A Instituição que foi outrora a casa do Barão do Rio Branco

[RobertoRS]

Sobre a tal da Sakineh, não me interessa, nem um pouco, o seu destino. Se é inocente ou culpada, é um problema para o povo iraniano resolver. Essa propaganda e essas declarações anti-iranianas "bárbaros", "primitivos", cheira a mentaliadade de cruzada. "Vamos lá, salvar as mulheres! Vamos lá, acabar com a barbárie".

E o resultado seria, um só: guerra. E na guerra, muitos milhares de "Sakinehs" morreriam, não com pedras, mas com bombas, mísseis, granadas. Então, é o paradoxo: matar uma mulher com pedras é uma barbárie. Matar mil mulheres com mísseis "Hellfire", é civilização?

Quanto a essa gana de alguns comentaristas brasileiros para que o Brasil se intrometa em assuntos internos do Irá, eu só diria: "Macaco, olha o teu rabo!"

Um dia, essa intromissão pode se voltar contra o Brasil. Lembrem-se "RAPOSA SERRA DO SOL".

Existem léguas e léguas de distância entre se intrometer e ser conivente com uma barbárie como esta...

[marcelo l.]

Sexto mais importante pensador do planeta...é a maior colocação de um brasileiro na votação da foreign policy...


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... s?page=0,5
6. Celso Amorim
for transforming Brazil into a global player.

FOREIGN MINISTER | BRAZIL

Celso Amorim wouldn't crack a smile at the old canard that Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be. The wily and urbane Brazilian diplomat, finishing off his second term as foreign minister, has done his utmost to make his country an international powerhouse -- right now.

Neither reflexively opposing the United States in the style of Latin America's old left nor slavishly following its lead, Amorim has charted an independent course. He has criticized developed countries as hypocritical and advocated that developing countries take a leading role in combating climate change. This year, he teamed with an unlikely partner, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (No. 7), to cut an eleventh-hour deal designed to dial down the international tension over Iran's nuclear program. Although the initiative succeeded mostly in setting teeth on edge in Western capitals, it also put Brazil on the map.

Under Amorim's guidance, Brazil has enthusiastically embraced the BRIC alliance with Russia, India, and China, which he thinks has the power to "redefine world governance." Brazil aspires to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council; in the meantime, it has built up its diplomatic corps and boosted its contribution to international peacekeeping missions in places like Haiti. Amorim's tenure under Brazil's larger-than-life retiring president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has proved that it is possible to have, as he recently put it, "a humanist foreign policy, without losing sight of the national interest."

Entrevista



Susan Glasser, Foreign Policy's editor in chief, met Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in Brasilia for a wide-ranging conversation on Brazil's role as the rest rises. Below, the edited excerpts.

Susan Glasser: What is the big idea, as far as you see it, for Brazil's role in the world? Some people have argued that Brazil is a negotiating power, or a symbol of the emerging world order. What is your view?

Celso Amorim: I would say, of course it's a negotiating power. But it would be very simplistic to think Brazil always looks for consensus for consensus's sake. We also have a view of how things should be, and we tend to work in that direction. We struggle to have a world that is more democratic, that is to say, more countries are heard on the world scene -- a world in which economic relations are more balanced and of course in which countries in different areas can talk to each other without prejudice. And that's what we try to do in our foreign policy.

But of course Brazil is also a big country with a big economy, a multitude of cultures, and in a way similar to the United States -- but also in some ways different because the way people got here and the way they mixed was slightly different. So, Brazil has this unique characteristic which is very useful in international negotiations: to be able to put itself in someone else's shoes, which is essential if you are looking for a solution.


Mr. 'Zero Problems'

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sits down with FP.
SG: What does Brazil want from the world right now, and what are you prepared to give to get it?

CA: Well, we give engagement. We give our minds, our thoughts. This costs quite a lot. I could be using -- President Lula, myself, and all others could be using our brains for other purposes, political or economic or whatever.

Brazil still has many problems. Inequality is still very big. It diminished a lot during President Lula's government, but it's still very big. So there is a long way to go. We know our shortcomings. If you look around, you'll see more women ambassadors and so on; you'll see some black people; but there is still a long way to go. But in any case, we have also this capacity to discuss and to have dialogue which was helpful in our own evolution and has helped in our relations with South America, and I think can help with the world at large.

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I'll give you an example. One time, when I was ambassador to the U.N., they were looking for someone to take care of the sanctions committee on the former Yugoslavia. I received a call from the president of the Security Council. I was on a 10-day vacation -- a very rare thing -- in Greece somewhere, and he said, "No, no, it has to be you, Celso. It has to be Brazil because Brazil is the only one that both the Americans and the Russians will accept." Because the others either were seen as very partial or, let us face it, too weak to be able to stand the different pressures.

SG: You make a great case for Brazil as a sort of global negotiator with hopes for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. But to what extent is that a strategy for your country, or is it really a tactic?

CA: Well, having a seat at the table is a means to have your voice heard and to have your ideas heard -- because we believe in them. In the same way that you believe in the American Dream, we believe in the Brazilian Dream and also how the Brazilian example can be useful for others. And maybe because we came after we can do that maybe with some more humility, which helps. We'll never have the military power that gets near to that of -- not even to speak of the United States -- but Russia or China. We'll have to have some military power because that is essential for any state as long as the nation-state exists. But we are aware that it cannot be at that level.

In the present-day world, military power will be less and less usable in a way that these other abilities -- the capacity to negotiate based on sound economic policies, based on a society that is more just than it used to be and will be more just tomorrow than it is today -- all these are things that help. I don't think there are many countries that can boast that they have 10 neighbors and haven't had a war in the last 140 years.

SG: So you're the ultimate soft-power power.

CA: There have to be some hard elements in it, as well: economic growth, as I mentioned, and we have to have some military power, some deterrent military power. Not because of the region; we don't think anything can happen, actually. [Latin America is] quickly becoming what I choose to call a "security community" in which war becomes inconceivable. But if other conflicts happen between other countries, we have to be prepared that it doesn't come to us. So some modicum of military power is necessary. It's not totally soft. People also say we have our music; I won't say our beautiful women because that would sound not very like a --

SG: Retro, not the future.

CA: Exactly.

SG: The Brazilian example in the world sounds so similar to what President Barack Obama campaigned on: the embrace of multilateralism, the sense that new institutions of global governance are needed, talking to one's enemies and not just one's friends.

