Suborno, corrupção e similares

[Penguin]

São Paulo, domingo, 23 de novembro de 1997.

Em 95, Thomson foi acusada de suborno
da Sucursal de Brasília

Dois anos após disputar a polêmica licitação do projeto Sivam (Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia), a empresa francesa Thomson volta a frequentar a Esplanada dos Ministérios. Desta vez, no Ministério das Comunicações.

Em 95, o Brasil assinou contrato de US$ 1,4 bilhão com a norte-americana Raytheon para o fornecimento de equipamentos destinados ao projeto Sivam -monitorado pelo Ministério da Aeronáutica.

A Thomson disputava com a Raytheon a licitação, que acabou sendo dispensada pelo governo sob a alegação de se tratar de assunto de "segurança nacional".

Em fevereiro de 95, o jornal "The New York Times" publicou reportagem dizendo que a CIA (central de inteligência dos EUA) havia identificado tentativa de suborno de autoridades brasileiras pela Thomson. A empresa negou.
Ainda em 95, a Thomson foi envolvida no episódio do "grampo" telefônico sofrido pelo embaixador Júlio César Gomes dos Santos, acusado de tráfico de influência a favor da Raytheon.

Mais uma vez, a acusação foi negada pela empresa, afirmando que processaria os autores de denúncias que a envolviam com "grampos" telefônicos no Brasil.

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São Paulo, terça-feira, 05 de dezembro de 2000
LUÍS NASSIF

O projeto "Echelon"
Semanas atrás, em uma coluna sobre a Abin, mencionei de passagem o projeto "Echelon", de espionagem industrial. Segundo informações veiculadas no Canadá, um dos alvos seria a empresa brasileira Embraer. A menção visava reforçar a idéia sobre a importância de ter um serviço de inteligência estratégica, sem arapongas, mas com especialistas em novas tecnologias e em sistemas estratégicos.

A propósito da coluna, recebi material publicado na revista gaúcha "Amanhã", no qual o autor, James Görgen, esmiuça o "Echelon" a partir de trabalhos do jornalista britânico Duncan Campbell.

Pai do "Echelon", o "Project P415" foi preparado inicialmente pelas agências de inteligência de cinco países -Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Canadá, Austrália e Nova Zelândia- logo após o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, com o objetivo de monitorar as comunicações entre a União Soviética e seus aliados.

Com o fim do império soviético, esses serviços se viram sem argumentos para preservar suas fontes de receita -verbas orçamentárias bilionárias, dos tempos da "guerra fria". Decidiram então adaptar o projeto para monitorar as "comunicações civis" do século 21.

Em 1996, o investigador neozelandês Nicky Hager lançou o livro "Poder Secreto. A posição da Nova Zelândia na rede de espionagem internacional", onde avançava nas suspeitas de que o projeto invadia a privacidade dos cidadãos comuns e das empresas.

Em 1999, o Parlamento Europeu decidiu encomendar um relatório para subsidiar investigações a respeito do tema. Preparado por Campbell, o relatório demonstrava que, em tese, o sistema era capaz de monitorar o conteúdo de ligações telefônicas, e-mail, fax ou pacotes de transmissão de dados. Permaneceu sem esclarecimento a questão do destino dessas informações e da razão para o projeto permanecer secreto.

De acordo com o relatório, o sistema central do "Echelon" fica em Fort Meade, ao nordeste da cidade de Washington, onde funciona a National Security Agency (NSA), a agência de segurança nacional do Departamento de Defesa dos EUA. A partir de lá são controladas as bases de Yakima (200 quilômetros a sudoeste de Seattle), Sugar Grove (250 quilômetros a sudoeste de Washington), Morwenstow (Cornualha britânica), Waihopai (Nova Zelândia) e Geraldton (oeste da Austrália). Um segundo eixo relevante está em Menwith Hill, Inglaterra, que monitora o fluxo de informações dos satélites Intelsat.
Antigamente os 52 sistemas trabalhavam isoladamente. Nos anos 80 foi criado o "Platform", um sistema integrador. A estrutura toda passou a ser denominada de United States Sigint System (USSS). Criado nos anos 70, o "Echelon" consiste de uma rede capaz de filtrar e ordenar informações a partir de palavras-chave, assim como esses sistemas de busca utilizados para rastrear informações na Internet.

Em reportagem de 25 de julho deste ano, Campbell informa que um sistema de coleta pode gerar 1 milhão de entradas a cada meia hora. Cerca de 6.500 entradas são jogadas fora pelos filtros, mil são separadas pelos critérios, dez são selecionadas pelos analistas e apenas um relatório é produzido.

Segundo o jornalista, em 1995 a empresa francesa Thomson, que participava da licitação para o Sivam (Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia), denunciou que o Brasil estaria sendo alvo dessa rede de espionagem. A empresa norte-americana Raytheon teria se valido de informações privilegiadas da Thomson obtidas por meio do USSS para vencer a concorrência feita sem licitação.

Tudo pode não passar de teoria conspiratória. Sem um serviço de inteligência competente, como saber?

---------------------------------------------------------


Época
ESPIONAGEM

Um grampo bilionário

Como a CIA usou rede de satélites, grampeou o Planalto e garantiu à Raytheon vitória sobre a Thomson na venda de radares para a Amazônia

O Brasil foi o alvo de uma operação conjunta dos serviços secretos dos Estados Unidos exclusivamente voltada para a espionagem econômica. A CIA e a NSA, agência nacional de segurança dos EUA, grampearam as comunicações do Palácio do Planalto, onde trabalham o presidente da República e assessores, além dos escritórios do grupo francês Thomson, no Rio de Janeiro e em Paris, durante a concorrência do governo brasileiro para a compra do conjunto de radares do Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (Sivam). A licitação correu no período dos governos Itamar Franco e Fernando Henrique Cardoso, entre 1994 e 1995.

Os serviços secretos americanos usaram a rede de satélites militares dedicada à interceptação de comunicações por telefone, fax e correio eletrônico. Depois de meses de vigilância clandestina sobre a licitação de US$ 1,3 bilhão do Sivam, informaram ao Departamento de Comércio sobre a provável vitória do grupo francês Thomson.

O então secretário de Comércio, Ron Brown, morto em acidente aéreo meses depois, produziu um relatório para a Comissão de Comércio dos EUA no qual incluía a concorrência do Sivam entre duas centenas de casos em que empresas européis subornavam funcionários em diferentes países para conseguir vencer as americanas em milionárias concorrências. A existência do relatório de Brown foi mencionada pelo ex-subsecretário de Comércio Jeffrey Gartey, durante entrevista ao jornal New York Times em fevereiro de 1995.

Na seqüência, houve um escândalo palaciano, em Brasília, quando se descobriu um grampo no telefone de um assessor presidencial, o embaixador Júlio César Santos, flagrado num lobby pró-americano. A concorrência do Sivam avançou. Acabou decidida, meses depois, com a interferência direta do presidente Bill Clinton. Por duas vezes, telefonou ao presidente Fernando Henrique para falar do "interesse americano" na vitória da Raytheon. A francesa Thomson perdeu o negócio. Não foi comprovada a suspeita de suborno de funcionários brasileiros.

O conselho e a comissão executiva da União Européia determinaram uma investigação sigilosa sobre o uso da rede militar de satélites dos EUA, conhecida como Echelon, para privilegiar empresas americanas em disputas comerciais com as competidoras da Europa. Em fevereiro, três anos depois, a Comissão Científica e Tecnológica do Parlamento Europeu concluiu que a CIA e a NSA usaram a rede Echelon para influir decisivamente na derrota de empresas européias, tanto no caso Sivam quanto em várias outras concorrências internacionais. Dias atrás o Parlamento Europeu começou a discutir a montagem de uma comissão especial de inquérito.

Nos documentos da comissão, o Sivam é mencionado como um dos primeiros e mais importantes casos de espionagem econômica executada pelo sistema militar Echelon, desenvolvido a partir de 1952, durante a Guerra Fria contra a União Soviética. Outros episódios de manipulação de negócios bilionários estão relacionados em um apêndice sob o título "Desenvolvimento de tecnologia de vigilância e o risco de abuso de informação econômica". Há, por exemplo, o registro de um grampo durante negociações entre o consórcio aeronáutico europeu Airbus e o governo da Arábia Saudita, no mesmo período do Sivam. A Airbus perdeu US$ 1 bilhão em vendas para as concorrentes americanas Boeing e McDonnell Douglas.


