressive aircraft, substantially bigger than Western warplanes such as the F-15 and F/A-18 and adorned with sharp angles meant to reduce its radar reflectivity. Such angles are also seen on the latest US F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, both built by Lockheed Martin, plus on the Sukhoi T-50 from Russia.

More photos and videos of the J-20 soon followed. But Beijing remained silent about the new plane’s purpose and capability. Foreign analysts, meanwhile, worked themselves into something of a panic.

‘Any notion that an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or F/A-18E/F Super Hornet will be capable of competing against this Chengdu design in air combat, let alone penetrate airspace defended by this fighter, would be simply absurd,’ wrote Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon, from the think tank Air Power Australia.

If the PLAAF masters engines to match the J-20’s airframe, ‘Asian Pacific’s political landscape will be changed,’ claimed Arthur Ding, a Taiwanese analyst.

Finally, a Chinese official opened up about the J-20. It was in late May, at a press conference during PLA chief Gen. Chen Bingde’s weeklong visit to Washington, D.C. ‘We do not want to use our money to buy equipment or advanced weapons to challenge the United States,’ Chen said in response to a question about the J-20.

There was a ‘gaping gap’ between US and Chinese technology, the general admitted.

But it was too late for Chen to stop an arms race. The J-20’s appearance had already prompted the United States and its closest Pacific ally, Japan, to accelerate the modernization of their own air arsenals. Russia, cash-strapped as always, doggedly plugged away at a planned decade-long test programme using two T-50 prototypes.

Despite a ballooning federal budget deficit and flattening defence spending, Washington shifted billions of dollars into efforts to improve its fleet of F-15 Eagle and F-22 Raptor fighters, while also reaffirming its commitment to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, the total cost of which was projected to exceed $1 trillion.

Tokyo’s reaction to the J-20 was arguably even more dramatic. In a surprise move for a country that carefully avoids military confrontation, Japan revived a plan to develop its own stealth warplane – from scratch.

Today, the so-called Shinshin (‘spirit’) fighter – the product of the Advanced Technology Demonstrator, or ‘ATD-X,’ programme – exists only as a small-scale, radio-controlled model, two non-flying mock-ups and various isolated bits of technology including engines, electronics and the canopy. But plans are in place to fly a fully-functioning demonstrator no later than 2014.

What happens after that is open to speculation. Sometime after 2016, a derivative of the Shinshin could join the F-22, the F-35, the T-50 and potentially the J-20 as combat-ready stealth warplanes in widespread military use.

More likely, Tokyo will continue using Shinshin for its original purpose, as a sacrificial player in a complex political, military and industrial game, the ultimate goal of which is to win Japan a stake in a more affordable (for Japan) and potentially more effective US stealth fighter.

Either way, the J-20’s appearance has raised the stakes for Tokyo and the Japanese air force. Tokyo is facing a shortage of combat-ready fighters, a problem the Chinese warplane’s appearance underscored in dramatic fashion.

The question is whether Japan will design and build new fighters on its own, despite the high cost and extreme risk of such an endeavour – or continue relying on the Americans to supply its warplanes, a strategy that comes with its own political and industrial costs.

Bargaining Chip

The Japanese Air Self-Defence Force, in cooperation with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, launched the Shinshin programme around six years ago. At the time, Tokyo was trying to talk Washington into selling to Japan the F-22, which entered service in 2005 and is widely considered the world's best air-to-air fighter.

It’s fair to say that the Shinshin's fortunes have always been tied to those of other countries’ stealth planes: first the F-22, next the J-20 and finally the F-35.

In 2005, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force needed around 50 fighters to replace 30-year-old, American-designed F-4 Phantoms. A competition dubbed ‘F-X’ was launched to select the new warplane. Six years later, the F-4s are still flying and F-X, repeatedly delayed, is scheduled to wrap up sometime this year.

The JASDF wants the first of the new fighters to enter service no later than 2017. Depending on the model selected, F-X could dovetail with another fighter competition known as ‘F-XX,’ which would select a type to begin replacing the oldest of Japan’s roughly 200 F-15s.

