Moderadores: Glauber Prestes, Conselho de Moderação
AlbertoRJ escreveu:O Tribunal de Contas da França demonstra o custo de desenvolvimento dividido pelo número de aviões e o chama de preço unitário, que está por volta de 100 milhões de euros.
O preço unitário de venda é o que consta no material da Assembléia Nacional da França e é de 60 milhões para o Rafale C.
Mais uma que cai.
Então o tribunal de contas deles está errado. Você leu o documento?Sintra escreveu:AlbertoRJ escreveu:O Tribunal de Contas da França demonstra o custo de desenvolvimento dividido pelo número de aviões e o chama de preço unitário, que está por volta de 100 milhões de euros.
O preço unitário de venda é o que consta no material da Assembléia Nacional da França e é de 60 milhões para o Rafale C.
Mais uma que cai.
O valor total do programa RAFALE dividido por 286 airframes é de cerca de 138,5 milhões de euros.
Abraço
OPAAlbertoRJ escreveu:Então o tribunal de contas deles está errado. Você leu o documento?Sintra escreveu:
O valor total do programa RAFALE dividido por 286 airframes é de cerca de 138,5 milhões de euros.
Abraço
Sintra escreveu:AlbertoRJ escreveu: Pois é, que coisa hein? Ninguém se lembra desses "detalhes".![[003]](./images/smilies/003.gif "Gargalhada")
A razão pela utilização dos binóculos por parte dos aviões Franceses no Afeganistão não tem nada a ver com uma qualquer suposta maior preocupação pelos civis (haja imaginação para inventar uma destas!), mas sim por uma questão de utilização de equipamento antiquado.
Só para ilustrar o que se escreveu aqui, façam o seguinte exercicio, num carro, vá numa estrada a 150 km/h, agarre num binoculo à mão e tente fixar um ponto a trezentos metros, este ponto tem de o identificar através de instruções vocais por telemóvel vindas de outro ponto completamente distinto a várias centenas de metros, boa sorte... Agora tente fazer a mesma coisa a voar a 900 km/h!
Quem quer que tenha utilizado um binóculo na vida sabe do que é que eu estou a falar.
Um LDP moderno utiliza uma sistema optico multiplas vezes maior e com uma MUITO maior capacidade de ampliação e resolução por comparação com uns binoculos manuais, está equipado com giroscópio que fixa automaticamente um alvo a milhares de metros de distância e que além do mais está equipado com canais IR.
Os braços dos navegadors Franceses devem ser "phod..." para conseguirem estabilizar uma peça optica equivalente aos dos mais recentes LDP (ou seja um grupo optico a pesar mais de 100 quilos) enquanto voam a 800/900 km/h no meio das montanhas do Afeganistão...
Mas a parte que me "matou" foi mesmo esta:
"Quanto ao uso de binóculos para definir o alvo, é uma ótima prática, porque mesmo tendo definição os HMD´s são pequenos"
A imagem vinda do LDP, ou do terreno via data link Rover pode, e normalmente é, colocado num dos MFD´s...
PrickPRick escreveu:Sintra escreveu:
A razão pela utilização dos binóculos por parte dos aviões Franceses no Afeganistão não tem nada a ver com uma qualquer suposta maior preocupação pelos civis (haja imaginação para inventar uma destas!), mas sim por uma questão de utilização de equipamento antiquado.
Só para ilustrar o que se escreveu aqui, façam o seguinte exercicio, num carro, vá numa estrada a 150 km/h, agarre num binoculo à mão e tente fixar um ponto a trezentos metros, este ponto tem de o identificar através de instruções vocais por telemóvel vindas de outro ponto completamente distinto a várias centenas de metros, boa sorte... Agora tente fazer a mesma coisa a voar a 900 km/h!
Quem quer que tenha utilizado um binóculo na vida sabe do que é que eu estou a falar.
Um LDP moderno utiliza uma sistema optico multiplas vezes maior e com uma MUITO maior capacidade de ampliação e resolução por comparação com uns binoculos manuais, está equipado com giroscópio que fixa automaticamente um alvo a milhares de metros de distância e que além do mais está equipado com canais IR.
Os braços dos navegadors Franceses devem ser "phod..." para conseguirem estabilizar uma peça optica equivalente aos dos mais recentes LDP (ou seja um grupo optico a pesar mais de 100 quilos) enquanto voam a 800/900 km/h no meio das montanhas do Afeganistão...
Mas a parte que me "matou" foi mesmo esta:
"Quanto ao uso de binóculos para definir o alvo, é uma ótima prática, porque mesmo tendo definição os HMD´s são pequenos"
A imagem vinda do LDP, ou do terreno via data link Rover pode, e normalmente é, colocado num dos MFD´s...