As descobertas provocaram um delicado problema diplomático, porque a rede Echelon nasceu de um pacto entre o governo dos EUA e o da Inglaterra, com adesão da Austrália, do Canadá e da Nova Zelândia - países onde foram construídas as bases para coleta de dados. A rede Echelon é composta de uma constelação de satélites e computadores equipados com programas de criptografia capazes de selecionar dados a partir de palavras-chave em qualquer tipo de comunicação. As bases dispersas pelo mundo enviam as informações coletadas para uma central em Fort Meade, em Maryland, nos EUA, controlada pela NSA. Essa agência foi criada em 1952 especificamente para interceptar comunicações soviéticas. Em Maryland, a NSA concentra 38 mil funcionários. As informações escolhidas são repassadas a outras agências federais, como a CIA e os órgãos governamentais interessados nos temas sob investigação.

A partir do fim do regime soviético, no início dos anos 90, o sistema de escuta passou a ser direcionado para a espionagem econômica. Em 1994, o governo brasileiro iniciou as negociações para a compra dos radares do Sivam. A Thomson apostava na vitória, pois já havia fornecido os equipamentos de controle do tráfego aéreo brasileiro, o Sindacta. A interferência da CIA e da NSA mudou o rumo do negócio: "Havia algo estranho. Cada vez que os franceses faziam uma proposta, os americanos vinham com outra melhor pouco tempo depois", disse a Época uma fonte ligada ao bloco perdedor.

Em 1995, funcionários do Departamento de Comércio já admitiam estar usando a rede de espionagem para beneficiar empresas supostamente vítimas de uma competição desleal na Europa. Argumentavam com a draconiana legislação anticorrupção americana: "Uma companhia nossa não pode escapar da lei de comércio contratando um intermediário", justificou Eleanor Lewis, chefe do Conselho de Comércio Internacional do Departamento de Comércio, em dezembro de 1995. "O Sivam não foi um caso isolado. Investigamos, envolvemos os serviços de inteligência, trabalhamos com informações classificadas."

Em depoimentos dados ao Senado americano e no Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, James Woolsey, diretor da CIA entre 1993 e 1995, descreveu com minúcia a conduta americana. "Quando encontramos evidências de suborno, não contamos à empresa americana envolvida na disputa. Vamos direto ao secretário de Estado e ele manda um embaixador americano falar com o presidente ou o rei do país", contou Woolsey, conforme documentos exibidos pela rede de televisão NBC, de Nova York, no dia 14 de abril.

Woolsey detalhou o ritual: "Nosso embaixador diz: 'Senhor presidente', ou 'Vossa Majestade', seu ministro está envolvido em suborno. O senhor tem muitas relações com os EUA e não achamos que essa é a melhor forma de atuar". No caso brasileiro, Clinton reforçou o recado com uma carta ao presidente Itamar Franco em favor da Raytheon. O emissário foi o secretário Ron Brown, que a entregou ao então ministro da Fazenda, Rubens Ricupero. O Congresso americano resolveu investigar o Echelon. Em depoimento prestado em 12 de abril, o atual diretor da CIA, George J. Tenet, disse preservar a privacidade de empresas e cidadãos americanos na espionagem digital. Ressalvou o "direito de atuar" quando se depara com uma situação de risco para as corporações empresariais dos EUA.

[Carlos Mathias]

"Quando encontramos evidências de suborno, não contamos à empresa americana envolvida na disputa. Vamos direto ao secretário de Estado e ele manda um embaixador americano falar com o presidente ou o rei do país"

Frase emblemática esta.

[Junker]

MAN Ferrostaal/Thyssen

Arms deal: 'Ministers got millions'
EVELYN GROENINK, SAM SOLE AND STEFAANS BRüMMER - Dec 14 2007 00:00

It's official: German prosecutors believe Tony Georgiadis, the shipping tycoon regarded as close to President Thabo Mbeki, helped channel millions of dollars in arms deal bribes to "South African officials and Cabinet members".

The explosive allegation is contained in a request for legal assistance, seen by the Mail & Guardian, that the German embassy in Pretoria forwarded to the Department of Foreign Affairs on September 28.

The document, a formal request for South African help to follow leads, presents the firmest outline yet of a criminal probe, led by state prose­cutors in Düsseldorf, into the sale of four naval corvettes to South Africa.

The German request follows a similar one from Britain last year, swelling a body of evidence that flatly contradicts government's insistence that the main contracts in the controversial arms deal were not tainted by corruption.

Accused persons
The request lists 10 "accused persons", Georgiadis prominently among them, and states that contraventions of German anti-bribery legislation, fraud and attempted tax evasion are being investigated.

The other nine suspects are mostly executives from German companies making up the consortium chosen as preferred supplier for the corvettes in November 1998 and awarded the multibillion-rand contract in December 1999. Georgiadis this week flatly denied wrongdoing.

Georgiadis, of Greek extraction but London based, shipped oil to apartheid South Africa in contravention of sanctions and developed close relations with members of the previous government.

He extended his sphere of influence to the ANC after 1990, developing relations, according to several accounts, with Mbeki, Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, her husband and former national prosecutions head Bulelani Ngcuka and Penuell Maduna, a former minister.

The presidency has deflected questions about Mbeki's relationship with Georgiadis. The M&G sent questions to presidential spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga in February. He responded in October, saying: "I am advised that Mr Anthony Georgiadis has been in contact with the African National Congress since the early 1990s. Your questions should therefore be directed to the ANC."

An inquiry directed to the head of the presidency in the ANC, Smuts Ngonyama, went unanswered until this week, when he said: "I wouldn't be able to answer any questions on this -- I have absolutely no clue."

Mbeki's ear
Georgiadis reportedly had the ear of Mbeki while acting as a lobbyist for German arms interests during the acquisition process. Mbeki chaired the Cabinet subcommittee that oversaw the acquisition.

The M&G first highlighted Georgiadis's role in February after the German magazine Der Spiegel revealed that Düsseldorf investigators were probing "commission" payments of $22-million (about R150-million) to a company in Liberia. The M&G identified this company as Mallar Incorporated, a secretive letterbox company, and said that Georgiadis was believed to be behind Mallar.

The German request lists three amounts of "bribe money" allegedly paid by the corvette consortium, led by Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik -- $22-million, $3-million and DM1-million. It also confirms Georgiadis's allegedly central role in the largest of the three.

Bribe money
The request states: "For the payment of these bribe monies, so-called 'commission agreements' were arranged by Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik with Liberia-based Mallar, which is represented by Tony Georgiadis, who distributed the money, for an amount of $22-million.

"At least the major part of these amounts had been paid to South African officials and Cabinet members directly or indirectly after the [German] international anti-corruption law had become effective."

Before February 1999, when this law came into effect, foreign bribery was not an offence in Germany.

Thyssen has strenuously denied wrongdoing. The company said this week: "ThyssenKrupp is confident that the suspicion of illegal commission payments will not be confirmed in the further course of the public prosecution office's investigations."

The German document states that Georgiadis expressly denies he passed on any money to South African politicians or officials. It concedes that the names of the recipients "are known only to a certain extent".

Georgiadis told the M&G this week: "I flatly deny that I have been involved in any wrongdoing and I have not been in any way involved in bribing anybody. Beyond saying the above I have no comment."

Three cheques
However, the German document reveals that in a raid on the home of Christoph Hoenings, the top Thyssen executive involved in the South African bid, investigators discovered photocopies of three cheques for R500 000 each to the ANC, the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund and the Foundation for Community Development. The latter is a Mozambican charity founded by Graça Machel, Nelson Mandela's wife.

Independent Democrats leader Patricia de Lille last month revealed the existence of these payments, saying Thyssen had made them in January 1999. This was during contract negotiations after the German consortium was named preferred bidder.

