MÉXICO

[Sterrius]

apesar de muita arma vir dos EUA tem que se atentar tb que boa parte vem da fronteira sul que é na melhor hipotese porosa de ambos os lados.

Conseguir comprar uma granada por 80 pesos nem no mercado ilegal americano. E é vendido a esse preço no mexico.

[delmar]

Ultima aprêensão feita no Mexico... M-4 e Beretta ARX-160. Olhem o estado das armas...





Um abraço e t+

As armas devem vir de todos lugares, os cartéis devem também controlar alguns portos por onde chegam os conteneires com armas e munições. Estas Berrettas não tem origem americana.

[Left Hand of God]

Essas Beretas e esses M4 são usados pelas polícias mexicanas e muito provavelmente devem ter vindo de lá. E esses fuzis M4 são todos da versão de cano curto CQBR, só que com o guarda mão tubular ao invés dos trilhos de 4 quadrantes, e esse tipo de fuzil de cano curto tem venda limitadíssima nos EUA inteiro e extremamente controlada pela BATFE, quem compra um desses tem de registrar a arma e re-registrar todo ano e pagar mais de 100 dólares pra renovar o registro; muito provavelmente esses fuzis foram desviados de organizações mexicanas, devido à uniformidade da montagem deles.

[delmar]

Partida de futebol em Honduras termina com 14 mortos
31 de outubro de 2010 •

Uma partida de futebol, realizada na localidade de Felipe Zelaya, em Rivera Hernández, norte de Honduras, acabou com 14 pessoas assassinadas a tiros. De acordo com a edição eletrônica do jornal hondurenho "La Prensa", quatro vítimas ainda foram levadas com vida para um hospital da cidade de San Pedro Sula, mas não resistiram aos ferimentos.
De acordo com o porta-voz do Ministério da Segurança do país centro-americano, Leonel Sauceda, um grupo de homens armados desceu de um carro e, em seguida, disparou contra as pessoas que estavam reunidas no jogo.

- São 14 os mortos, 10 faleceram no campo de futebol e os outros quatro no caminho do hospital - disse Sauceda à agência Reuters.

O "La Prensa" também relata que o vice-ministro do Segurança, Armando Calidonio, afirmou que o motivo do massacre pode ser um ajuste de contas. Já o jornal "Tiempo" revela que os assassinatos foram cometidos por sujeitos desconhecidos que desceram de um veículo e dispararam contra o grupo que estava em um campo de futebol.

As reportagens exibem uma série de fotos onde é possível ver várias vítimas, já sem vida, ainda estendidas no chão.

A violência na região está atingindo também os países vizinhos da América Central. Honduras, guatemala, El Salvador e outros estão numa escala crescente de violência.

[Left Hand of God]

Partida de futebol em Honduras termina com 14 mortos
31 de outubro de 2010 •

Uma partida de futebol, realizada na localidade de Felipe Zelaya, em Rivera Hernández, norte de Honduras, acabou com 14 pessoas assassinadas a tiros. De acordo com a edição eletrônica do jornal hondurenho "La Prensa", quatro vítimas ainda foram levadas com vida para um hospital da cidade de San Pedro Sula, mas não resistiram aos ferimentos.
De acordo com o porta-voz do Ministério da Segurança do país centro-americano, Leonel Sauceda, um grupo de homens armados desceu de um carro e, em seguida, disparou contra as pessoas que estavam reunidas no jogo.

- São 14 os mortos, 10 faleceram no campo de futebol e os outros quatro no caminho do hospital - disse Sauceda à agência Reuters.

O "La Prensa" também relata que o vice-ministro do Segurança, Armando Calidonio, afirmou que o motivo do massacre pode ser um ajuste de contas. Já o jornal "Tiempo" revela que os assassinatos foram cometidos por sujeitos desconhecidos que desceram de um veículo e dispararam contra o grupo que estava em um campo de futebol.

As reportagens exibem uma série de fotos onde é possível ver várias vítimas, já sem vida, ainda estendidas no chão.

A violência na região está atingindo também os países vizinhos da América Central. Honduras, guatemala, El Salvador e outros estão numa escala crescente de violência.

Na américa central o problema é o MS-13, ou Mara Salvatrucha. Sanguinários impiedosos e perturbados que fazem o PCC parecerem um convento de donzelas mimadas e doces.

[PRick]

Chacina deixa sete mortos em Ciudad Juárez, no México
Disputa pelo controle dos cartéis do narcotráfico de Sinaloa e de Juárez já deixou mais de 2.600 mortos

iG São Paulo | 07/11/2010 08:50

Sete jovens foram mortos e um ficou ferido durante um ataque de supostos bandidos na noite deste sábado em Ciudad Juárez.

Um oficial da Polícia Municipal explicou que os agressores eram ao menos seis homens armados, a bordo de veículos.