Pretty much every major, in-production Western jet fighter has been associated with F-X over the years. Today just three are still in the running: the European Typhoon, Boeing's F/A-18E/F and the F-35.

In the beginning, the F-22 was the preferred solution to the F-X requirement. But Tokyo’s lobbying for the Raptor was complicated by a US law, passed in 2000, that prohibited the stealthy plane’s export in order to protect its technology.

The Shinshin was widely viewed as an effort by Tokyo to pressure Washington into changing its F-22 policy, by showing the US leadership that Japan was determined to have a stealth fighter one way or another. Washington could either profit from Tokyo's acquisition of stealth warplanes, or stand idly by and let Japan reap all the benefits itself. That was what Aviation Week writer Bradley Perrett called ‘the implicit threat behind the ATD-X programme.’

To lend credibility to the veiled threat, Japan’s Technical Research and Development Institute – the defence ministry's main weapons-development agency – sketched out the basic shape of a radar-evading airframe and began work on a jet engine, called the XF5-1, plus other technologies.

TRDI reportedly also built at least three test models to support Shinshin development. One, a full-scale, non-flying example, was shipped to a radar range in France in 2005 to gather data on its ‘radar cross-section’ – in other words, how big the plane might appear on enemy radars. In 2006, the defence ministry released photos of the radar model for the first time.

In addition, a smaller model, around six feet-long, was built for wind-tunnel testing. Finally, TRDI assembled a 1/5-scale, radio-controlled, flying version to observe the airframe’s basic flight characteristics.

Even with all this hardware to demonstrate its seriousness, Tokyo’s stealth fighter gambit failed. The US Congress repeatedly declined to repeal the Raptor export ban, and in 2007 the US State Department made it official. ‘US law prohibits the U.S. from selling the F-22,’ the department stated. ‘The United States is committed to working with Japan as Japan chooses its future fighter aircraft, to find the appropriate capabilities for a strong and credible alliance.’

At that point, Tokyo began talking about the Shinshin as something other than a bargaining chip. Now the ATD-X programme represented Japan’s best chance for acquiring a stealth fighter – a certain kind of stealth fighter, at least. In August 2007, Japan’s Defence Ministry authorized the TRDI to construct a flying Shinshin demonstrator. ‘We realized that it was important for us to develop our domestic capabilities,’ TRDI’s Lt. Gen. Hideyuki Yoshioka explained.


In 2007, the goal was for the Shinshin prototype to fly for the first time around 2011. Production models could have followed a few years later. It would have been unlikely, but not impossible, for a combat-ready version of the Shinshin to enter service by the JASDF’s 2017 deadline for new fighters. And if even if the Shinshin had been delayed, it could have been ready in time for the F-XX competition. That would have meant Tokyo selecting an interim fighter to precede the Shinshin.

All the same, in theory the Shinshin could have eventually met at least a portion of Japan’s future fighter requirement, provided the Defence Ministry adequately funded its development. But in 2008, it unexpectedly cut back the ATD-X programme, allocating just $66 million for the next year’s work. At that level of funding, a Shinshin prototype was off the table.

Price of Admission

Cost was probably the biggest factor in the 2008 decision. It’s possible Tokyo realized that a Shinshin demonstrator should be a low priority as long as a production version remained unjustifiably pricey. ‘There’s a very big jump from funding a technology demonstrator to creating a producible aircraft,’ says Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group based in Virginia. ‘That jump is at least $20 billion, which certainly isn’t in the (ASDF) budget.’

The design and production of advanced warplanes can be enormously expensive – in some cases, the most expensive national undertaking in a country's history. At a trillion dollars over 50 years, the US military’s F-35 is the costliest weapons programme ever, and is expected to exceed on an annual basis the entire US foreign aid budget.

In the late 1980s, Israel cancelled its indigenous Lavi fighter after realizing the warplane would consume around half of the country’s annual weapons budget over many years.

Cost is the major reason why only a handful of countries design and produce their own fighters, and why just three – the United States, Russia and China – make more than one type of fighter.