CA: At some point he even said: "It's good," he said to President Lula, "that you can talk to some people I cannot talk to."

In ideological terms, I think we are very close to President Obama. We feel a lot of identification and actually saluted and welcomed the election of President Obama in a very strong way. Even though President Lula had a very pragmatic relationship with President Bush, the fact is that precisely because of the reasons that you mentioned -- because of what he represents in terms of fighting for equality, fighting inside his country, and also fighting for a more multilateral democratic world -- we felt very much at ease, and I would say that this is still the case. It's not for me to judge, but I do believe that maybe some hard facts of reality imposed themselves on President Obama. So it's up to him to see how he can deal with them.

SG: What of your experience with multilateralism do you think is useful to the United States? What are the limits of a multilateral world?

CA: It's more useful to think about the limits of unilateralism. Because when we see the situation in Iraq, what is the country that has benefited the most from the Iraq invasion? It's probably Iran. Nowadays Iran is seen as the biggest enemy. It's a strange situation.

So unilateralism also has its limits. But with multilateralism, it's like asking, "What are the limits of democracy?" Of course democracy has its limits. Of course sometimes I would like to have things done in one month and they take one year because you have to discuss them with other ministries, with NGOs, with trade unions, with the business class, and so on. So it takes a long time. And sometimes it doesn't happen in the way I have thought precisely. But still it's much better than having an autocrat acting very quickly, even if it's an autocrat with good intentions. I would say that multilateralism is for international politics, at the stage at which we live today, more or less the equivalent of what democracy represents inside states. And people could say the same thing of multilateralism that Churchill said of democracy.

SG: The worst system except for all the others?

CA: Yes.

SG: Tell me about your new partnership, or alliance, with Turkey. How did that come about? With your joint action on Iran, you must, I think, have built a close working relationship with your counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu.

CA: Yes. Let me say, we, as part of our diversification of partners, we already had made some approaches to Turkey and vice versa because I think they were more or less in the same process. So there was an exchange of presidential visits, which had never taken place before.

SG: Yes, it's such an unlikely couple.

CA: Well, you know, sometimes unlikely couples are the most interesting ones!

What happened is that we both were trying to see how we could help in this problem of Iran. I think Turkey has its extra motives -- it's a neighbor of Iran and a Muslim country and so on and so forth. But let me tell you about the case of Brazil.

We were last year about to become a nonpermanent member of the Security Council. We think that when we are in the Security Council, whether permanent or not, we have to contribute to peace and security in the world and not just deal with our own interests.

I have followed this subject for a long time, and it was a problem that I always thought had no solution until I heard about the swap agreement. I discussed the [nuclear material] swap agreement with [then EU foreign-policy chief Javier] Solana -- which was proposed, you understand, by the United States as a reply to Iran's request to buy fuel. So I had these discussions with Solana, with [former International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed] ElBaradei, and I found there was a possibility of working for something. And I thought maybe a country like Brazil, which has this capacity for dialogue with several countries, could somehow help.

And so I discussed this subject with the Iranians. President Ahmadinejad came here. And I made trips to Iran, and I really found that it was in principle possible to pursue that role.

I had, just by chance, a trip to Turkey at the beginning of this year. When we compared notes in relation to Iran, I found out that both of us were trying to do the same thing and work along the same lines to use the swap agreement that was proposed by the United States, which was almost accepted by Iran. We saw that that was a possibility. So we found out that we were doing more or less the same thing, and we tried to coordinate our acts. And both being countries that look to have, how should I say, a more creative role in the world.

G: For many people it was a sign of "the rise of the rest," that there was a different world order in which there would be other players and not just a small handful involved in negotiating major world solutions.

CA: I don't think we had an objective to show that. But that's really true, I believe, and that will happen more and more. Of course, we keep aspiring to be a permanent member of the Security Council. But in any case, what was clear is that the nonpermanent members of the Security Council in an important case like that didn't have any say whatsoever. We were invited to see the resolution after it was really ready. I came to know it through the news agencies. Only later on were we invited to make suggestions. Of course, it was suggestions that had no importance whatsoever, so we preferred not to make any. So I think it's a good lesson also on the lack of transparency of the Security Council. What I saw in this case, and I say that very openly and without any resentment of any kind, is that the fact that you have five permanent members with veto powers discussing only among themselves lends itself to all kinds of bargaining, which is not the best kind. Negotiation is natural. Of course you have to negotiate. But you know, if I am looking for exemptions for my own firms, this is not good for world order.

SG: Did the experience leave a lasting bad taste, do you think, between Brazil and the Obama administration?

CA: No, I don't think there is any bad taste. Of course, we were disappointed because we thought we were doing precisely what was, at least in spirit, the role that was being sought. So we were disappointed that there was no time even for examination. Actually, in Brazil you have a saying for when you don't like something, a book for instance; you say, "I haven't read it, but I didn't like it." So that was what happened with the Tehran declaration. Before it was at least analyzed in all its implications, it was refused.

And another moment was when, after I think three or four weeks, the Vienna group -- the United States, Russia, and France -- wrote back to the International Atomic Energy Agency. They didn't wait for Iran's reply. They presented their letter in the morning, and before midday they were adopting the sanctions. So, again, even if Iran would say, which of course would be unlikely, they said something like, "We'll accept everything," still the sanctions would be there. I think there was this haste to approve the sanctions that we didn't like.

But this is natural. We don't take that with resentment. But of course we cannot accept when people say, "Well, you knew that it would not be sufficient" or "You knew that we would not accept" because that did not correspond to the signals we received. Now, even Ahmadinejad is already saying that he's ready to interrupt the 20 percent enrichment if there is a swap agreement. As I said, the P5 [the five permanent Security Council members] was, I think in the latest meeting, during the General Assembly, they said that they were prepared to look at the revised swap agreement -- you don't even need to call it revised. We won't charge copyright.

SG: If there's one persistent criticism of President Lula's foreign policy, it has been the surprise at his unwillingness to criticize violators of human rights. It's one thing perhaps to negotiate with President Ahmadinejad over nuclear proliferation issues, but --

CA: I don't agree with that criticism. Because first, it's not true. We have criticized very often. But we don't think that just pointing your finger at someone will actually improve human rights on the ground. So, you know, it's a different view. And we are a very strong proponent, as you know, of the Universal Periodic Review, in which everyone will be analyzed: Brazil, Sudan, the United States, Germany, everyone. What we don't like is singling out one country. We have been critical; we have made recommendations to Iran; we have made recommendations to Cuba -- we have ongoing political dialogue with Cuba in which no subject is taboo. But that's the way we act. There are things we are able to say to them that we would not be able if I just go to the world podium and say, "Here I am; I'm a great guy. I'm a self-righteous guy. And you have to do what I say."