A disputa pelo controle da cidade pelos cartéis do narcotráfico de Sinaloa e de Juárez já deixou mais de 2.600 mortos até o momento.

Foto: Arte/iG


Presidente mexicano, Felipe Calderón, lançou guerra contra o narcotráfico logo após posse

Assassinatos

No México, a intensa onda de violência associada à criminalidade do narcotráfico superou a barreira dos 10 mil mortos apenas neste ano. Até a última quarta-feira haviam sido 10.035 assassinatos violentos apenas em 2010.

Trata-se do "pior registro anual desde a declaração do governo federal de guerra contra o narcotráfico", de acordo com o jornal Reforma. Os números ultrapassam os da gestão do ex-presidente Vicente Fox, que administrou a nação de 2000 a 2006.

*Com EFE e Ansa

http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/mundo/ch ... 19070.html

[marcelo l.]

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... orever_war

December 16, 2009, was supposed to be a turning point in Mexico's long and violent war on drugs. On that day, 200 Mexican naval commandos -- the army and local police were considered too infiltrated by the drug cartels to lead the operation -- stormed the luxury high-rise apartment of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, one of the country's most notorious drug kingpins. Following a two-hour gun battle that was captured on local television, the troops overpowered the drug lord's security forces, killing Beltrán Leyva and six of his bodyguards.

The operation was praised by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials and hailed by Mexican President Felipe Calderón as "an important achievement for the people and government of Mexico and a heavy blow against one of the most dangerous criminal organizations in Mexico." Mere days later, however, Beltrán Leyva's gunmen brutally slaughtered the family of a young marine killed during the operation, including his mourning mother and sister, in an act of retribution. This was a mere prologue to the worst spike in killings in the past four years. In the six months that followed this operation, disputes over leadership of the Beltrán Leyva cartel helped push the number of drug-related murders in Mexico from less than 800 per month to more than 1,100, where it has remained ever since.

One year later, Calderón's offensive against the country's drug-trafficking cartels continues to exact a horrible price on Mexico's population. If current trends hold, Mexico will end 2010 with more than 11,000 drug-related killings, up from approximately 6,600 last year. The 2010 figure represents a fivefold increase over the number of deaths in 2006, at the dawn of Calderón's war.

Even worse, drug-related violence is spreading throughout Mexico. In 2008, three states -- Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja California -- accounted for 57 percent of killings. Two years later, they account for well less than half of the deaths, as massacres have spread to areas that had previously been largely spared of the violence, such as Mexico City and the state of Nayarit. And yet, not long ago Calderón still claimed that "our hope lies in persevering in this attack, in persevering in this strategy." Despite the difficulties, he promised that "a clear day will come."

Calderón's failure to bring peace to the country should prompt serious questions about his strategy, which has focused on weakening the cartels by military means. More than 45,000 soldiers are currently deployed to this end. While the government can point to discrete achievements in disrupting the cartels' operations, the long-term consequences of its operations have been ambiguous.

For example, seizures of cocaine have indeed gone up in Mexico during Calderón's offensive. However, the scale of the confiscations is underwhelming when compared with those made by much smaller countries in the region, at a fraction of the human cost. Cocaine seizures in Mexico during 2008 and 2009 were similar in volume to those made by Costa Rica and were less than 40 percent of those achieved by Panama's authorities.

Similarly, the government regularly touts having arrested around 20 major drug bosses in the past four years as a signature victory in its war on the cartels. However, this achievement has done little to bring stability to the country -- in fact, it has done just the opposite. The resulting fragmentation of the cartels has unleashed vicious murderous cycles and a geographical dispersion of violence as emerging organizations vie for control of new routes.

When Calderón introduced his military plans to deal with the drug cartels, violence in Mexico was nowhere near the heights it has reached today. The country's murder rate had fallen by nearly half between 1992 and 2006. And this was true even in the states that have borne the brunt of drug-related violence in the past four years. The state of Chihuahua -- where the violence-ridden city of Ciudad Juárez is located -- had 18 murders per 100,000 people when Calderón took over at the end of 2006. Three years later, it suffered a whopping 74 murders per 100,000 people, 13 times the rate of the United States. If Chihuahua were an independent country, it would have the dubious honor of having the world's highest homicide rate.

f reported robberies in Mexico was 520 per 100,000 people in 2006. By the end of 2009, the rate had jumped to 633, higher than at any point since the mid-1990s. One possible reason for why is that the government's assault on the cartels' drug trafficking activities has forced them to diversify their income sources, fueling the expansion of other criminal activities. Whatever the impetus, it's clear that the reach of crime in Mexico is expanding, not contracting.

Calderón has justified his military confrontation with the cartels by arguing that the rule of law cannot thrive where organized crime rules. However, it is equally true that the rule of law can never take root in a situation of widespread bedlam like that of Mexico this past year. The Mexican government's inability to consistently bring down drug-related violence anywhere since the military campaign began is looking less like the inevitable price of success against organized crime and more like the symptom of a strategy in dire need of revamping.