None of these entities has admitted receiving the money. It now appears these amounts might have been paid by Georgiadis, although with Thyssen's knowledge. The German document states: "The accused Hoenings received these photocopies from the accused Georgiadis and was asked to keep them confidential."

Hoenings was the Thyssen official who, in 1995, revealed that Mbeki had intervened to restore the German bid after Armscor had excluded the company from a shortlist drawn up during an earlier round of bidding for the corvette-supply contract. That process was aborted in favour of the later Strategic Defence Procurement Programme, which issued new tenders for jets, helicopters and submarines, as well as corvettes.

Thyssen and Shaik
It was also Hoenings who allegedly met Shamin "Chippy" Shaik, then head of procurement at the department of defence, in July 1998. According to Der Spiegel, Hoenings -- although he was not named by the publication -- recorded in a memo that Shaik had asked for a payment of $3-million.

The German request now confirms that a lobby agreement for $3-million -- the second amount it calls "bribe money" -- was signed with a London company, Merian Limited, represented by accountant Ian Pierce, the go-between allegedly nominated by Shaik in his meeting with Hoenings.

The request states that the money was paid to "a South African official acting on behalf of Armscor" -- erroneously identified in the document as Schabir and not Shamin Shaik -- "in order to motivate him in violation of his duties to support the delivery contract for the corvettes".

Shaik has previously denied any wrongdoing.

Raids sought
The German request seeks South African assistance in carrying out "search and confiscation warrants" issued by a Düsseldorf judge in June this year, with raids also being sought in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Jersey and Monaco.

Raids are sought on several entities in South Africa (which are known to the M&G) to obtain information about the "flow of bribe payments" and "agreements between the participants".

The German request has not been acted on yet.

The Foreign Affairs Department passed it on to the department of justice, which has to allocate it to either the police service or the Scorpions to pursue. Justice and Constitutional Development Department spokesperson Zolile Nqayi said this week the request was still with his department, which was "in touch with the Germans and … awaiting further information from them that we requested".

Telltale tax
The German document reveals how Thyssen's alleged desire to deduct commission payments from tax as "business expenses" first alerted the authorities.

The German Income Tax Act outlawed such deductions after the end of 1998, if the payments constitute an illegal act.

Thyssen, the request alleges, "falsely declared that these payments had been made for the bid … as early as 1998 and that in the end they did not know who was the recipient of these monies".

The who's who of ThyssenKrupp
A who's who within multinational ThyssenKrupp is named in the German prosecutor's office investigation of the sale of four corvettes to South Africa, write Stefaans Brümmer and Sam Sole.

The German request for legal assistance names nine German citizens as "accused persons".

At the top of the list of suspects is Jürgen Koopmann, who was described in 1997, when a German delegation presented a comprehensive arms package proposal to South Africa, as managing director of the Thyssen shipbuilding consortium.

In 1995, during an earlier acquisition process for corvettes only, Koopmann was quoted as complaining that Armscor had stuck to a shortlist excluding Germany, despite two assurances from Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president, that Germany was still in the race.

Accused alongside Koopmann are Christoph Hoenings and Ulrich Scheel, both of Thyssen subsidiary Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, and both signatories to the corvette contract.

Hoenings, like Koopmann, told the media in 1995 that Mbeki had declared the bids for the corvettes still "open", even after Armscor had composed a shortlist excluding the German bid.

That process was eventually aborted and Germany won the corvette and submarine contracts after a new, comprehensive acquisition process was launched.

Also on the list are Sven Moeller, ThyssenKrupp representative in South Africa; Dr Hans-Erich Forster, who resigned as a member of ThyssenKrupp's supervisory board in 2002; Herbert von Nitzsch, who served as chief executive of ThyssenKrupp's Blohm + Voss shipyard subsidiary between 1996 and 2003; Klaus-Joachim Müller, a ThyssenKrupp executive, and Klaus Bauernsachs, a Blohm + Voss manager.

Although he is not named as an "accused person", Monaco-based businessman Rolf Wegener is also implicated.

The German request says that for the payment of suspected "bribe monies" Thyssen arranged "commission agreements", including with an "RW", apparently Wegener -- who is no stranger to controversy, or arms deals.

When a Thyssen subsidiary concluded a sale of "Fuchs" wheeled tanks to Saudi Arabia in 1991, the company set off DM220-million of "necessary expenses" -- often a euphemism for commission payments -- against taxes.

A portion of that money went via a Panamanian postbox company that investigators linked to Wegener.

Wegener's explanation was that he was an "export consultant" for Thyssen after all.

The Saudi deal generated tremendous controversy in Germany, because of allegations that a portion of the commissions was channelled as kickbacks to fund the Christian Democratic Union of then chancellor Helmut Kohl.

A spokesperson for ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems this week commented: "Since the investigations are ongoing, we cannot make public comments on the matter. ThyssenKrupp is keenly interested in obtaining full clarification of the matter and to this end has formed a task force that is investigating the allegations with the help of external experts.

"We are cooperating fully with the investigating public prosecution office. However, on the basis of the internal investigations carried out, ThyssenKrupp is confident that the suspicion of illegal commission payments will not be confirmed in the further course of the public prosecution office's investigations."

http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-12-14- ... t-millions

[Junker]

Mbeki 'paid R30m arms-deal bribe'
MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE REPORTER AND SAPA
JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA - Aug 03 2008 07:33

Despite a pre-emptive strike by President Thabo Mbeki's staff to discredit it, the Sunday Times has published explosive allegations that Mbeki was paid R30-million by a German shipbuilding company to guarantee it would receive a submarine contract in South Africa's multibillion-rand arms deal.

According to the newspaper, a secret report compiled last year by a British specialist risk company revealed the deal. Mbeki allegedly gave R2-million of the money to Jacob Zuma and the rest to the African National Congress (ANC).

On Saturday, Mbeki's spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga urged anyone with evidence of corruption against the president to come forward, South African Broadcasting Corporation radio reported.

"They [the allegations] do not warrant any response. Anybody who has got a case to make against any South African, including the president of the republic, must simply approach the law-enforcement agency," Ratshitanga said.

He also told the Sunday Times that the allegations were "of such fantastical proportions as not to warrant any response", and ANC spokesperson Jesse Duarte apparently said: "Anyone can write a document and claim it is authentic."

In its exposé, the Sunday Times said the British consultancy was apparently commissioned to write the report by a leading central European manufacturer to investigate the business practices of shipbuilder MAN Ferrostaal, which had launched a hostile takeover bid against it.

MAN Ferrostaal, which led the German Submarine Consortium, won a contract worth more than R6-billion to sell three submarines to the South African Navy. In return, it apparently promised to build a R6-billion stainless-steel mill at Coega in the Eastern Cape, providing 1 000 direct jobs and 3 000 indirect jobs.

"The project, which promised billions of rands in export and local sales, has not happened," said the newspaper.

It quoted from a section of the report that alleges: "A former South African official who had access to such information informed us in confidence that Ferrostaal paid R30-million to current President Thabo Mbeki to gain the arms contract in the first place. When questioned by investigators in South Africa, Mbeki claimed that R2-million was given to his former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, and the rest went to the ANC."

The report apparently says the information was unlikely to be leaked in the near future "because Mbeki maintains a tight [rein] on the National Prosecuting Authority where this matter would be dealt with". It also alleges that South African intelligence services have proof that MAN Ferrostaal paid Mbeki the bribe.

MAN Ferrostaal has dismissed the allegations as a "fishing expedition" aimed at destroying the reputation of the company and the South African government.

The Sunday Times said a draft report into the submarine contract, drawn up by the Attorney General in May 2001, was "diluted and sanitised" before being included in the final report of the joint investigation team set up to probe the arms deal.

The draft apparently says "deviations from the approval process occurred" and that "good procurement practices were lacking" during the submarine bidding process, the newspaper said. For example, Tipp-ex correction fluid was apparently used on the evaluation working papers -- contrary to instructions -- and corrections made were not initialled by anyone.

The Sunday Times also said Mbeki allegedly ignored an August 1999 affordability study and two independent steel reports that assessed the economic and financial impact of the arms deal and apparently warned that Ferrostaal's stainless-steel offset project was "high risk and likely to fail".

http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-03- ... deal-bribe

[Bolovo]

Esse tópico vai ser dos bons. Vamos ver até onde vai chegar.