President Lula, as you know, went very publicly, for instance, on the story of the stoning of the lady in Iran, even to the point that it might sound like a little bit of interference to our Iranian friends. But we thought in that case it was justifiable and that we had, let us say because of our good relations with them and what we had tried to do, we had the moral authority to do so. Others don't, to be quite honest. They won't be heard. They may think they have the moral authority, but they won't be heard. President Lula is heard. How many foreign ministers, how many countries can have meetings on the same day with Bill Gates and President Ahmadinejad?

[Viktor Reznov]

Sobre a tal da Sakineh, não me interessa, nem um pouco, o seu destino. Se é inocente ou culpada, é um problema para o povo iraniano resolver. Essa propaganda e essas declarações anti-iranianas "bárbaros", "primitivos", cheira a mentaliadade de cruzada. "Vamos lá, salvar as mulheres! Vamos lá, acabar com a barbárie".

E o resultado seria, um só: guerra. E na guerra, muitos milhares de "Sakinehs" morreriam, não com pedras, mas com bombas, mísseis, granadas. Então, é o paradoxo: matar uma mulher com pedras é uma barbárie. Matar mil mulheres com mísseis "Hellfire", é civilização?

Quanto a essa gana de alguns comentaristas brasileiros para que o Brasil se intrometa em assuntos internos do Irá, eu só diria: "Macaco, olha o teu rabo!"

Um dia, essa intromissão pode se voltar contra o Brasil. Lembrem-se "RAPOSA SERRA DO SOL".

Que seja auma cruzada, eu pouco ligo, mas dessa vez não será uma cruzada de cristãos contra muçulmanos, será uma cruzada do ocidente democrático contra o Islã radical. Já diz o grande ditado: "Quem cala consente."

[RobertoRS]

Sexto mais importante pensador do planeta...é a maior colocação de um brasileiro na votação da foreign policy...


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... s?page=0,5
6. Celso Amorim
for transforming Brazil into a global player.

O mundo já foi melhor frequentado, hehehe...

[EDSON]

30/11/2010 - 07h37
Documentos confidenciais revelam que, para EUA, Itamaraty é adversário
Publicidade
FERNANDO RODRIGUES
DE BRASÍLIA

Telegramas confidenciais de diplomatas dos EUA indicam que o governo daquele país considera o Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil como um adversário que adota uma "inclinação antinorte-americana".

Esses mesmos documentos mostram que os EUA enxergam o ministro da Defesa, Nelson Jobim, como um aliado em contraposição ao quase inimigo Itamaraty.

Mantido no cargo no governo de Dilma Rousseff, o ministro é elogiado e descrito como "talvez um dos mais confiáveis líderes no Brasil".

Documentos revelam infiltrações políticas dos EUA em diferentes países
Hugo Chávez está 'louco' e EUA tentaram isolá-lo
EUA queriam investigar presença da Al Qaeda na tríplice fronteira
Brasil disfarçou luta antiterror, dizem EUA
Acompanhe a Folha Poder no Twitter
Comente reportagens em nossa página no Facebook

A Folha leu com exclusividade seis telegramas (leia a íntegra em inglês) de um lote de 1.947 documentos elaborados pela Embaixada dos EUA em Brasília, sobretudo na última década.

Os despachos foram obtidos pela organização não governamental WikiLeaks. As íntegras desses papéis estarão hoje no site da ONG, que também produzirá reportagens em português. O site da Folha divulgará os telegramas completos.

Num dos telegramas, de 25 de janeiro de 2008, o então embaixador dos EUA em Brasília, Clifford Sobel, relata aos seus superiores como havia sido um almoço mantido dias antes com Nelson Jobim. Nesse encontro, o ministro brasileiro contribuiu para reforçar a imagem negativa do Itamaraty perante os norte-americanos.

Indagado sobre acordos bilaterais entre os dois países, Jobim citou o então secretário-geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.

Segundo o relato produzido por Clifford Sobel, "Jobim disse que Guimarães 'odeia os EUA' e trabalha para criar problemas na relação [entre os dois países]."

Não há nos seis telegramas confidenciais lidos pela Folha nenhuma menção a atos ilícitos nas relações bilaterais Brasil-EUA. São apenas descrições de encontros, almoços e reuniões.

Ao mencionar um acordo bilateral, Clifford Sobel diz que caberá ao presidente Lula decidir entre as posições de um "inusualmente ativo ministro da Defesa interessado em desenvolver laços mais próximos com os EUA e um Ministério das Relações Exteriores firmemente comprometido em manter controle sobre todos os aspectos da política internacional".

Num telegrama de 13 de março de 2008, Sobel afirma que o Itamaraty trabalhou ativamente para limitar a agenda de uma viagem de Jobim aos EUA.

Ao relatar a visita (de 18 a 21 de março de 2008), os EUA pareciam frustrados: "Embora existam boas perspectivas para melhorar nossa relação na área de defesa com o Brasil, a obstrução do Itamaraty continuará um problema".

CAÇAS DA FAB

Apesar de elogiado, Jobim nunca apresentou em reuniões nenhuma proposta especial aos EUA a respeito da licitação dos 36 aviões caça que serão comprados pela Força Aérea Brasileira.

Em todos os relatos confidenciais os diplomatas dos EUA em Brasília mencionam frases de Jobim que coincidem com o que o ministro declarou em público.

Em uma ocasião, por exemplo, os norte-americanos escrevem: "Compras de fornecedores dos EUA serão mais competitivas quando [o país] autorizar uma produção brasileira de futuros sistemas militares".

Procurado pela Folha, o Departamento de Estado dos EUA se recusou a comentar as comunicações sigilosas.

Uma porta-voz do departamento enfatizou que os países mantêm boas relações. A Casa Branca não respondeu à reportagem até a conclusão desta edição.

[rodrigo]

Segundo o relato produzido por Clifford Sobel, "Jobim disse que Guimarães 'odeia os EUA' e trabalha para criar problemas na relação [entre os dois países]."