Japan is constitutionally limited to spending just 1 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on the military. That makes the calculations for a domestic fighter programme even more difficult than they would be for other wealthy countries. ‘No other major country spends only 1 percent of its gross domestic product on defence,’ says Patrick Cronin, an analyst with the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.

Three percent seems to be the average, and the United States spends close to 5 percent.

Yoshioka estimated ATD-X could eventually set Japan back $100 billion once design, production, maintenance and operations were factored in. Assuming a 40-year service life for the plane, that would mean the Shinshin could consume more than 5 percent of Japan’s roughly $50-billion-a-year defence budget – and produce just a few dozen copies.

By comparison, the F-35 should account for just 3 percent of the United States’ much larger military budget. The US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps together plan to buy as many as 2,500 F-35s; foreign customers are likely to purchase hundreds more.

US fighters such as the F-35, plus their European, Russian and Chinese counterparts, are almost always meant for, and usually result in, export orders. They are often licensed for foreign production. By contrast, many smaller nations initiate what Aboulafia calls ‘national fighter concepts’ – that is, advanced combat aircraft tailored specifically to a single nation’s defence needs and produced mostly from the country’s own industrial base, with little chance of export.

‘National fighter concepts are almost always a very bad idea,’ Aboulafia says. Examples include Israel’s Lavi, an overpriced Czech fighter-bomber called the L-159 and, most catastrophically, India’s Light Combat Aircraft, which spent 30 years in development, consuming more than a billion dollars before finally producing a rudimentary, lightweight fighter this year.

As Japan is prohibited by law from exporting weapons, the Shinshin could only ever be a national fighter concept. It’s unclear why it took Tokyo a year to realize that, especially considering Japan is still trying to dig itself out of the financial hole resulting from its last national fighter, the ill-starred F-2.

That warplane began development in the late 1980s as a ‘Japanization’ of the Lockheed Martin F-16, adding a bigger wing and better electronics. But the modifications, performed by Mitsubishi, proved difficult. And the limited production run – fewer than 100 copies over 20 years – made it impossible for Mitsubishi to achieve economies of scale. It’s been claimed that an F-2 costs four times as much as an F-16, without providing anywhere near a fourfold increase in capability.

As expensive as US-made warplanes have become – $60 million per copy for an F/A-18E/F; at least $100 million for a single F-35 – they are still far cheaper than anything Japan could likely produce. The Shinshin threatened to take the national fighter concept to its most extreme, potentially bankrupting the JASDF in exchange for a small number of airplanes.

Which Niche?

It’s also unclear that the Shinshin was the right plane at the right time. ‘Japanese officials will have to compare requirements, fleet size, availability, budget constraints and questions about interoperability (with the United States), as they seek to invest wisely in the future defence of Japan,’ Cronin says.

Besides serious cost concerns, the issue of combat requirements – that is, what the warplane was meant to do – probably factored heavily in Tokyo’s decision to suspend ATD-X in 2008.

The JASDF’s fighter force is not, on average, old – only the F-4s are. Most of Japan’s approximately 400 fighters are F-15s and F-2s produced since the mid-1980s. The F-15 is built tough; the US Air Force intends to keep upgraded Eagles in service into the 2030s, and there’s no reason Japan couldn’t do the same. The F-2s should be good for at least as long.

The F-X competition is rather meant to pick a replacement for the 1970s-vintage F-4s, implying the new plane should also fill the same roles. But it’s not at all clear the Shinshin is suited to all the tasks currently assigned to the rugged Phantom. In Japanese service, the 30,000-pound F-4 performs two missions: it’s an interceptor and a ship-killer. In the former role, the Phantom fires long-range missiles to destroy enemy aircraft. In the latter, it’s a ‘truck’ for carrying air-to-surface missiles to attack warships.

In its current form, the Shinshin could be an effective aerial fighter, but not a ship-killer. Besides being a third lighter than the F-4, with commensurate reduction in payload over a similar range, it’s not designed to effectively use current and projected anti-ship missiles.

For one, any derivative of the Shinshin will presumably carry its weaponry in an internal bay, in order to minimize its radar-reflection. Such bays, a staple of advanced warplane design, largely dictate the overall size of a stealth fighter. The F-22 is big – 62 feet long, with a 44-foot wingspan and weighing 43,000 pounds empty – because it needs to accommodate eight air-to-air missiles in order to match the weapons load of the F-15 it partially replaced.