Depois sou eu que tenho imaginação, comparar o voo de avião com um carro na estrada, não dá!! O primeiro é muito mais suave e permite circular o alvo!
Sim, e os MFD´s tem poucas polegadas de tela, portanto, são péssimos para visualização de alvos, quando estamos falando de combate a mendigos, por isso, o ideal é ter confirmação visual do alvo, para evitar o que os EUA fazem, e chamam de danos colaterais.
[]´s
Eu sei que a realidade lhe incomoda, mas o que vou fazer! Continue lá com a máfia anglo-saxã, e seus equipamentos maravilhosos de efeitos colaterais e suas propagandas. E ande de carro com binóculos querendo comparar com aviões.Sintra escreveu:PRick escreveu: Prick
Quando obviamente e claramente não se sabe do que se está a falar mais vale estar calado...
The Secrets of Low-Rate, Low-Cost Rafale Production
November 15, 2009
Aerospace Industry, Defense
How can the Rafale be produced–and offered for export–at an economic price when the production rate is only about one aircraft per month? Official French statistics give a unit production cost of only ?64- to ?70 million in 2008 prices, depending on variant, excluding amortization of development costs, but including value-added tax of 19.6 percent (which would not be payable on export aircraft).
According to Guy Piras, the Dassault executive vice president for industrial operations, the answer lies in a combination of leadership style, up-front investment and shop-floor expertise.
Piras told AIN that clear design leadership, to an agreed technical language, by a team that also extends to manufacturing engineering is very important. This is a familiar Dassault theme. “But we make a big effort on the nonrecurring costs. Just like the automobile industry, we invest heavily in manufacturing engineering,” Piras also noted. This includes the flow-through of digital data from design to manufacturing. The Rafale was the first combat jet to be industrialized from a digital mockup. Dassault has been the world leader in aerospace digital design–indeed, it has exported CATIA systems that have been used to design competitors to the Rafale.
“We use the minimum of tools, but the very best ones, together with the best possible working instructions,” Piras continued. Dassault switches tooling between products more than other airplane companies, he believes. Final assembly of the Rafale and of the Dassault Falcon business jets are both done at Bordeaux.
“Our people are very important to us,” said Piras. “We educate them, and they are craftsmen and experts in their domain. We provide the best possible working instructions. But we don’t have to tell them how to drill a rivet or what tools to use. They know that already.”
Unlike most competitors, Dassault manufactures its own flight controls in a dedicated facility at Argonay. The company also designs robotic engineering tools, from the CATIA system, and programs them, as well as designing and making all its own tool bits.
The Rafale is entirely French-made. Two Dassault sites–at Argenteuil (forward fuselage) and Martignas (wings)–are key cogs in the production wheel. The aft fuselage is subcontracted to Latécoère, “a long-standing and trusted supplier,” according to Piras.
Unless current plans change, the French defense ministry will eventually order 286 Rafales. Since the program started, this total has been reduced by only eight aircraft, in order to pay for the “F3-Plus” development. The contract for a further 60 aircraft, bringing the total on firm order to 180, was approved by the government last Thursday. Production is not to end until 2023.
According to the French defense ministry, despite the slow pace of orders and the consequent need to replace obsolescent parts more often than originally planned, the overall cost of the Rafale program (development and production) increased by only 4.45 percent between 1996 and 2007. It is now ?39.6 billion in 2008 prices. This is a remarkable record, especially when compared to the Eurofighter Typhoon, to which the four partner nations committed in the belief that there was strength and efficiency in numbers. However, Dassault officials cautioned AIN that inflation was taking its toll in the Rafale program. Against this, there is the serious prospect of export orders, which will increase the production rate and help amortize the cost of future development.
http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-ne ... roduction/
Nossa Senhora...Luís Henrique escreveu:Essa o PRick vai gostar:
Na Índia, o Rafale parece estar sendo considerado um caça de 5ª geração.
Parece que a furtividade atingida pelo caça, apesar de não ser VLO como o F-22, é bem melhor que os demais caças considerados de 4ª geração. Isto, adicionado ao Spectra condicionam o caça como MUITO DIFÍCIL de ser detectado e abatido.
Juntando as outras características, fusão de dados, sensores passivos, etc., garantem ao Rafale uma posição SUPERIOR em capacidade entre os demais competidores do MMRCA.