Isso é publico, o problema é a fonte.

[Hader]

Desculpe-me Rodrigo. Eu conheço o Samuel pessoalmente já de muito tempo e ele não é anti-americano. Não no sentido que está sendo colocado. Nacionalista exacerbado as vezes, mas não é, a priori, anti coisa alguma.

Abraços.

[rodrigo]

Desculpe-me Rodrigo. Eu conheço o Samuel pessoalmente já de muito tempo e ele não é anti-americano. Não no sentido que está sendo colocado. Nacionalista exacerbado as vezes, mas não é, a priori, anti coisa alguma.

Você o conhece melhor que o Jobim? Caso positivo, não deixe passar a oportunidade de contradizer a informação: https://www1.defesa.gov.br/index.php?page=fale_conosco

[Hader]

E você, aposta sua credibilidade nesta suposta afirmação do JN? Tenho certeza que se eu perguntar ele vai negar. Mas depois eu te conto...

[rodrigo]

aposta sua credibilidade

Que credibilidade!?

suposta afirmação do JN

Eu não vejo televisão a mais ou menos 6 anos, então não posso responder.

[Sterrius]

Em nota, Jobim nega ter dito que colega de governo odiava os EUA
Wikileaks publicou telegramas entre embaixada americana e EUA.
Defesa admite divergência de visões, mas ressalta boas relações.

O Ministério da Defesa divulgou nesta terça-feira (30) que o ministro Nelson Jobim ligou nesta manhã para o ministro-chefe da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE), Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, para negar as afirmações atribuídas a ele em telegrama da embaixada dos Estados Unidos divulgado pelo site Wikileaks. Nesta terça, Jobim cumpre visita oficial à Polônia.

Documento divulgado pelo site aponta que, numa comunicação oficial de 2008, o então embaixador dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, Clifford Sobel, relatou uma conversa com Jobim e disse que o ministro da Defesa brasileiro havia afirmado que Guimarães “odeia os Estados Unidos”. (Veja a íntegra do documento). À época, Guimarães atuava como secretário-Geral das Relações Exteriores, o segundo cargo na hierarquia do Itamaraty.

No telefonema dado ao colega de Esplanada nesta terça, Jobim esclareceu a Guimarães que conversou sobre ele com o embaixador, mas negou a afirmação do relatório e disse que o tratou com respeito. O ministro classificou ainda Guimarães como “um nacionalista, um homem que ama profundamente o Brasil”.

Segundo Jobim, “se o embaixador disse que Samuel não gosta dos Estados Unidos, isso é interpretação do embaixador, eu não disse isso. Samuel é meu amigo”, afirmou o ministro.

Adversário
Os documentos apontam ainda que o governo americano considera o Itamaraty como um adversário, com inclinações antiamericanas. Sobel diz em um dos documentos (leia a íntegra do original, em inglês), que “a atual administração de centro-esquerda tem evitado cuidadosamente uma cooperação próxima em assuntos policiais e militares importantes para nós e tem se mantido à distância na maioria dos assuntos relacionados à segurança”.

Em nota, o ministério da Defesa destacou que "as relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos, tanto no âmbito diplomático quanto na área de Defesa, estão cada vez mais aprofundadas. No entanto, eventuais divergências entre as duas Nações tornam-se visíveis, à medida em que aumenta o relevo do Brasil no cenário internacional".

Divergências admitidas
O ministério admitiu, entretanto, divergências de visões entre Brasil e Estados Unidos, que foram expressas publicamente por Jobim em duas palestras recentes. "Na primeira palestra, em Lisboa, em 16 de setembro, o ministro protestou contra as mudanças de normas da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte(OTAN), que potencialmente autorizaria a organização a intervir militarmente em qualquer parte do mundo, inclusive no Atlântico Sul", aponta o texto.

De acordo com a assessoria da pasta, Jobim avalia que isso poderia ser pretexto para os Estados Unidos intervirem com “verniz de legitimidade” quando não tivesse respaldo da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU).

A segunda divergência manifestada por Jobim ocorreu, segundo o ministério, em reunião de ministros da Defesa na Bolívia, em 22 de novembro. "Jobim disse que o Brasil rejeita uma tese eventualmente aventada de que os Estados Unidos garantiria a defesa da América do Sul, e as Forças Armadas do continente passariam a cuidar de assuntos de Segurança, que hoje no Brasil são do âmbito policial", aponta o texto.

[Hader]

aposta sua credibilidade

Que credibilidade!?

suposta afirmação do JN

Eu não vejo televisão a mais ou menos 6 anos, então não posso responder.

Caceta, eu to disléxico no teclado! Leia-se NJ...

Você tem credibilidade Rodrigo.

[]'s

[lelobh]

30/11/2010 - 07h37
Documentos confidenciais revelam que, para EUA, Itamaraty é adversário

É, parece que o Sr. Jobim é o agente número um da inteligência americana.

O que mais ele disse as autoridades dos EUA, que para nossa infelicidade foi encaminhado/repassado por outros meios? Vai saber...

O Planalto devia combinar com os comandantes militares o lançamento de um blog, no qual se publique todos os segredos militares do Brasil, aí desarmamos o pobre coitado (também conhecido nos meios populares como "Dona Vamércia").

[lelobh]

Segundo documentos publicados nesta terça-feira pelo WikiLeaks, Jobim tem sido um interlocutor frequente dos diplomatas americanos desde que tomou posse em 2007. // Informante, minha querida, informante. Interlocutor é outra coisa.

O ministro mantinha uma relação próxima com o antigo embaixador americano Clifford Sobel, que deixou o cargo no começo deste ano - ponto de confidenciar sua irritação com o Ministério de Relações exteriores, em especial com o embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.

Jobim também contou que o presidente boliviano Evo Morales estaria sofrendo de um tumor. Sobel o considerava um ministro “atipicamente ativista” em prol da proximidade militar com os EUA.

A briga pelo acordo de defesa

Em abril deste ano, o Brasil assinou um acordo de cooperação militar com os EUA que facilita a compra e venda de armamentos, a cooperação no desenvolvimento de tecnologia e a realização de exercícios militares conjuntos.

Os arquivos diplomáticos mostram a guerra silenciosa travada dentro do governo a respeito do acordo. De um lado, o Itamaraty; do outro, Jobim.

Em 17 de janeiro de 2008, durante um café-da-manhã com o embaixador Sobel, ele desabafou sobre suas desavenças com Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.