The 30,000-pound F-35 is slightly smaller than the F-22 because it is scaled to contain just two air-to-air missiles plus two 2,000-pound bombs simultaneously.

Forty-six feet long, with a 30-foot wingspan and weighing only 20,000 pounds without fuel or weapons, the Shinshin will be small for a modern fighter, to say nothing of a stealth fighter.

Stealth Jobs Programme

It’s possible Tokyo suspended ATD-X after calculating the Shinshin's long-term cost in the context of its limited ability to attack naval vessels. But that was before the events of 2010, which altered the strategic calculus not only for Tokyo, but for governments across Asia and the Pacific

In a roughly 12-month span beginning in January last year, both Russia and China unveiled, and flew, stealth fighter prototypes or demonstrators. The T-50 and J-20 are both big enough, and apparently sufficiently advanced, to be readily adapted for full-scale production – possibly within a decade's time.

It’s debatable just how much the T-50 and J-20 could actually alter the overall Pacific balance of power. But their effect on the thinking of Russia’s and China's neighbours is undeniable. ‘At this stage it’s only a psychological impact,’ Ding said of the J-20's impact. ‘It shows China's determination to spend tremendous resources to develop new fighters.’

The United States responded with a demonstration of its own determination. In one of his last major speeches as US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates reaffirmed the US commitment to air power. ‘The most plausible, high-end scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements,’ Gates said. ‘The weight of America’s deterrent and strategic military strength has shifted to our air and naval forces.’

Cash flowed with the rhetoric. This year, the Pentagon announced plans to spend $25 billion annually over three decades developing, buying and maintaining F-15s, F/A-18E/Fs, F-22s, F-35s and other warplanes. The investment is meant to preserve, indefinitely, the United States’ position as the world’s biggest and most advanced air power.

The ASDF began talking about the Shinshin again. For two years after Tokyo effectively suspended the ATD-X programme, Japanese officials were all silent about the stealth fighter. But the T-50 and J-20 changed that. ‘If the countries surrounding Japan have stealth capabilities, Japan will need to develop those capabilities itself to ensure our own defence,’ TRDI's Col. Yoshikazu Takizawa told the Associated Press in March.

Yoshioka, the ASDF general, told the same reporter that Shinshin was back in development, and should fly by 2014. He said the government would decide by 2016 whether to proceed with a combat-ready version of the plane.

With an infusion of cash and firm plans in place, suddenly the Shinshin was more viable than it had ever been during the early days of the F-X competition and Tokyo’s efforts to wheedle F-22s from Washington – or so it seemed.

In truth, the factors that rendered the Shinshin unaffordable and less than suitable operationally back in 2008 remained in 2011. The Japanese stealth fighter was still too expensive and too small to meet the ASDF's needs in the medium term.

But what if Shinshin in 2011 is just a pawn in a political, military and industrial game, as it had been in 2005? That’s Aboulafia's view. ‘I really don’t think it’s intended as a production programme,’ he says of ATD-X.

It could be that the Shinshin is now a jobs initiative, meant to keep Japan’s several hundred remaining fighter engineers employed, and their skills current, until a new warplane enters production following the F-X decision. ‘Japan’s ATD-X is an important way for Japan’s defence industry to remain ready for joint production of a new-generation fighter,’ Cronin says.

Today, just one fighter, the F-2, is still in production in Japan. After Mitsubishi delivers the last F-2 in September, the ATD-X will be the only fighter programme requiring advanced engineering. All other fighter work will be focused on maintenance and basic upgrades to existing planes.

Keeping engineers busy designing and assembling the Shinshin demonstrator would be particularly relevant to one of the three warplanes still in the F-X competition. The F-35 is the only stealth fighter vying for the Japanese contract. And signs point to it as the likely winner.

For starters, the F-35 is the closest thing to an F-22 that Japan is likely to have access to, now or in the near future. While not as fast as the Raptor or capable of carrying as many air-to-air missiles internally, the F-35 is equally stealthy by some metrics and even holds several key advantages over its larger Lockheed stable mate.