[soultrain]

Some call it bribery
Did Condit make an offer Congress can't refuse?
Rick Anderson
Published on February 23, 2000

*

AFTER HIS TALK to a business group in DC the other day, Boeing Chairman Phil Condit paused as reporters gathered round. A little diplomacy seemed in order. Boeing's engineers were on strike, grumbling about corporate callousness and the company's threats to subcontract more production— to China, say.

Condit, however, didn't have a new money offer for the engineers. But he had one for Congress.

If our top elected officials would approve a permanent normal-trade status for Beijing, he said, the company would pay for those aye votes.

No fooling around. A congressional vote for Boeing's China policy could be redeemed in campaign contributions.

It was a Kodak moment in the history of vote-buying. To stabilize China's trade status and avoid the now-yearly congressional battles that ensue over policy renewal, Boeing and other US corporations were pulling out all the stops—and wallets.

Some observers were stunned. "Unfortunately, this kind of quid pro quo is standard operating procedure in government," says Aaron Taylor of the DC watchdog group Citizens Against Government Waste. "What is unusual is for a company official to speak to the media about it in such explicit terms."

The usual method is quiet backroom arm-twisting and the implication of political contributions for doing the right thing. But with the US having agreed to seek permanent trade approval as a condition for China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the Clinton administration and American corporations face an intense vote in Congress this summer—with Condit as their advance man.

He chairs a $6-million China trade campaign on behalf of the formidable US Business Roundtable (representing chief executives from the US's biggest companies). Boeing's fortunes are at stake as well. Already the number one US exporter to China, Boeing expects Beijing to order $120 billion in aircraft in the next two decades.

Thus, to keep Boeing and America strong, Condit publicly announced the company was offering bucks for ballots.

"We are an issues-oriented company," the chairman told reporters, in reference to the China vote. "We try to support people who believe in the kind of issues that we think are important for the United States. So clearly, yes, we will be supporting people that believe in the direction we do."

There was no mistaking Condit's public offer. It may have been the boldest ever made to Congress. "This is a bribe," Joe Maciariello, a Claremont Graduate University business expert, says flatly—in effect, a mass payoff bid extended to 535 elected officials.

Boeing is no stranger to charges of bribery, of course. It was something the company was accused of doing under cover of darkness in foreign lands, greasing commercial jet sales with millions handed to Saudi royal families, Japanese government officials, and assorted airline potentates. In the late 1970s, the company agreed to a US consent decree following allegations it paid $52 million in bribes to foreign governments. Boeing admitted no wrongdoing. It just said it wouldn't do it again.

But apparently it did. In a civil case still proceeding on appeals through a US court in Florida, a Canadian airplane maker has earned a $2.8 million judgment alleging in part that Boeing executives approved a $786,000 bribe on the sale of planes in the Bahamas.

It would seem prudent that Boeing today might avoid offers that smack of payoffs. But Condit didn't even bother to lurk in a dark corner with a bag of goodies—he shouted his deal from the media rooftops.

"Generally," says watchdog Taylor, "this type of thing is done in a sort of doublespeak that is understood by the parties involved, but vague enough to provide plausible deniability."

Condit simply may have "unwittingly broken one of the unspoken rules of the Washington game," Taylor adds. "I imagine that Boeing's professional government relations people would never make this kind of statement."

To test that theory, we asked one of the company's public relations staff how exactly Boeing might "support" those who back its China policy. A flat amount? More for fence straddlers? Lump sums for those who cave the last moment?

Says Tim Neale, a Boeing spokesperson in DC: "Boeing's practice is to contribute money to elected officials and to people running for public office whose interests coincide with the company's. All information about Boeing's political contributions is on file with the Federal Election Commission and is public record."

In other words, no comment. But those FEC records do show that in 1997-98 Boeing gave $1.65 million to federal candidates. The latest 1999-2000 figures reflect $289,750 in contributions to House and Senate members.

Apparently, for the right vote, they can all expect more—save for Oregon Representative Peter DeFazio. Records show virtually all House members except him have gotten support from Boeing. One possible reason: He happens to strongly oppose the China trade plan. And he apparently isn't taking up Condit's offer.

"Our biggest export to China is family-wage American jobs," DeFazio says in a statement issued by his office. US trade policy "coddles dictators and ignores the cries of millions of Chinese who are suffering persecution for their religious beliefs, their cultural heritage, and their political views."

If Boeing's bid is just a case of accidental honesty, an unguarded corporate moment, it's no less revealing, says watchdog Taylor.

"This kind of talk underscores what we already know: The political system is in need of some serious reform."

[soultrain]

Canadian Bribe Inquiry Said to Look at Boeing
By JAMES STERNGOLD
Published: Tuesday, February 13, 1996



The Boeing Company and a former senior sales executive are under criminal investigation in Canada on suspicion that a former Boeing subsidiary paid more than $1 million in bribes and fees to sell five airplanes to Bahamasair in 1990, people with knowledge of the investigation said.

In addition, people close to the situation said the United States Justice Department had been looking into the matter, although it did not appear that a grand jury had been convened.

An American criminal case could have a big impact on Boeing since, under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, companies can face stiff penalties if they are found to have made improper payments to secure deals overseas. It is also possible that some top Boeing executives might be implicated in the investigation.

According to a civil lawsuit filed in Miami, the chairman and another senior Boeing official approved the hiring of a consultant who, a Bahamian Government report has said, was retained solely to pass along bribes and had no experience with aircraft or their sale. The suit contends that Boeing's chairman and chief executive, Frank A. Shrontz, and R. B. Woodard, currently the head of Boeing's commerical airplane group and the president of the Canadian subsidiary in 1990, signed off on retaining the politically influential businessman.

Accusations of improper payments were made in a highly detailed report issued by a Bahamian Government commission of inquiry late last year. The reported bribes are also the subject of the Miami lawsuit, which was filed last year against Boeing by Aviaco International Leasing, a Canadian aircraft leasing company. Aviaco contends it was cut out of the aircraft sale after signing a deal to provide financing, because, the suit says, Aviaco's presence would have impeded the payment of bribes.

Aviaco, which has said it was essentially put out of business after being forced out of the deal, is seeking $300 million in the lawsuit filed in United States District Court in Miami. So far, Boeing has said little beyond that it is looking into the matter.

"This is being examined as part of the overall litigation," said Paul Binder, a spokesman for Boeing and its executives in Seattle. "We don't believe the charges have merit."

Constable Michel Paradis, a spokeswoman for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, confirmed that an investigation was under way and said that Boeing's role was one subject being pursued.

"Whether in fact they had knowledge or not is what we are assessing," she said.

A Justice Department official in Washington said the agency would have no comment.

Improper payments, commissions and fees are not uncommon in international aircraft sales. Boeing signed consent decrees with Federal authorities in 1978 after being charged with making $52 million in improper payments in a number of developing countries. A classified study by the Commerce Department and the Central Intelligence Agency last year found that in many industries, but particularly aircraft, foreign companies frequently pay bribes to close deals abroad, a Government official who had seen the study said.

The Canadian police said their investigation was looking at Nomar Acuna, a top sales executive at de Havilland Inc., a maker of turboprop airliners based in Downsview, Ontario, a suburb of Toronto. Boeing, which is based in Seattle, owned de Havilland from 1986 to 1992, when it sold the company. It is now owned 51 percent by Bombardier Inc. of Montreal and 49 percent by the provincial government of Ontario.

A de Havilland spokesman said that Mr. Acuna was not available to comment. The spokesman said that Mr. Acuna was still in his job and that the company rejected the accusations made by the Bahamian commission.

"We disagree with the commission's conclusions, which are based on the testimony of individuals whose credibility is in serious doubt," said Colin Fischer of de Havilland.

De Havilland sold five Dash 8 turboprop aircraft, which each seat 50 passengers, for $64 million to Bahamasair in 1990. The Bahamian commission report contended that Mr. Acuna masterminded an effort to pass along bribes to win the sales. The report also states that Mr. Acuna received a $90,000 kickback.