Segundo o telegrama confidencial (CLIQUE AQUI LINK - 1387), Jobim disse que Guimarães causava “sérios problemas” não só para o acordo militar, mas nas relações entre os dois países.

“Ele odeia os Estados Unidos”, teria dito. Para ele, Guimarães estaria colocando entraves dilomáticos para evitar a visita de Jobim aos EUA, em março.

Jobim disse que preferia perder a batalha para ganhar a guerra, economizando capital político em vez de brigar na ocasição pelo acordo militar.
// Ele é ministro da Defesa de qual país mesmo?

O observador no telegrama: “O presidente Lula deve ter um papel decisivo entre um ministro de Defesa atipicamente ativista, interessado em desenvolver relações mais próximas com os Estados Unidos, e um MRE firmemente comprometido em manter controle sobre todos os aspectos da política externa e manter a distância entre o Brasil e os EUA”. // Acho que já passou da hora de acabar com o alinhamento automático, não é?

Ministro forte

Sobel via Jobim com bons olhos, como mostra a análise preparatória enviada pela embaixada antes da visita de março de 2008 (CLIQUE AQUI).

Nele, diz que Jobim é “primeiro ministro da defesa forte no Brasil”, embora ainda penasse para lidar com as três forças, bastante autônomas. Além disso, durante a administração Lula, o foco em programas sociais teria “levado a uma redução do orçamento da defesa, gerando menos oportunidades de treinamento e compras de equipamento”.

A coisa estaria mudando com a busca do país pela liderança internacional, e aí entra a figura de Jobim como um ministro que busca fortemente acordos de cooperação militar.

Na época o Brasil tinha acabado de assinar um acordo militar bilateral com a França, com bastante empenho do ministro.

Em um contexto pós-mensalão, diz o documento, Jobim seria um dos “líderes mais confiáveis do Brasil”, com uma “reputação e integridade raras entre as lideranças brasileiras”.
// Realmente, não é todo o dia que alguém altera a constituição de modo, digamos, pouco republicano

O embaixador encerra o relatório ditando palavra por palavra o que o secretário de Defesa deveria dizer a Jobim: “Como você toma decisões importantes sobre a modernização do Brasil, tenha em mente que a parceria com os EUA pode ajudar os dois países a perceber nosso objetivo comum de preservar a estabilidade no hemisfério oeste”.

Jobim esteve na capital americana entre os dias 18 e 21 de março de 2008. A visita foi conturbada aos olhos do diplomata americano. Em especial, Sobel reclama da interferência do Itamaraty, que teria feito uma verdadeira campanha de boicote à viagem.

Sobel descreve em outro documento (CLIQUE AQUI) como o MRE teria trabalhado para encurtar e esvaziar a visita.

“Enquanto Jobim dizia ao embaixador que queria uma programação completa, incluindo uma visita a Norfolk (onde há uma base aeronaval) e encontros com representantes da indústria de defesa americana, a embaixada em Washington dizia que a viagem teria que ser encurtada”, relala.

Ele avalia que “a atual administração de centro-esquerda tem evitado cuidadosamente uma cooperação próxima em assuntos policiais e militares importantes para nós e tem se mantido à distância na maioria dos assuntos relacionados à segurança”. Leia-se: tem prezado pela SOBERANIA.

E menciona acordos de compartilhamento de informação e o polêmico Artigo 98, que “blinda” cidadãos americanos da possibilidade de extradição a pedido da Corte Penal Internacional.

“A dificuldade é mais aparente no MRE, que tem uma inclinação antiamericana e impede a melhora nas relações entre o Departamento de Defesa e o Ministério de Defesa brasileiro”.

Sobel vai mais longe ao comentar que a liderança do Brasil à frente da missão de paz da ONU no Haiti - apesar do pouco apoio nacional - se deve à “obsessão” do ministro de relações exteriores Celso Amorim em obter um assento no conselho se seguranca da ONU.

Os EUA se opõem ao pleito brasileiro.

Vizinhos

Um tema que causou fricção entre o ministro brasileiro e os americanos foi o acordo militar com a Colômba. Em um encontro com a atual Ministra Conselheira da embaixada Lisa Kubiske em 13 de novermbro de 2009 (LINK- 2347), Jobim mal esconde sua irritação.

Em especial, ele reclama do vazamento de um memorando da Força Aérea americana na internet, citando “países não-amigáveis” na região como um dos motivos para o acordo militar.

“Isso mostra completa falta de entendimento sobre a América Latina”, esbravejou Jobim, que teria interferido junto a Lula para pedir “moderação” na resposta ao memorando. O ministro explicou que tanto o presidente colombiano Uribe quanto Hugo Chavez usam a retórica beligerante para desviar as atenções de problemas domésticos.

Na conversa, ele defendeu a atitude neutra do Brasil, adiantando que o governo ofereceria vigilância aérea para apaziguar as tensões na fronteira entre os dois países. Mas deixou no ar um dos pontos mais polêmicos.

Perguntado se acreditava que as Farc mantinham presença na Venezuela, respondeu que, se reconhecesse a presença, “isso arruinaria a habilidade do Brasil como mediador”.

Morales

Outro documento, de 22 de janeiro de 2009 (LINK - 188376), traz um relato inusitado sobre outro país vizinho. Jobim teria ido até Sobel para relatar em primeira mão que o presidente boliviano Evo Morales estraria sofrendo de um tumor no nariz, o que teria sido revelado em uma reunião com Lula em La Paz. Lula teria oferecido tratamento em São Paulo. // Que bom, o cara é um fofoqueiro de dar inveja em muita dona do interior de Minas.

Jobim disse que Morales estaria “desconcentrado” e “não estaria sendo ele memso”, por conta da doença. A história nunca saiu na imprensa. Morales fez uma cirurgia na época, supostamente por uma sinusite aguda. // É, mas o cara colocou em ação sua central de fofocas

Os documentos da embaixada de Brasília fazem parte de um conjunto de 2855 telegramas da representação americana no Brasil que serão publicadas nas próximas semanas pelo WikiLeaks.

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/articles ... Jobim.html

"MUI AMIGO"!

[EDSON]

01/12/2010 - 11h32
EUA fazem duras críticas à Estratégia Nacional de Defesa; leia versão em inglês
PUBLICIDADE

DE SÃO PAULO
Dois telegramas produzidos pela Embaixada dos EUA em Brasília no início de 2009 fazem duras críticas à Estratégia Nacional de Defesa lançada pelo presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, em dezembro de 2008.