Ai vai um trecho da matéria e o link:
How they measure up
Rafale
France Dassault
Strengths Advanced fifth-generation aircraft with stealth features
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
Typhoon
European Consortium Eurofighter
Strengths Futuristic fighter aircraft with advanced features
Weaknesses Expensive; more in the league of IAF’S existing Su-30MKI
MIG-35
Russia
United Aircraft Corp
Strengths Compatible with IAF’s existing MiG-29 fleet
Weaknesses Russia’s track record of poor after-sales support and service
F-16
USA
Lockheed Martin
Strengths Versatile medium fighter; has record global sales to its credit
Weaknesses Is being sold to Pakistan; prospects of upgradation are bleak
F/A-18
USA
Boeing
Strengths Fighter-attack; formidable radar; room for upgradation
Weaknesses Due to its high cost, it may not fit in India’s MMRCA budget
Gripen
Sweden
SAAB
Strengths Capable fourth-generation light fighter
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/content_ma ... nt&id=1110
Luís Henrique escreveu:Essa o PRick vai gostar:
Na Índia, o Rafale parece estar sendo considerado um caça de 5ª geração.
Parece que a furtividade atingida pelo caça, apesar de não ser VLO como o F-22, é bem melhor que os demais caças considerados de 4ª geração. Isto, adicionado ao Spectra condicionam o caça como MUITO DIFÍCIL de ser detectado e abatido.
Juntando as outras características, fusão de dados, sensores passivos, etc., garantem ao Rafale uma posição SUPERIOR em capacidade entre os demais competidores do MMRCA.
Ai vai um trecho da matéria e o link:
How they measure up
Rafale
France Dassault
Strengths Advanced fifth-generation aircraft with stealth features
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
Typhoon
European Consortium Eurofighter
Strengths Futuristic fighter aircraft with advanced features
Weaknesses Expensive; more in the league of IAF’S existing Su-30MKI
MIG-35
Russia
United Aircraft Corp
Strengths Compatible with IAF’s existing MiG-29 fleet
Weaknesses Russia’s track record of poor after-sales support and service
F-16
USA
Lockheed Martin
Strengths Versatile medium fighter; has record global sales to its credit
Weaknesses Is being sold to Pakistan; prospects of upgradation are bleak
F/A-18
USA
Boeing
Strengths Fighter-attack; formidable radar; room for upgradation
Weaknesses Due to its high cost, it may not fit in India’s MMRCA budget
Gripen
Sweden
SAAB
Strengths Capable fourth-generation light fighter
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/content_ma ... nt&id=1110
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Sintra,Sintra escreveu:PrickPRick escreveu:
Depois sou eu que tenho imaginação, comparar o voo de avião com um carro na estrada, não dá!! O primeiro é muito mais suave e permite circular o alvo!
Sim, e os MFD´s tem poucas polegadas de tela, portanto, são péssimos para visualização de alvos, quando estamos falando de combate a mendigos, por isso, o ideal é ter confirmação visual do alvo, para evitar o que os EUA fazem, e chamam de danos colaterais.
[]´s
Quando obviamente e claramente não se sabe do que se está a falar, mais vale estar calado...
February 18, 2010
Op-Ed Contributor
Empty Skies Over Afghanistan
By Lara M. Dadkhah
Washington
THE Taliban have found a way to beat American airpower. And they have managed this remarkable feat with American help.
The consequences of this development are front and center in the current offensive in Marja, Afghanistan, where air support to American and Afghan forces has been all but grounded by concerns about civilian casualties.
American and NATO military leaders — worried by Taliban propaganda claiming that air strikes have killed an inordinate number of civilians, and persuaded by “hearts and minds” enthusiasts that the key to winning the war is the Afghan population’s goodwill — have largely relinquished the strategic advantage of American air dominance. Last July, the commander of Western forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, issued a directive that air strikes (and long-range artillery fire) be authorized only under “very limited and prescribed conditions.”
So in a modern refashioning of the obvious — that war is harmful to civilian populations — the United States military has begun basing doctrine on the premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct of war. The trouble is, no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that claim.
In Marja, American and Afghan troops have shown great skill in routing the Taliban occupiers. But news reports indicate that our troops under heavy attack have had to wait an hour or more for air support, so that insurgents could be positively identified. “We didn’t come to Marja to destroy it, or to hurt civilians,” a Marine officer told reporters after waiting 90 minutes before the Cobra helicopters he had requested showed up with their Hellfire missiles. He’s right that the goal is not to kill bystanders or destroy towns, but an overemphasis on civilian protection is now putting American troops on the defensive in what is intended to be a major offensive.
And Marja is not exceptional.
While the number of American forces in Afghanistan has more than doubled since 2008, to nearly 70,000 today, the critical air support they get has not kept pace. According to my analysis of data compiled by the United States military, close air support sorties, which in Afghanistan are almost always unplanned and in aid of troops on the ground who are under intense fire, increased by just 27 percent during that same period. (While I am employed by a defense consulting company, my research and opinions on air support are my own.)