According to the report, the Government-owned airline had initially decided to buy aircraft from Fokker N.V. of the Netherlands. De Havilland then decided to retain as a consultant Duncan Rapier, a Canadian citizen who had run a hotel in the Bahamas and knew people at high levels in the Government there. Mr. Rapier, whose credibility has been questioned because of his conviction in a case involving stolen securities in Miami, did his consulting through a company called Sovereign Aircraft Ltd.

"We are satisfied that the contract entered into by Boeing de Havilland and Sovereign was for the corrupt purpose of passing on a bribe to any person in the Bahamas whose duty it was to decide on the acquisition of aircraft for Bahamasair," the commission report stated.

Eventually, de Havilland won the order. The report said Mr. Rapier acknowledged receiving $1.14 million from de Havilland, then passing along $786,000 to two businessmen close to the Government ministers who had run Bahamasair.

Mr. Rapier did not return messages left at his home in Toronto, and his son, Philip, said he was not available to comment.

There have been accusations that the Bahamian report was politically motivated, since it was initiated after a change in the government there. But the former chief financial officer of Bahamasair, John C. Utter 3d, a primary witness in the case, denied this.

"This wasn't political at all," Mr. Utter said in an interview. "It's just corruption, period."

[Penguin]

Page last updated at 12:35 GMT, Thursday, 1 October 2009 13:35 UK
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8284853.stm

Q&A: How are arms deals done?

BAE Systems is facing corruption charges following an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into allegations that the firm paid bribes to win contracts.
The SFO inquiries are into contracts that BAE won from countries including Tanzania, the Czech Republic, Romania and South Africa.BAE has previously been investigated by the SFO over a deal with Saudi Arabia.
The news has raised further questions over the way arms deals are done.

How are contracts awarded?
The country that wants to buy the equipment will put out a request for proposal (RFP), inviting tenders from arms dealers around the world.
A current example is the US government's $35bn (£22bn) contract to supply the US Air Force with refuelling tankers, which sparked a bidding war between aerospace giants Boeing and EADS, the parent company of Airbus.
Some contracts can take years to be awarded. When India bought Hawk jets from BAE in 2001, competition for the contract had been running for more than 20 years.
Usually, contracts are between the government of the buying country and an arms company.
However, sometimes they can be country-to-country contracts, depending on the buying country's preference. For instance, BAE's £43bn al-Yamamah deal with Saudi Arabia, signed in the 1980s, was between the Saudi government and the British government.
That deal was also investigated by the Serious Fraud Office for alleged bribery, but the inquiry was dropped in 2006 after the prime minister at the time, Tony Blair, said there was a risk to national security.

What factors are taken into consideration?
First and foremost, the actual product on offer will be scrutinised by the buying country, as well as the price that the arms dealer wants for it.
'One man's bribe is another man's commission.' That's how one leading Bristol business guru reacted to the furore
Dave Harvey, business correspondent, BBC West
"Offset" activities offered by the contractor can also make a bid more attractive. For instance, in exchange for a government buying weapons or aircraft, a company could offer to reinvest money into defence industries (and non-defence industries, if they so wish) in that country.
Political relations between countries can play a part too.
There is also a widespread perception that bribery and kickbacks are rife in the arms business.
Facilitation payments, middle-men's commissions, introduction fees - there are dozens of names for what critics would say is a pervasive system of paying bribes to get business done.
It has been argued that in the 1980s and 1990s, defence companies could not win contracts without the use of some form of bribery or corruption.

What rules are there governing ethics in arms sales?
In 2001, the British parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act. In relation to the arms industry, it served as an extension to existing corruption laws, banning companies based in the UK from bribing officials abroad.
However, anti-corruption campaigners allege a double standard is being practised. They say the British government only opposes corrupt practices when the UK's own interests are not at stake.
Other countries have their own rules governing bribery.
In the US, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 prohibits corporate bribery overseas.

Have other defence companies faced allegations of bribery?
Yes. The FCPA was partly triggered by the outcry following huge kickbacks paid to former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the early 1970s by US arms firm Lockheed.
In the 1980s, French arms firm Dassault was alleged to have bribed Belgian officials to win a big contract.
Dassault denied bribery - but in leaping to the firm's defence, a French minister protested that commissions were a "normal part" of arms deals.
And much more recently, a former chief financial officer of Boeing admitted that he had helped a senior procurement official from the US Air Force land a job with the firm after she steered several big contracts Boeing's way.
Boeing was banned from Air Force contracts for five years as a result.

Didn't BAE set up an "ethics committee"?
Yes. In 2007, BAE appointed Lord Woolf, former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, to head an independent committee to review business practices at the company.
The move came after the BBC's Panorama programme disclosed that BAE had made hundreds of millions of pounds in payments to a leading member of the Saudi royal family, as part of the al-Yamamah deal, although the company said this was not a direct response to the Panorama programme.
Lord Woolf published his review in May last year, urging bosses to adopt stronger anti-bribery measures and a global ethical code of conduct.
The review set out 23 recommendations for BAE, and the firm later announced a three-year programme that will "fully implement and embed" all the recommendations.
One move it has made is to get rid of third-party agencies, which in the past it would have had working on its behalf in other countries.

[soultrain]

http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1 ... 37,2920070

[Ilya Ehrenburg]

Lembro que as matérias sobre suborno que abriram tão ditoso tópico, versam sobre o período do governo, onde estava à testa o prestigiado sociólogo das obras esquecíveis, bem como todos os seus asseclas, inúteis, que por hora, se abrigam sob o rótulo de "oposição" (nome pomposo para traidores da pátria), fazendo carga contra o atual governo, covardemente, com a proteção duma mídia vendida. Cães, cães, cães! Morram sarnentos, morram!

[orestespf]

Talvez esteja sendo muito puritano, mas um tópico de título "Suborno, corrupção e similares", com a intenção de se postar assuntos que saíram na mídia et all, mas sem dar o direito de resposta aos acusados (não necessariamente culpados) é dose!!!

Toda vez que se reúne um grupo, não importa o local e a forma, para se apontar culpados, de forma tal que de um jeito ou de outro poderia lesar alguém (pessoa física e/ou jurídica), caracteriza conluio, e isto me preocupa e muito... Cabe a quem é de direito, analisar e julgar, no meu caso, apenas apontar preocupação (no máximo é o papel que me cabe), até porque sou leigo nestes assuntos.


Cordialmente,

Orestes

[Penguin]

França
Angolagate: Pasqua ameaça jogar no ventilador
quarta-feira, 28 de outubro de 2009 | 20:17

Charles Pasqua, ex-ministro do Interior e ex-senador da UMP, partido de Sarkozy, condenado no Angolagate (leia post abaixo), em entrevista ao Grand Journal da TV fancesa Canal + prometeu “fazer tremer um certo número de personagens da República”.

Em entrevista ao jornal Le Figaro, que circula amanhã Pasqua, diz que durante os mandatos de François Mitterrand e Jacques Chirac, tanto os presidentes quanto seus primeiros-ministros, Édouard Balladur et Alain Juppé, tinham pleno conhecimento das tramóias com vendas de armas.

Balladur reagiu: “O problema das vendas de armas na França é recorrente desde que o país fabrica armas. Eu não fui especialmente informado sobre a venda de armas a Angola.” Pasqua replicou : “Ele pode dizer o que quiser, no processo, seu chefe de gabine disse que o informou.”


Além do Angolagate, três casos de corrupção envolvendo vendas de armamento são investigados pela Justiça francesa. A compra de fragatas por Taiwain, as propinas do caso Clearstream e as causas do atentado terrorista de Karachi onde há suspeita que ele ocorreu porque o suborno prometido na venta de submarinos ao Paquistão não foi honrado.



-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



França
Angolagate
quarta-feira, 28 de outubro de 2009 | 15:33

As investigações internacionais do Angolagate, o caso de tráfico de armas e corrupção com envolvimento de políticos, empresários e artistas na França, duraram sete anos até ontem quando o juiz Jean-Baptiste Parlos do Tribunal Penal de Paris dirigiu-se a cada acusado: “Levante-se”. Em seguida, em um ambiente de extrema tensão, proferiu 36 sentenças. As penas mais pesadas foram para os mentores da venda ilícita - 533 milhões de euros - o bilionário israelense de origem russa, Arkadi Gaydamak, de 57 anos, e o empresário francês Pierre Falcone, de 55 anos. Ambos foram condenados a 6 anos de prisão. Gaydamak está foragido.