EUA veem 'paranoia' em defesa da Amazônia
EUA avaliam que submarino nuclear é 'elefante branco'
Lula diz que telegramas vazados são 'insignificantes'
Jobim nega ter dito que ministro 'odeia os EUA'
Documentos revelam infiltrações políticas dos EUA em diferentes países
Hugo Chávez está 'louco' e EUA tentaram isolá-lo
Acompanhe a Folha Poder no Twitter
Comente reportagens em nossa página no Facebook

Confira a versão orginal dos telegramas, em inglês:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000034

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY--STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

REF: A. 08 SAO PAULO 268 B. 08 BRASILIA 175 BRASILIA 00000034 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason: 1.5 (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

On December 18, President Lula signed the National Defense Strategy, concluding a fifteen month drafting exercise. The document was principally drafted by Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and it provides a security policy framework that places defense in the context of the government,s broader goal of national development. The strategy is built on the presumption that it is in Brazil,s interest to be "independent," that is able to project its military power as it wishes, able to produce its own military hardware and able to control strategic economic sectors, including space, cybernetics and nuclear power. Much of the document focuses on the future roles and structures for Brazil,s armed forces -- including updating equipment, promoting deployability and enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. It also devotes considerable space to issues such as nuclear energy, reducing imports and national civilian service that are only indirectly related to how Brazil,s armed forces will defend the country, but are crucial when defense is viewed in the context of a vision of a broader strategy for Brazil,s development into a world power. By linking reform of the security sector with the government,s broader development vision, the strategy places the military, for the first time since the end of military rule in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda and strengthens its case for increased resources. Comments on the strategy,s provisions for the Brazilian military will be reported septel. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

2. (SBU) On September 7 (Brazilian Independence Day) 2007, President Lula tasked Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger to produce a National Defense Strategy paper within one year. Although Unger announced he had completed work on September 7, 2008, the new strategy was not signed by President Lula and published until December 18, reportedly because of concerns from the armed services that their inputs were not incorporated. The resulting document clearly includes many service priorities, especially in the area of equipment modernization, but the main focus of the document is less to outline future roles and structures for the military than to provide a context for the role of the defense sector in the Brazilian state. The Defense Strategy is available online via the MOD website: www.defesa.gov.br/eventos temporarios/2008 /estrategia defesa nacional.pdf in Portuguese. An English version will be transmitted to Washington agencies when available.

3. (C) The Defense Strategy as approved by the government and signed by the President reflects the government,s overall priority: Brazil,s "development" into a modern world power and sets conditions for the Defense sector,s role in this development. In creating this strategy for the defense sector to contribute to development, Unger goes beyond a normal plan for restructuring the security sector to meet anticipated challenges and cites two other "axes" for work: strengthening defense industry and maintaining required military service in the context of a national service obligation. In the three main areas of the strategy (military reform, defense industry and national service), the document underlines the importance of acquiring control of the latest technology and of enhancing the role of the central government.

INDEPENDENCE

4. (C) The strategy for defense and development is built around the concept of "independence." In the government,s vision, Brazil should be able to control its own security and not have to go outside its own borders in order to equip its security forces. The strategy allows for "strategic partners," but these are seen as countries willing to transfer to Brazil technologies that will make Brazil more independent, not as collaborators in security operations. Similarly, where Brazil currently does not have the capability to produce defense equipment, it should, according to the document, seek to purchase the appropriate articles from foreign suppliers, but with the aim of allowing for domestic production. This point is clearly illustrated by the prescriptive language on acquisition of modern fighter aircraft which rejects the "extreme solution" of simply buying foreign-made planes and calls for the Air Force to either 1) purchase aircraft of which Brazil can then produce its own upgraded variant, or 2) purchase a minimal number of foreign planes which then can be augmented by domestic production of the same model.

COMMENT: Given the relatively small number of aircraft to be ultimately acquired by the Air Force, neither option makes economic sense, but Unger places a greater importance on "independence" than military capability or efficient use of resources. END COMMENT.

5. (C) The strategy also repeatedly cites three sectors as being of critical importance for the independent development of the Brazilian state: space, cybernetics and nuclear, calling for Brazil to "control" these technologies. The strategy calls for enhanced Brazilian space launch capacity, satellite monitoring and surveillance and for Brazil to deploy its own GPS-type system. Cybernetics is listed as important for communications and information processing. Although, the strategy document acknowledges that as a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil will not have nuclear weapons, it then states that for this reason, Brazil must therefore pursue nuclear power development as an element of security that is important for Brazil,s development. This stated connection to defense of the country serves as justification for inclusion of nuclear power as a strategic industry, albeit one whose importance is more relevant to development than security. (NOTE: Nuclear energy is, in fact, one of the strategic industries enumerated in GOB,s latest Industrial Policy, published in May - see ref c. The other Industrial Policy strategic sectors are defense industry, information technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and healthcare industry.)

MILITARY RESTRUCTURING

6. (C) The heart of the defense strategy is its plan for the restructuring of the Brazilian military. Specific comments on plans for each service and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will be reported septel. Much of the restructuring strategy was contributed by the services and provides practical answers to key strategic questions about how Brazil will see to its own security over the next generation. Among the conclusions are that Brazil must focus on the three key areas of monitoring/controlling large areas, strategic mobility and military presence to provide security. These areas contribute to the services, requirements for airlift, better communications, satellite reconnaissance and maritime domain awareness. The strategy notes the necessity of developing better joint service cooperation and the capabilities to conduct joint operations and the need for a professional civil service component in the Defense Ministry. There is also a clear understanding that a country with pretensions to world power status will be asked to make greater contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations. (Brazil currently ranks just below Uruguay in regional UNPKO participation.) The strategy therefore recognizes that as Brazilian capabilities increase, so should peacekeeping deployments.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

7. (SBU) The strategy paper,s most important goal for defense industry is to use the need to modernize the armed forces to acquire new technologies with applications for national development. To do so, the Government of Brazil is encouraged to offer tax incentives and legal benefits to these industries (tax and financing benefits are already provided under the May 2008 Industrial Policy). Unger also clearly states that commercial considerations, i.e. increased trade, must be considered subordinate to the country,s "strategic interest." Therefore, efficient use of resources and deployment of effective military capabilities are less important than stimulating domestic defense industries which are optimistically viewed as having future export potential. According to the strategy, industrial partnerships with non-Brazilian entities are advantageous as a means to reduce dependence on foreign purchase -- when the main role in the partnership is played by the Brazilian side.