Anecdotal evidence and simple logic dictate that there are two reasons for this relative decrease of air support: Troops in contact with the enemy are calling for air support less often than before the tactical directive was issued, and when they do call for air strikes their requests are more frequently being denied.
Pentagon data show that the percentage of sorties sent out that resulted in air strikes has also declined, albeit modestly, to 5.6 percent from 6 percent. According to the military’s own air-power summaries, often when the planes or helicopters arrive, they simply perform shows of force, or drop flares rather than munitions. It is only a matter of time before the Taliban see flares and flyovers for what they are: empty threats.
One of the most egregious episodes of failed support occurred last September in Kunar Province, when a detachment of Marines and Afghan troops tried to search the village of Ganjgal for a weapons cache. When they were fired on by insurgents in the nearby hills, they radioed for artillery support, a request that was rejected on the ground that civilians might be injured. They then pleaded for helicopters, which didn’t arrive for more than an hour after the shooting started.
“We are pinned down,” a Marine major explained to his Afghan counterpart as they waited helplessly, according to a report from McClatchy Newspapers. “We are running low on ammo. We have no air. We’ve lost today.” In the end, four Marines, eight Afghan troops and an Afghan interpreter were dead, and 22 others wounded.
Some would argue that more combat troops will always mean more combat troop deaths. That holds true, however, only if you believe that our soldiers should fight fair. Logic dictates that no well-ordered army would give up its advantages and expect to win, and the United States military, which does not have the manpower in Afghanistan to fight the insurgents one-on-one, is no exception.
Perhaps the directive against civilian casualties could be justified if one could show that Afghan lives were truly being saved, but that’s not the case. According to the latest report by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the number of civilian deaths caused by Western and Afghan government forces decreased to 596 in 2009, from 828 the year before. But the overall number of civilian deaths in the country increased by 14 percent, to 2,412, and the number killed by Taliban troops and other insurgents rose by 41 percent. For Afghan civilians who are dying in greater numbers, the fact that fewer deaths are caused by pro-government forces is cold comfort.
There is also little to indicate that the “hearts and minds” campaign has resulted in the population’s cooperation, especially in the all-important area of human intelligence. Afghans can be expected to cooperate with American forces only if they feel safe to do so — when we take permanent control of an area. Obviously, this involves defeating the enemy. With NATO intelligence services recently noting that the Taliban still have a “shadow government” in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, it’s hard to say we’re close to accomplishing that feat. Just last month, the Taliban set off a series of bombs in the heart of Kabul; the insurgents, it appears, no longer need to winter in Pakistan.
Of course, all this is not to say that we should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage “total” war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.
Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a “long war” should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have.
Lara M. Dadkhah is an intelligence analyst.
A impressão que passa, é essa mesmo.PRick escreveu:Luís Henrique escreveu:Essa o PRick vai gostar:
Na Índia, o Rafale parece estar sendo considerado um caça de 5ª geração.
Parece que a furtividade atingida pelo caça, apesar de não ser VLO como o F-22, é bem melhor que os demais caças considerados de 4ª geração. Isto, adicionado ao Spectra condicionam o caça como MUITO DIFÍCIL de ser detectado e abatido.
Juntando as outras características, fusão de dados, sensores passivos, etc., garantem ao Rafale uma posição SUPERIOR em capacidade entre os demais competidores do MMRCA.
Ai vai um trecho da matéria e o link:
How they measure up
Rafale
France Dassault
Strengths Advanced fifth-generation aircraft with stealth features
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
Typhoon
European Consortium Eurofighter
Strengths Futuristic fighter aircraft with advanced features
Weaknesses Expensive; more in the league of IAF’S existing Su-30MKI
MIG-35
Russia
United Aircraft Corp
Strengths Compatible with IAF’s existing MiG-29 fleet
Weaknesses Russia’s track record of poor after-sales support and service
F-16
USA
Lockheed Martin
Strengths Versatile medium fighter; has record global sales to its credit
Weaknesses Is being sold to Pakistan; prospects of upgradation are bleak
F/A-18
USA
Boeing
Strengths Fighter-attack; formidable radar; room for upgradation
Weaknesses Due to its high cost, it may not fit in India’s MMRCA budget
Gripen
Sweden
SAAB
Strengths Capable fourth-generation light fighter
Weaknesses Poor export orders could jeopardise future development
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/content_ma ... nt&id=1110
Parece que os caças estão colocados segundo um ramk, é isso mesmo?
[]´s