A condenação de empresários na França é considerado fato quase tão corriqueiro quanto ir comprar baguete na esquina. A ressonância maior, no entanto, veio com a pena de 3 anos de prisão, sendo que dois condicionais, e multa de 100.000 euros ao ex-ministro do Interior e ex-senador conservador do partido de Sarkozy, Charles Pasqua, de 82 anos. E também dois anos de prisão suspensa acrescido de multa no valor de 375.000 euros para Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, primogênito do falecido presidente socialista, François Mitterrand. Durante o governo do pai, o mais longo mandato da história da França republicana, Jean-Christophe era conselheiro em uma célula secreta do governo para tratar de assuntos africanos.

O conflito armado separatista em Angola foi um dos capítulos mais longos e sangrentos da Guerra Fria - 500.000 mortos em 27 anos. De um lado, o exército do presidente marxista Eduardo dos Santos, o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) que contava com ajuda de uma força expedicionária cubana enviada pelo ditador Fidel Castro. Os Estados Unidos, na época da presidência de Ronald Reagan, e o regime segregacionista da África do Sul, apoiavam os rebeldes comandados por Jonas Savimbi, a União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). A ONU impôs um embargo para venda de armamentos na região. O comercio de armas durante conflitos é também proibido pela legislação francesa.

Eduardo dos Santos para armar suas forças, formulou um pedido extra-oficial a França, na época sob o governo socialista de François Mitterrand. Jean-Cristophe Mitterrand contatou Gaydamak e Falcone, donos da empresa franco-eslováquia ZTZ-OSOS para organizar uma operação triangular de compras no antigo arsenal dos países do ex-bloco soviético. Eles conseguiram entregar o seguinte material bélico ao MPLA: 80 tanques T-62, 340 tanques BMP, 44.250 fuzis de assalto Kalachnikov, 3.150 lança-chamas, 36 canhões de propulsão autonoma, 61.053.000 cartuchos de 7.62 mm, 30.000 granadas, 500 lança-granadas do tipo RPG, 315 morteiros, 181.250 obuses de diferentes calibres, 170.000 minas antipessoal , 12 helicópteros de combate e 6 navios de guerra. Jean-Cristophe Mitterrand recebeu 1,8 milhão de euros em pot de vin - cerveja, propina, comissão.

Em 1997, a Justiça francesa abriu inquérito de lavagem de dinhero contra a empresa ZTZ-OSOS. Dois anos depois, o fisco francês começou a correr atrás de Arkadi Gaydamak. Para conferir um ar de respeitabilidade e amenizar as acusações, Pasqua indicou a François Mitterrand, a pedido de Falcone, o sócio Gaydamak, para receber a condecoração da Ordem Nacional do Mérito. O favor do ex-ministro do Interior custou 1,5 milhão de euros. Ao receber a condenação, Pasqua reagiu: “O presidente da República [na época, François Mitterrand] sabia das vendas das armas a Angola, o primeiro-ministro [Edouard Balladur] estava ciente e a maioria dos ministros também. Pasqua quer que o presidente Sarkozy, ministro da Economia na época, suspenda o segredo de estado no que diz respeito a venda de armas autorizadas pela França. “Chegou a hora de colocar as coisas em pratos limpos” , disse ele no telejornal do canal France 2.

A suspensão do segredo de estado sobre venda de armas não é da competência do Presidente da República, mas do ministro da Defesa. “Se as autoridades judiciárias formularem o pedido, ele será examinado”, disse Luc Chatel, porta-voz do governo. Atendida a reinvidicação de Pasqua que tem o apoio de uma petição assinada por parlamentares da oposição, haja pratos limpos. A França sediará um dos maiores banquetes da sua história. O nome de Sarkozy aparece no processo. No diário de Yves Bertrand, ex-diretor do serviço de informações francês, um dos envolvidos no Angolagate. “Sarko é um cara que está nas mãos de Tassez.” E a nota conclui: “Tassez recebeu grana de Falcone para Sarko.” Jean-Noël Tassez diretor da emissora de rádio RMC, do paraíso fiscal e de bandidagem financeira, jura que os 165.000 euros que recebeu de Falcone eram só para ele.

Por Antonio Ribeiro


Fonte: http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/de-paris/ ... ngolagate/

[alcmartin]

Escandalos da Lockheed:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_bribery_scandals

Citei essa nota do Santiago, porque quem viveu nos 70, 80, lembra desses episódios.

Lockheed bribery scandals
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Lockheed F-104G Starfighter in Luftwaffe markingsThe Lockheed bribery scandals encompassed a series of bribes and contributions made by officials of U.S. aerospace company Lockheed from the late 1950s to the 1970s in the process of negotiating the sale of aircraft.

The scandal caused considerable political controversy in West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan. In the U.S. the scandal nearly led to the corporation's downfall, as it was already struggling due to the commercial failure of the L-1011 TriStar airliner.

Contents [hide]
1 Background
2 West Germany
3 Italy
4 Japan
5 Netherlands
6 Saudi Arabia
7 Aftermath

[edit] Background
The U.S. Government had bailed out Lockheed in 1971, guaranteeing repayment of $195 million in bank loans to the company. The Government Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, set up to oversee the program, investigated whether Lockheed violated its obligations by failing to tell the board about foreign payments.[1]

In late 1975 and early 1976, a sub-committee of the U.S. Senate led by Senator Frank Church concluded that members of the Lockheed board had paid members of friendly governments to guarantee contracts for military aircraft.[2] In 1976, it was publicly revealed that Lockheed had paid $22 million in bribes to foreign officials[1] in the process of negotiating the sale of aircraft including the F-104 Starfighter, the so-called "Deal of the Century".[3][4]

[edit] West Germany
Former Lockheed lobbyist Ernest Hauser told Senate investigators that Minister of Defence Franz Josef Strauss and his party had received at least $10 million for West Germany's purchase of 900 F-104G Starfighters in 1961. The party and its leader denied the allegations, and Strauss filed a slander suit against Hauser. As the allegations were not corroborated, the issue was dropped.[5]

In September 1976, in the final phase of the 1976 Bundestag election, the controversy was re-opened when questions were asked about the whereabouts of the "Lockheed documents" within the Federal Ministry of Defence. In the course of the investigations, it emerged that most of the documents had been destroyed in 1962. The whereabouts of the documents was again discussed in a committee of inquiry meeting of the Bundestag between January 1978 and May 1979.[2]

[edit] Italy
The Italian branch of the Lockheed scandal involved the bribery of Christian Democrat politicians to favor the purchase by the Italian Air Force of C-130 Hercules transport planes. The allegations of bribery were supported by political magazine L'Espresso, and targeted former Cabinet ministers Luigi Gui and Mario Tanassi, the former Prime Minister Mariano Rumor and notably then-President Giovanni Leone, forcing him to resign his post on June 15, 1978.[6]

[edit] Japan

An All Nippon Airways L-1011 at Osaka International Airport in 1992The scandal involved the Marubeni Corporation and several high-ranking members of Japanese political, business and underworld circles, including Finance Minister Eisaku Sato and the JASDF Chief of Staff Minoru Genda. In 1957, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force wished to buy the Grumman F-11 Super Tiger to replace the F-86 Sabre then in service, but heavy lobbying by Lockheed of the key LDP figures led to the adoption of the F-104 instead.

Later, Lockheed had hired right-wing nationalist underworld figure Yoshio Kodama as a consultant in order to influence Japanese parastatal airlines, including All Nippon Airways (ANA), to buy the L-1011 instead of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. On February 6, 1976, the vice-chairman of Lockheed told the Senate subcommittee that Lockheed had paid approximately $3 million in bribes to the office of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for aid in the matter.