8. (SBU) In exchange for support for the growth of defense industries, the strategy proposes that the central government gain "special powers" over such industries, including through so-called "golden share" arrangements - government vetoes over designated corporate actions. Several press reports carried the story that the MOD would be seeking special taxes on private businesses that are perceived as benefiting from security (e.g. Petrobras) to pay the costs of their defense, but such a proposal is not included in the final document.

NATIONAL SERVICE

9. (C) The strategy states that "the basis of national defense is the identification of the nation with the armed forces and the armed forces with the nation." For this reason, mandatory military service is viewed as essential for the future. The strategy states explicitly that the armed forces must "limit and reverse the tendency to lower the proportion of draftees and raise the proportion of professionals." Consistent with the overall goal of encouraging the Brazilian government,s vision of national development, military service is viewed primarily as a means of unifying the population and fostering greater social equality. The strategy document states specifically that its objectives include forcing higher socio-economic classes to provide a larger proportion of military draftees and opening more places in military academies to students from more diverse backgrounds.

10. (C) The means by which the strategy plans to democratize the armed forces will be a new form of national service. All young people will have to be available to the military which would be able to select the best qualified as its recruits. Everyone else would go into a "civil service" which would receive basic military training and be available for mobilization in the case of a national emergency of some sort. The strategy does not, however, provide any information as to what sort of national emergency would require the mobilization of potentially millions of poorly trained young Brazilians or how the basic training of about three million civil service members per year will be managed by the limited number of military professionals available.

REGIONAL FOCUS

11. (C) One of the most notable elements of the strategy has been the focus on the defense of the Amazon region. While the document notes that this region faces ongoing security challenges from uncontrolled borders and potential instability in neighboring states, it also indulges in the traditional Brazilian paranoia concerning the activities of non-governmental organizations and other shadowy foreign forces that are popularly perceived as potential threats to Brazil,s sovereignty. The strategy calls for greater use of mobility and monitoring technology to improve security in the Amazon region and for the shifting of forces north as needed to improve security there.

12. (C) The strategy also calls for improved defense relations with other South American states, especially through the development of the South American Defense Council, although it notes that a main purpose of the council will be to enhance Brazil,s defense industrial base through exports to its neighbors. The strategy concedes that Brazil will require greater capacity for participation in international peacekeeping, although increasing Brazil,s deployments should be linked to restructuring of international organizations to give developing countries more important roles in their leadership.

COMMENTS

13. (C) The first sentence of the strategy portion of the document reads: "National defense strategy is inseparable from national development strategy." This point is key for understanding the document,s purpose and why it was tasked to the Ministry of Strategic Planning and not the Defense Ministry. Not a defense strategy per se, the strategy is a set of ideas for how Brazil,s military, defense industry and national service can contribute to the goal of development. Nowhere in the strategy is the goal of development defined, but it seems to point toward a generally understood vision of Brazil as a major world power (with a UN Security Council seat), with strong state institutions and without threats to its security -- a situation described as "Brazil,s proper place." By linking reform of the security sector with the government,s broader development vision, the strategy places the military, for the first time since the end of military rule in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda and strengthens its case for increased resources.

14. (C) While the restructuring plans generally are consistent with the goal of a modern, more capable military, (leaving aside such politically popular white elephants as a nuclear powered submarine), the strategy document is silent on how resources will be found to cover the costs of expensive new hardware including aircraft carriers, satellite constellations and fighter production. Even ballpark estimates by embassy staff of possible modernization costs are far in excess of current defense budgets. The defense strategy as a whole is in some measure designed to address this question by linking defense to overall development goals, but it is likely that defense expenditures will not be increased to the degree required to fulfill the shorter term goal of equipping the armed forces with cutting edge technology produced in Brazil.

15. (C) The other two "axes," defense industry and national service, have less to do with improving the military than with integrating national security with national development. Some of the specific proposals in these areas (e.g., propping up inefficient industries, increasing conscription) actually could reduce the effectiveness of the military and divert resources from modernization. The emphasis on societal benefits over professionalism in military service is consistent with the views of a President and other government leaders who started in politics under the military government of the 1970s and 80s and want to ensure that the military,s capacity to become involved in politics remains circumscribed. The socialist background of Lula,s Workers, Party is clearly evident in the efforts at social engineering through mandatory national service at the cost of more effective defense.

16. (C) Perhaps the most significant Brazilian comment on the defense strategy has been the lack of comment. Most of the coverage in the Brazilian press relied on official press releases, in some cases, for example reporting inaccurately that the strategy would include the possible taxing of private business to pay for defense. Other coverage focused on a few headlines, including the construction of a nuclear submarine, possible redeployments of forces to the Amazon and protection of maritime oil fields. This may have been, in part, a reflection of the timing of the release as most Brazilians were heading away for the holidays. Embassy contacts do not seem to have read the document and regard it as a summation of already-known government views on defense. The document,s legal status is also unclear. By signing, President Lula seems to have adopted it as national policy, but as many of the recommendations are non-concrete and would require further action to develop, it remains to be seen how much will be implemented. While Lula seems to pay attention to what Unger has to say, the degree to which the strategy,s recommendations are implemented will be
a good barometer of the Minister for Strategic Planning,s real influence.