Calderón should begin by rethinking his diagnosis of what ails Mexico. He has based his approach on the notion that Mexico suffers from waning control over its territory, as was the case in Colombia until recently. However, the Mexican government is far from absent in the areas most afflicted by drug-related violence. Of the 10 states with the highest intensity of violence in 2010, the majority receives more money from the federal government than the average Mexican state. Remarkably, with a couple of exceptions, all have ratios of police officers to population that are virtually identical or greater than that of the United States.

Mexico's problem is not territorial control, but the penetration of public institutions -- particularly law enforcement institutions -- by organized crime. This is a problem that cannot be solved by any military contingent, no matter how large, committed, or effective. It requires instead nothing short of rebuilding law enforcement institutions and intelligence agencies.

Calderón should focus less on parading arrested drug bosses before the media and more on restoring trust in Mexico's beleaguered judiciary and police. According to the Iberoamerican Governance Barometer -- a regional opinion poll -- the public's trust in Mexico's judiciary and police fell by 7 and 10 points, respectively, from 2007 to 2010.

Here is the single most important figure that explains the persistence of the drug cartels: 98.5 percent of crimes go unpunished in Mexico. Unless this number starts coming down dramatically, Mexico has simply no hope of containing the toxic social and political effects of organized crime. Despite Calderón's admirable efforts to revamp law enforcement institutions, including the creation of a strong federal police force and a far-reaching reform of criminal procedures, implementation of some of the most critical projects remains in doubt in many parts of Mexico. Restoring the integrity of public institutions should be the government's main focus, not a sideshow to military raids.

The serious delays in the implementation of judicial and police reforms in most Mexican states are symptomatic of the single biggest weakness of Calderón's strategy: the lukewarm support it receives from state and municipal governments. The president's insistence on pursuing a top-down strategy for fighting the cartels has undermined its success and sustainability. The federal government often does not even consult state and local security forces when launching an offensive against drug traffickers in their jurisdictions. While there are often sound security reasons for this decision, it breeds resentment and an attitude among state officials that the war against drug organizations is solely a federal concern.

In 2008, the National Agreement for Security, Justice and Legality -- which included 75 commitments toward the professionalization of law enforcement institutions and the promotion of a law-abiding culture -- was endorsed by every single relevant political authority in Mexico. However, the truth is that the offensive against the cartels continues to be seen as Calderón's war. While the National Agreement was a crucial step toward transforming the establishment of the rule of law into a national priority, the implementation of its mostly worthy commitments has been sketchy, according to civil society organization United Mexico Against Crime .

The National Agreement must be revisited, reinvigorated, and enriched with a clear discussion of goals and metrics. The governors' role is particularly crucial. Despite the often troubled history of abuse and corruption by state-level police in Mexico, the recentralization of police forces in the governors' hands would be an important step toward making them more accountable for the reduction of impunity in the country. It is also important to modify the legal provisions that make felonies perpetrated by organized crime federal offenses, to be prosecuted by the national government alone -- which obviates state and local authorities of the responsibility for tackling the threat posed by the cartels.

But what does the public at large think of Calderón's strategy? Until this year, a majority approved. But support for the president's military assault on the cartels appears to have been a result of the relative isolation of the majority of the Mexican population from the worst of the bloodshed. But the expansion of violence in 2010 is now seriously undermining political support for the government's efforts. In October, only 33 percent of Mexicans thought that Calderón's efforts against the cartels were successful, a drop of 14 points since March.

The president remains adamant in his approach. Less than six weeks ago, he insisted that the cartels "are losing markets, are losing territory, are losing the ability to get their way as in the past." But after four years of ambiguous results and ever worsening violence, the burden of proof for proving these assertions lies with the president rather than with his critics. It is unclear how this military assault has helped the government's efforts to improve law enforcement and reduce the country's endemic impunity. In the meantime, the drug cartels are still doing a brisk business in turning vast swaths of the country into anarchic battlefields.

Rather than bludgeoning organized crime into submission through military means, the government should prioritize the revitalization of the federal and local institutions that have been ineffective or, worse, penetrated by the very criminal elements they were designed to combat. Only after he accomplishes this task will Calderón be able to stand up and honestly declare that the country has turned the corner in the battle against Mexico's drug cartels.

[marcelo l.]