Lockheed paid ¥2.4 billion to earn the contract from ANA. ¥500 million of the total was received by the Prime Minister. ¥160 million was received by ANA's officials. ¥1.7 billion was received by Kodama.[7] On October 30, 1972, ANA announced its decision to purchase 21 Lockheed Tristar L1011s, which cost approximately $5 million each, even though it had previously announced options to purchase the DC-10.[8]

Tanaka was arrested on July 27, 1976 and was released in August on a ¥200 million ($690,000) bond. He was found guilty by a Tokyo court on October 12, 1983 for violations of foreign exchange control laws but not on bribery. He was sentenced to four years in prison, but remained free on appeal until his death of a stroke in 1993.[9][10]

[edit] Netherlands
Prince Bernhard received a $1.1 million bribe from Lockheed to ensure the Lockheed F-104 would win out over the Mirage 5 for the purchase contract. He had served on more than 300 corporate boards or committees worldwide and had been praised in the Netherlands for his efforts to promote the economic well-being of the country. Prime Minister Joop den Uyl ordered an inquiry into the affair, while Prince Bernhard refused to answer reporters' questions, stating: "I am above such things".[11] Prince Bernhard always denied the charges, but after his death on December 1, 2004 interviews were published showing that he admitted taking the money. He said: "I have accepted that the word Lockheed will be carved on my tombstone."[12]

[edit] Saudi Arabia
Between 1970 and 1975, Lockheed paid Saudi Arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi $106 million in commissions. Khashoggi himself is said to have made hundreds of millions from other corporations in this period, however as Khashoggi was a mediator for bribes, his payment included money destined for officials. His commissions started at 2.5% + and eventually rose to as much as 15%. Khashoggi "became for all practical purposes a marketing arm of Lockheed. Adnan would provide not only an entree but strategy, constant advice, and analysis," according to Max Helzel, then vice president of Lockheed's international marketing.[13]

[edit] Aftermath
Lockheed chairman of the board Daniel Haughton and vice chairman and president Carl Kotchian resigned from their posts on February 13, 1976. The scandal also played a part in the formulation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which President Jimmy Carter signed into law on December 19, 1977, which made it illegal for American persons and entities to bribe foreign government officials, which, consequently, may be in violation of The Logan Act.[14]

According to Ben Rich, director of Lockheed's Skunk Works:

“ Lockheed executives admitted paying millions in bribes over more than a decade to the Dutch (Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana, in particular), to key Japanese and West German politicians, to Italian officials and generals, and to other highly placed figures from Hong Kong to Saudi Arabia, in order to get them to buy our airplanes. Kelly ["Kelly" Johnson, first team leader of the Lockheed Skunk Works] was so sickened by these revelations that he had almost quit, even though the top Lockheed management implicated in the scandal resigned in disgrace.[15] ”

[edit] See also
Airbus

[Penguin]

Escandalos da Lockheed:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_bribery_scandals

Citei essa nota do Santiago, porque quem viveu nos 70, 80, lembra desses episódios.

Lockheed bribery scandals
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Lockheed F-104G Starfighter in Luftwaffe markingsThe Lockheed bribery scandals encompassed a series of bribes and contributions made by officials of U.S. aerospace company Lockheed from the late 1950s to the 1970s in the process of negotiating the sale of aircraft.

The scandal caused considerable political controversy in West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan. In the U.S. the scandal nearly led to the corporation's downfall, as it was already struggling due to the commercial failure of the L-1011 TriStar airliner.

Contents [hide]
1 Background
2 West Germany
3 Italy
4 Japan
5 Netherlands
6 Saudi Arabia
7 Aftermath

[edit] Background
The U.S. Government had bailed out Lockheed in 1971, guaranteeing repayment of $195 million in bank loans to the company. The Government Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, set up to oversee the program, investigated whether Lockheed violated its obligations by failing to tell the board about foreign payments.[1]

In late 1975 and early 1976, a sub-committee of the U.S. Senate led by Senator Frank Church concluded that members of the Lockheed board had paid members of friendly governments to guarantee contracts for military aircraft.[2] In 1976, it was publicly revealed that Lockheed had paid $22 million in bribes to foreign officials[1] in the process of negotiating the sale of aircraft including the F-104 Starfighter, the so-called "Deal of the Century".[3][4]

[edit] West Germany
Former Lockheed lobbyist Ernest Hauser told Senate investigators that Minister of Defence Franz Josef Strauss and his party had received at least $10 million for West Germany's purchase of 900 F-104G Starfighters in 1961. The party and its leader denied the allegations, and Strauss filed a slander suit against Hauser. As the allegations were not corroborated, the issue was dropped.[5]

In September 1976, in the final phase of the 1976 Bundestag election, the controversy was re-opened when questions were asked about the whereabouts of the "Lockheed documents" within the Federal Ministry of Defence. In the course of the investigations, it emerged that most of the documents had been destroyed in 1962. The whereabouts of the documents was again discussed in a committee of inquiry meeting of the Bundestag between January 1978 and May 1979.[2]

[edit] Italy
The Italian branch of the Lockheed scandal involved the bribery of Christian Democrat politicians to favor the purchase by the Italian Air Force of C-130 Hercules transport planes. The allegations of bribery were supported by political magazine L'Espresso, and targeted former Cabinet ministers Luigi Gui and Mario Tanassi, the former Prime Minister Mariano Rumor and notably then-President Giovanni Leone, forcing him to resign his post on June 15, 1978.[6]

[edit] Japan

An All Nippon Airways L-1011 at Osaka International Airport in 1992The scandal involved the Marubeni Corporation and several high-ranking members of Japanese political, business and underworld circles, including Finance Minister Eisaku Sato and the JASDF Chief of Staff Minoru Genda. In 1957, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force wished to buy the Grumman F-11 Super Tiger to replace the F-86 Sabre then in service, but heavy lobbying by Lockheed of the key LDP figures led to the adoption of the F-104 instead.

Later, Lockheed had hired right-wing nationalist underworld figure Yoshio Kodama as a consultant in order to influence Japanese parastatal airlines, including All Nippon Airways (ANA), to buy the L-1011 instead of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. On February 6, 1976, the vice-chairman of Lockheed told the Senate subcommittee that Lockheed had paid approximately $3 million in bribes to the office of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for aid in the matter.

Lockheed paid ¥2.4 billion to earn the contract from ANA. ¥500 million of the total was received by the Prime Minister. ¥160 million was received by ANA's officials. ¥1.7 billion was received by Kodama.[7] On October 30, 1972, ANA announced its decision to purchase 21 Lockheed Tristar L1011s, which cost approximately $5 million each, even though it had previously announced options to purchase the DC-10.[8]

Tanaka was arrested on July 27, 1976 and was released in August on a ¥200 million ($690,000) bond. He was found guilty by a Tokyo court on October 12, 1983 for violations of foreign exchange control laws but not on bribery. He was sentenced to four years in prison, but remained free on appeal until his death of a stroke in 1993.[9][10]

[edit] Netherlands
Prince Bernhard received a $1.1 million bribe from Lockheed to ensure the Lockheed F-104 would win out over the Mirage 5 for the purchase contract. He had served on more than 300 corporate boards or committees worldwide and had been praised in the Netherlands for his efforts to promote the economic well-being of the country. Prime Minister Joop den Uyl ordered an inquiry into the affair, while Prince Bernhard refused to answer reporters' questions, stating: "I am above such things".[11] Prince Bernhard always denied the charges, but after his death on December 1, 2004 interviews were published showing that he admitted taking the money. He said: "I have accepted that the word Lockheed will be carved on my tombstone."[12]

[edit] Saudi Arabia
Between 1970 and 1975, Lockheed paid Saudi Arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi $106 million in commissions. Khashoggi himself is said to have made hundreds of millions from other corporations in this period, however as Khashoggi was a mediator for bribes, his payment included money destined for officials. His commissions started at 2.5% + and eventually rose to as much as 15%. Khashoggi "became for all practical purposes a marketing arm of Lockheed. Adnan would provide not only an entree but strategy, constant advice, and analysis," according to Max Helzel, then vice president of Lockheed's international marketing.[13]

[edit] Aftermath
Lockheed chairman of the board Daniel Haughton and vice chairman and president Carl Kotchian resigned from their posts on February 13, 1976. The scandal also played a part in the formulation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which President Jimmy Carter signed into law on December 19, 1977, which made it illegal for American persons and entities to bribe foreign government officials, which, consequently, may be in violation of The Logan Act.[14]

According to Ben Rich, director of Lockheed's Skunk Works:

“ Lockheed executives admitted paying millions in bribes over more than a decade to the Dutch (Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana, in particular), to key Japanese and West German politicians, to Italian officials and generals, and to other highly placed figures from Hong Kong to Saudi Arabia, in order to get them to buy our airplanes. Kelly ["Kelly" Johnson, first team leader of the Lockheed Skunk Works] was so sickened by these revelations that he had almost quit, even though the top Lockheed management implicated in the scandal resigned in disgrace.[15] ”

[edit] See also
Airbus

Eles foram bem ativos...