17. (C) Even if some of the more grandiose plans (nuclear submarines, universal military service) are never realized, there remains a great deal that Brazil can do consistent with the new defense strategy that will help it develop a more capable modern military. Focusing on deployability and using technology to help monitor the northern regions of the country are the optimal solutions to Brazil,s strategic problem of controlling a vast, unpopulated territory. These plans create opportunities for U.S. business to partner with Brazilian counterparts and for the U.S. armed forces to engage in increased cooperation as Brazil,s military seeks to modernize (See ref b). We should, however, expect that engagement with Brazil will increase only gradually, particularly while the current government is in power. The strategy document looks at strategic partnerships primarily in terms of defense trade and technology transfer, but we should seek to open up the concept to include real security cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Such cooperation, however, must be gauged to be consistent with the Brazilian government,s vision of defense as a means of national development. SOBEL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000035

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: BR PREL MARR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S DEFENSE STRATEGY -- MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

REF: A. BRASILIA 34 B. 08 BRASILIA 93
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason: 1.5 (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Ref a reported on the strategic aspects of Brazil,s new Defense Strategy document, signed by President Lula on December 18. While the main purpose of the strategy as written by the Minister for Strategic Planning, was to place Brazil,s military and defense sector in the framework of a broader vision of national development (reported in ref a), the document also contains policy guidance for the Defense Ministry and the three services that give a clearer view of how Defense Minister Jobim and senior military leaders see these institutions developing over the next generation -- into a more flexible, modern force with joint operational capabilities. The restructuring of the Brazilian military can be seen as a compromise between setting conditions for a its role in a broader plan for national development and the goal of having a modern, effective military. After more than twenty years outside the political mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now making a case for its modernization. As it does so, opportunities will exist for improving the U.S.-Brazil security partnership. END SUMMARY.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

2. (SBU) In its nine-year history, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has been under resourced and has had difficulty in providing effective civilian control over the armed forces. The Defense Strategy seeks to ameliorate this situation by calling for the employment of better-prepared civilian Ministry officials in place of some of the military personnel who now predominate. The Ministry will have the lead on developing implementing arrangements for the Defense Strategy and is tasked with issuing instructions for the activities of the Armed Forces during peacetime. The Strategy also recognizes the importance of the Armed Forces becoming more "joint" in their operational capabilities and tasks the Ministry with encouraging more inter-service cooperation. As noted in ref a, sources in the Defense Ministry and Ministry for External Affairs told Embassy personnel that a principal reason for the delay in final approval of the strategy was to ensure inclusion of the services, comments. As the section on each service differs markedly in terms of focus and style from the others, it is likely that the interagency agreement reached to allow the strategy document to go forward was to add in services, submissions to the document. The chapters on the services all seek to make a case for increased resources and modernized equipment but are not always successful at spelling out the strategic vision for the potential security threats or contingencies to which many of the desired upgrades would respond.

NAVY

3. (C) The Navy is tasked with control of the seas and rivers and denying their use to potential adversaries. Its main tasks will be defense of oil facilities and ports and assistance against transnational criminals. COMMENT: There is, however, no information as to what possible threats to oil facilities the Navy may be asked to counter, making it difficult, for example to evaluate the strategy,s assertion that a nuclear submarine would be necessary to meet the goal of protecting such facilities. END COMMENT. The strategy does recommend increased Navy capabilities in two key areas: control of the rivers and power projection in support of peacekeeping. Noting that lack of effective control of the Amazon and Parana river systems undermines stability, the Navy will seek more brown water assets, including patrol vessels and better reconnaissance capability. While Brazil,s current peacekeeping effort is focused on Haiti, there is an acknowledgement that Brazil will have to take a great share of the global burden and should be able to deploy and support peacekeepers out of its immediate region.

4. (C) The Navy,s wish list for equipment includes the expected nuclear powered submarines. (See ref b for discussion.) The Navy also seeks patrol craft and air patrol capabilities that will be important to effective monitoring of coasts and river systems. Naval aviation is set to BRASILIA 00000035 002 OF 003 improve through acquisition of aircraft and aircraft carriers, although the strategy specifies that any naval aircraft should be produced in Brazil. Finally, the Navy is charged with improving its search and rescue capabilities, including the potential for international cooperation.

ARMY

5. (C) The Army,s strategic instructions focus on restructuring to make the force more mobile and able to engage in non-traditional conflicts. To this end, the Army plans to shift to a brigade model in order to have more deployable units available. These "rapid action forces" are intended to give commanders the ability to react to crises in remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be tailored to the situation. In support of such missions, the Army,s acquisition priorities will be improved reconnaissance and communications, helicopters, night vision and fire control technology. 6. (C) While mentioned prominently elsewhere in the Defense Strategy, the Army chapter does not, unlike the other services, raise the possibility of additional peacekeeping operations as a future mission, possibly a reflection of the Army,s frustration with the lack of an exit strategy in Haiti. The Army,s planning is also silent on the major new task it will have in training up to three million potential reservists per year should the strategy,s national service provisions be fully implemented.

AIR FORCE

7. (C) Apart from the highly prescriptive section on fighter procurement discussed in ref a, the Air Force chapter focuses on how to meet challenges in joint operations, reconnaissance and communications. The Air Force,s highest priority, aside from new fighters, will be on acquiring more airlift capability so that one of the Army,s new brigades can be deployed rapidly at any time. Other priorities include UAVs and improved satellite capability, particularly through indigenous space launch. These priorities are underlined by a clear directive to favor domestic industry where possible. The capability to build aircraft (including UAVs and space launch vehicles) in Brazil is considered "so important as to transcend discussions of equipment," a policy of sacrificing capability in favor of domestic production.

COMMENTS

8. (C) As with the rest of the Defense Strategy, the sections on restructuring of the Brazilian military are a compromise between setting conditions for a military role in a broader plan for national development and the goal of having a modern, effective military. After more than twenty years outside the political mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now making a case for its modernization. Making the case, however, means that the Defense Strategy must observe the conventional wisdom of Brazilian politics. There is no threat, for example, to Brazil,s maritime oil deposits, but Brazilian leaders and media have routinely cited oil discoveries off the coast as an urgent reason for better maritime security. This concern has been merged with Brazil,s twenty year quest to develop a nuclear submarine to give new impetus to research on a small reactor for naval propulsion. While the Army chapter of the strategy includes the seemingly mandatory caution about being prepared to protect Brazil,s sovereignty against a country or group of countries acting "on pretext of the supposed interests of humanity," it remains primarily focused on more realistic security challenges. The political preoccupation with imagined threats to sovereignty in the Amazon, however, serves the practical purpose of tasking the military with developing greater capabilities to project power into the region most likely to be affected by instability in neighboring countries.

9. (C) A Brazilian military that is more capable and deployable can support U.S. interests by exporting stability in Latin America and be available for peacekeeping elsewhere. The plans by the Brazilian services, as evidenced in those parts of the defense strategy likely contributed by the services, are consistent with this interest, and, if implemented, will lead to Brazil becoming a more effective security partner. There are however, serious questions as to how much of these plans will see follow through, particularly with other supposed strategic priorities, including national service, nuclear submarines and government support to non-competitive defense industries, providing black holes to suck in all available resources. SOBE