At as little as $100 million per copy, it’s potentially cheaper than the $150-million F-22, provided several ongoing cost-cutting efforts pan out. And in any event, it would certainly be far less expensive than a derivative of the Shinshin, while also more capable in many, if not most, respects.

Also, the F-35 is designed to balance both air-to-air and surface-attack missions, meaning it could replace the F-4 in both of that plane’s major roles – with one caveat. To preserve the F-35’s stealth while attacking naval vessels, Japan would need to design a new, smaller anti-ship missile…or buy into a missile being developed by Norway and Australia specifically for carriage inside the Joint Strike Fighter.

Most importantly, the F-35 isn’t only not barred from export, it’s specifically designed to be sold abroad, with electronic ‘locks’ on certain systems to prevent tampering.

Lockheed has promised to give Japanese industry – meaning Mitsubishi – a share of F-35 production. Whether that means producing or assembling parts, or building entire planes, remains to be seen. In any event, that’s more involvement than Japan would have enjoyed with the strictly US-made F-22.

Gates pushed hard for Tokyo to select the F-35. At a January press conference, he called the Joint Strike Fighter ‘the right airplane’ and the only one that could give Japan so-called ‘fifth-generation’ capability on par with the F-22.

Continuing ATD-X is the best way to preserve Japanese industry to participate in, though not monopolize, production of the ASDF’s next fighter, particularly if that fighter shares the Shinshin's stealthy qualities.

Will the Shinshin demonstrator fly in 2014, as Yoshioka said it would? It doesn’t really matter. From its beginning as a bargaining chip in negotiations for one US stealth fighter, the Shinshin has apparently evolved over the years into a front for Japanese involvement with another US stealth fighter. It can play that role without ever taking to the air.

The ASDF will probably operate warplanes equal or better to Russia’s T-50 and China’s J-20, technologically matching those countries in an escalating Pacific arms race. But if so, these planes will most likely be US designs, partially built in Japan, rather than anything purely Japanese.

Having played its sacrificial part in a complex political, industrial and military game, the Shinshin is likely to begin fading from memory as soon as the first F-35s arrive in Japan painted with the ASDF’s traditional red roundel.

Alternative Future

Or maybe not. Just as the ATD-X programme survived the F-22 campaign in order to play an equally important role in the current deliberation over F-35s or alternative fighters, the tiny Japanese stealth warplane could live on well into the 2030s, as a technology incubator for a far-term domestic fighter programme.

A panel of engineers proposed the programme in late 2010, at a meeting of the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies. They said the fighter chosen for F-X should remain in production through 2028, replacing the ASDF’s F-4s and some of its F-15s.

At which point, production should switch to an indigenous fighter to replace the rest of the F-15s and all the F-2s. The government should fly the Shinshin demonstrator for several years beginning in 2014, afterwards launching full-scale development of a new warplane using the Shinshin’s technology, the engineers said.

Essentially, the engineers’ plan delays and expands the government’s existing, but highly ambiguous, F-XX concept.

It’s a grand ambition for a country quickly ceding its ability to affordably design and produce its own fighters. And if recent trends hold, the Shinshin’s homegrown successor, as imagined by the engineers, would have less chance of actually entering service.

More likely, it would wind up a pawn in a government gambit to acquire whatever US fighter succeeds the F-35.

http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/23/japa ... er-gambit/

[thelmo rodrigues]

Asas em terra Fri, 24 Jun 2011 07:36:11 -0300
Direto da Fonte
Sonia Racy


Luiz Marinho avisa: está de olho na retomada do setor da defesa. Isso inclui conversas recentes com representantes de uma certa fábrica de helicópteros e com uma empresa europeia de carros de combate, ambas interessadas em se instalar em São Bernardo do Campo.
A de helicópteros, inclusive, escalou gente para procurar terreno na cidade.



Será a Agusta-Westland???????

[pampa_01]

Vai concorrer com RS, tbem estão pensando em construir CC por aqui. E a empresa é européia.