[Penguin]

http://arquivoetc.blogspot.com/2009/01/ ... es-da.html



ASSESSORIA
O contrato com os lobistas previa o pagamento de 8% do valor da venda, mas foi desfeito, segundo a Embraer

Sábado, Janeiro 31, 2009
Aviação Lobistas cobram 18 milhões da Embraer

COBRANÇA SUSPEITA
Lobistas cobram 18 milhões de dólares da Embraer.
Eles dizem (mas não provam) que parte do dinheiro
pagou "contribuições políticas" na Colômbia


O contrato com os lobistas previa o pagamento de 8% do valor da venda, mas foi desfeito, segundo a Embraer
No mundo em que voa a Embraer, a maior fabricante de aviões da América Latina, são comuns pendengas por interesses comerciais contrariados envolvendo cifras vultosas. Desde o fim do ano passado, a Embraer está às voltas com um litígio assim. A empresa brasileira tornou-se alvo de uma ação da lobista colombiana Maria Juliana Buendía de La Vega, sócia da Eximco International, uma conhecida representante do comércio mundial de armas e equipamentos militares. Ela contratou um escritório de advocacia no Brasil para cobrar da Embraer uma suposta dívida de 18 milhões de dólares. O dinheiro, segundo ela, deveria ter sido pago como bônus de sucesso por um acordo que envolveu a venda ao governo da Colômbia de 25 aviões Super Tucano pelo valor de 234 milhões de dólares. Para uma companhia que tem uma receita anual de 7 bilhões de reais e emprega 23 000 funcionários, o valor da dívida não seria um grande problema. O que fere a Embraer é o fato de a Eximco afirmar que o negócio só se concretizou mediante o pagamento de "contribuições políticas" a autoridades colombianas.

A Eximco International intermedeia a venda de equipamentos militares a governos de vários países. Em 2000, a companhia foi contratada pela Embraer para assessorá-la numa concorrência aberta pelo governo colombiano para a compra de aviões de combate. De acordo com Maria Juliana de La Vega, a fabricante brasileira venceu a licitação, em 2005, graças a um trabalho de lobby realizado por seu marido, o major aposentado Guillermo Garcia Gil, conhecido como Mayorca e bem relacionado no governo. O major era amigo do general Héctor Velasco, comandante da Força Aérea da Colômbia. Segundo a lobista, para garantir a vitória da Embraer, Mayorca, que morreu em 2005, teria distribuído 4 milhões de dólares em propina, tendo o general Velasco e o então ministro da Defesa e vice-presidente Gustavo Bell como os principais beneficiados.

Para tentar embasar as acusações, os advogados da lobista apresentaram um conjunto de documentos à Embraer aos quais VEJA teve acesso. Além de um contrato de prestação de serviços, há várias trocas de correspondência entre diretores das duas empresas. Os papéis não provam pagamento de propina às autoridades colombianas – nem que a atuação do lobista tenha sido decisiva para a compra dos aviões. Nas conversas dos executivos da Embraer, os lobistas falam em "contribuições políticas", "comissões" e "taxas políticas", termos que poderiam sugerir alguma ação menos ortodoxa. Nada mais do que isso. Mayorca foi contratado pela Embraer em 2000, depois de procurar a companhia e narrar as intenções do governo colombiano. "Ficou claro que ele tinha um acesso político privilegiado e poderia ajudar na venda", explica Eduardo Munhós, executivo responsável, ao tempo do episódio, pela diretoria internacional da Embraer. Pelo acordo, Mayorca receberia 8% do valor da venda. O executivo diz que a tal "contribuição política" fazia parte do trabalho legal de lobby, como a montagem de um escritório e jantares de representação. Nada a ver com suborno de funcionários.

Em um relatório datado de 2 de novembro de 2001, endereçado ao executivo da Embraer Eduardo Munhós, o lobista lembra que, durante as negociações entre as duas partes, ficou acertado que ele "desenvolveria a representação com 8 (%), restando estabelecido que vocês (Embraer) reservariam 2 (%) para o manejo da parte política, tão importante neste tipo de negócio". O lobista afirma no mesmo relatório que combinara os "acertos" diretamente com "Superfuente", codinome dado ao vice-presidente Gustavo Bell. Munhós respondeu apenas que o valor da comissão prometido já era "bastante elevado" e que temia estar perdendo o "controle das variáveis em jogo". Também recorrendo a codinomes, Munhós mostrou-se apreensivo: "Nos preocupa muito que Condor 6 (o general Héctor Velasco), nosso aliado mais forte, tenha, aparentemente, se virado para outros campos".

Meses depois, em outro documento enviado à Embraer, o lobista renovou seu pedido de "aumento de comissão" – e mais uma vez demonstrou sua influência junto ao governo colombiano. Mayorca anexou um ofício assinado pelo general Velasco, o Condor 6, com data futura, reiterando ao ministro da Defesa a "urgente necessidade" de conseguir o dinheiro para a licitação. Escreveu o lobista: "Isto é o que chamamos no jargão de inteligência de ‘informação marcada’; por conseguinte, peço o grande favor de que destrua este texto uma vez que o tenha lido e analisado, para que você se dê conta da grande cooperação que aporta este senhor ao nosso projeto". E concluiu: "A única coisa que pode levar esse projeto adiante, no curto tempo que nos resta, é a colaboração política". O lobista sublinhou a expressão "colaboração política".

A Embraer garante não ter fechado nenhum tipo de acordo adicional com o lobista – e, efetivamente, não existe prova disso. A empresa brasileira afirma ter rescindido o contrato por falta de resultados práticos. Mas pelo menos os contatos continuaram, conforme mostram os documentos. Logo após a posse do presidente Álvaro Uribe, em 2002, o lobista comemorou a decisão do governo de manter o comandante da Força Aérea. Escreveu Mayorca à Embraer: "A nave segue seu rumo, com capitão a bordo, com o norte indicado". Segundo a viúva do lobista, para evitar problemas com o novo governo, o contrato entre a Embraer e a Eximco, já alvo de denúncias de irregularidades, passou a ser informal. "A contratação de profissionais ou empresas para a promoção de vendas de produtos de defesa constitui prática de mercado prevista na legislação de inúmeros países, inclusive a Colômbia. Informações contratuais específicas são sujeitas a cláusulas de confidencialidade e não serão comentadas pela Embraer", diz uma nota da companhia.


O episódio envolvendo a Embraer com os colombianos tem alguma relevância – e pode virar-se agora contra a imagem da empresa de forma desproporcionalmente injusta – por uma razão básica: o comércio mundial de armas e equipamentos militares é sempre eivado de suspeitas. Na França, Christine Deviers-Joncour, amante de um ministro do governo François Mitterrand, recebeu 10 milhões de dólares para convencer o parceiro a autorizar a venda superfaturada de fragatas francesas a Taiwan. No Japão, o ex-vice-ministro da Defesa Takemasa Moriya admitiu ter recebido propina de uma fornecedora de material militar. No fim do ano passado, VEJA procurou Maria Juliana de La Vega, que mora na Espanha. Por meio do advogado Raul Canal, a lobista confirmou a denúncia e disse que viria ao Brasil conceder uma entrevista. Na data marcada, ela não apareceu e mandou avisar que fora procurada por um emissário da Embraer, que teria se comprometido a pagar a dívida. A Embraer nega a existência de qualquer acordo e garante que estuda processar a lobista colombiana.