Expansão dos zetas

http://www.clarin.com/mundo/Zetas-amena ... 59813.html

La amenaza está lanzada. O levantan el estado de sitio y los operativos militares o comenzarán a atacar centros comerciales y lugares públicos. El cartel de los Zetas advirtió mediante llamadas a varias radios locales que está dispuesto a convertir Guatemala, no en zona de paso, sino en escenario de su guerra por el control del tráfico de drogas en México y Centroamérica.
Periodistas de radios guatemaltecas denunciaron que desde hace varios días han recibido en sus teléfonos móviles mensajes de texto en los que presuntos sicarios de Los Zetas amenazan con ataques contra civiles en el departamento de Alta Verapaz, si el gobierno sigue con el estado de sitio que decretó días atrás en la región.
Las amenazas llegaron a tres medios de comunicación de la localidad: “Este es un mensaje para el presidente de Guatemala, somos el grupo Los Zetas y sólo queremos que sepa el país que el presidente Álvaro Colom recibió 11 millones 500 mil dólares antes de cerrar elecciones de este país (2007) y pagará por no cumplir , con culpables o inocentes. Empezará la guerra en este país, en centros comerciales, escuelas y comisarías”, dice el mensaje entregado a los periodistas en Cobán, capital de Alta Verapaz. E incluía una advertencia: “quemaremos la radio y mataremos a los dueños y familiares si no lo hacen público”.
El presidente guatemalteco respondió con contundencia: “vamos a seguir dando fuerte a Los Zetas; a mí no me van a intimidar las amenazas de ellos”. El propio Colom dejó abierta la posibilidad de extender a cuatro departamentos más el estado de sitio. Colom sin embargo no hizo referencia al supuesto pago de los Zetas y que supuestamente les habría garantizado una inmunidad para actuar que ahora se ha visto.
Desde el 19 de diciembre, Colom decretó el estado de sitio en el departamento de Alta Verapaz con el objetivo de luchar contra las células de los Zetas, que en esta región lo controlan prácticamente todo : alcaldes, policías, jueces, el comercio formal y hasta la piratería. Se trató del primer gesto de fuerza de Guatemala después de ver como poco a poco va perdiendo el control de la frontera con México . Desde que se decretó el estado de sitio se han capturado 18 sicarios, un pequeño capo local, 150 armas y 5 avionetas.
Según la información publicada por el periódico El Universal de México, y que cita informes de la Agencia anti drogas norteamericana (DEA), del Centro Internacional Woodrow Wilson, desde hace dos años, los Zetas se han asentado en gran parte de Guatemala y disputan al cartel de Sinaloa el control de zonas estratégicas. Para ello se aliaron con organizaciones locales del narcotráfico, como los Lorenzana y los Mendoza lo que les ha dado mucho poder en la franja del Caribe.
La semana pasada se supo también, gracias a las filtraciones del sitio WikiLeaks que, según los diplomáticos estadounidenses, l a situación en la frontera es “dramática” . Un territorio que describen “dominado por narcotraficantes y contrabandistas, donde las avionetas cargadas con cocaína aterrizan a plena luz del día ”.
También está preocupado El Salvador, para quien “el combate de México al narcotráfico genera desafíos en Centroamérica”, dijeron autoridades.
Es la forma diplomática de decir que la guerra contra el narco que se vive en México ha provocado un reacomodo y expansión de los cárteles mexicanos hacia Centroamérica, gobiernos muchos más débiles que el mexicano para hacer frente al desafío. Es el llamado efecto “cucaracha” que expulsa a los narcos hacia Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador, donde “trabajan” más tranquilamente.

[delmar]

Os países da América Central e Caribe poderão ser um grande problema. Dominados por quadrilhas de traficantes podem acabar como uma nova Somália. Aqui na vizinhança do Brasil apostaria na Guyana e no Suriname com os mais propensos a serem dominados pelos carteis das drogas e outros crimes. É muito provavel que será em um, ou em ambos, destes países que o Brasil fará sua primeira intervenção militar no século XXI.

[Pablo Maica]

Mais e mais e mais apreensões...

Ja devem ter armamento pra uns 2 conflitos de media intensidade!










Um abraço e t+

[rodrigo]

Olha o Brasil tirando casquinha do conflito:

[Viktor Reznov]

apesar de muita arma vir dos EUA tem que se atentar tb que boa parte vem da fronteira sul que é na melhor hipotese porosa de ambos os lados.

Conseguir comprar uma granada por 80 pesos nem no mercado ilegal americano. E é vendido a esse preço no mexico.

Só que tem de se lembrar que 90% das armas que foram rastreadas pelo govenro Mexicano têm sua origem nos EUA, mas só cerca de 30% de todas as armas apreendias puderam ser rastreadas.

PS: esse ARX-160 foram todos desviados de órgãos policiais mexicanos, pois vários começaram a usar tais fuzis no ano passado.

[Sterrius]

Maioria dos paises da america central e do sul tem praticamente nenhum controle sobre suas armas ou como rastrea-las. Logo não é surpresa os EUA deter o monopolio das armas rastreadas.

[Pablo Maica]

Os caras ja tão formando até forças especiais... ou estão achando...







Um abraço e t+

[marcelo l.]