TÓPICO OFICIAL DO FX-2: GRIPEN NG

[luisdmrx]

Olha aí a bondade americana em todo seu explendor::::

Lockheed Launches Attack On Gripen's MMRCA Campaign

The gloves are off, not that they were ever on. Just a few days after Gripen held a well-reported press conference in Delhi last week, Lockheed-Martin has hit out at the Swedish plane-maker's campaign for India's $10.2-billion medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition. At a reception for Lockheed-Martin's new India head Roger Rose, there was lots of talk on Gripen country head Eddy de la Motte's repeated affirmation that there would be "total transfer of technology" if the Gripen was selected. Lockheed-Martin Vice President (Business Development, India) Orville Prins told journalists that the Gripen campaign's assertion that there would be 100 per cent ToT was "dishonest and inaccurate".

Prins pointed out that with an admitted 35 per cent of the Gripen being made up by American components and systems, there was no way that the Swedes could trumpet full transfer of technology, simply because a full transfer of technology would mean formal release of the said technology by the US government, which may or may not be forthcoming. "Without formal sanction for technology release, it simply not honest to say you can transfer all technology. It is plainly false," Prins said.

Like I said, the gloves are off, and even the world's biggest aerospace firm feels the heat sometime or other. The F-16IN campaign considers itself seriously threatened by the Gripen IN's concerted effort to fritter out American content. It's interesting how Lockheed-Martin would also rely on a political leash on the Swedes, rather than concentrate its effort on attacking its competitors on technology. But then again, even the Swedes know this isn't a meat and potatoes campaign.

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/09/ex ... ck-on.html

BINGO

[Sintra]

What is wrong with the Rafale?

I have noticed a lot of discussion on here lately about the Rafale and its inability to compete with the various other late 4th generation designs on the market today. In an effort to shed some light on this issue I have taken a moment to list some of the Rafale's major crippling flaws and their origins.

The single biggest issue with the Rafale, and the common thread throughout most of its major design flaws, is that its design team simply lacked sufficient vision of where the future of fighter aviation was heading. Throughout the Rafale's design process its designers chose to go with incremental improvements rather than generational leaps in technology. The Rafale was intended to catch up to, rather than leap ahead of, aircraft that were designed years earlier such as the F-16 and Mig-29. The end result is a somewhat refined, but badly overpriced aircraft that has struggled to even compete with the aircraft it was designed to match, and utterly lacks the potential to compete with newer designs.

The most obvious area where this lack of vision is displayed is in the Rafale's overall layout and its notable lack of signature reduction design features. The Rafale exhibits numerous features that would simply never be incorporated into any design intended to have a reduced RCS, including its prominent intakes, a huge vertical stabilizer, canards, a non-retractable refueling probe, and numerous other probes, protrusions, and other serious RCS offenders. What does this mean? Late in the Rafale's design process its engineers realized that they had failed to anticipate the key role RCS reduction would play in future designs and scambled to find ways to reduce the Rafale's RCS. With minimal experience with RCS reduction and an airframe that was already too far along in its design to be fixed, the end result was of course disappointing. Shaping is the single most important consideration in RCS reduction and the Rafale has too many major flaws to ever be considered stealthy. RAM coatings and last minute saw-tooth edge features are at best minimally effective on an aircraft that is otherwise designed all wrong from the start.

Not only that, but the Rafale's maneuverability proved to be disappointing, comparable to, but only marginally better than that already offered by earlier 4th generation designs and noticably lacking in comparison to its bigger brother, the Eurofighter. As the US/Israel found with the Lavi design, the improvement in aerodynamic performance available with such a design was insufficient to justfy the cost of creating an entire new airframe and a generational leap in performance would require a new approach.

Like its airframe, the Rafale's pit and interfaces sought to close the gap with earlier 4th generation designs. Drawing its inspiration from the US, the Rafale design team sought to replicate the hands on throttle and stick interface the US had adopted by the time the Rafale entered its design phase. While the Rafale was largely successful in matching the interfaces seen in US fighters in the early 90s, its designers failed to see the direction future designs were heading. Today the Rafale's pit and human interface are at best mediocre in comparison to those found in other aircraft in production. It lacks a helmet mounted site, a serious flaw in a WVR fight, and numerous other advanced features such as the Super Hornet's fully decoupled interfaces. Most critically, the Rafale's man machine interface lacks the defining features of a 5th generation design, such as advanced sensor fusion and sophisticated multi-purpose helmet mounted displays.

Probably the most famous and inexcusable design flaw in the Rafale is its unusually small and short ranged radar. While the US launched fully funded AESA programs and prepared for a generational leap in radar performance, for some reason the Rafale was designed with a PESA radar, a technological dead-end. Worse, the Rafale was simply not designed to accomodate a radar of sufficient size to operate effectively autonomously. Now, although France is working to retrofit an AESA antenna onto its PESA back-end in the Rafale, the nose of the Rafale will simply not accomodate a competitive radar. The best the Rafale can hope to do is close some of its radar performance gap with aircraft like the F-16, but will never be capable of competing with designs like the Eurofighter or Super Hornet.

Finally, one of the most critcal flaws in the Rafale's design is its widely misunderstood "Spectra" self protection jammer and RWR suite. As was done with the F-16 and Super Hornet, the Rafale design team sought to incorporate an internal self protection jammer into the Rafale to improve its survivability against radar guided threats. The major failure of Spectra was that its development cycle was far far too long and France's semiconductor and computer industry was simply incapable of providing the necessary components to create a truely cutting edge system. By the time it went from the drawing board to production, a period of over 10 years, it was barely able to match systems being offered by Israel and the United States on other 4th generation fighters. The Spectra self protection jammer simply lacks the processing power, flexibility, and diverse threat response range available on aircraft like the Super Hornet, F-16 block 60, or modern Israeli systems. Not only that, but because of nearly continual funding shortages in development, Spectra lacks now-standard features such as sophisticated towed decoys and next generation jamming waveforms that it simply lacks the processing power or antennas to produce.

Instead, what Spectra offers are relatively simplistic signals generated by its prominent but inflexible and simplistic transmitters.(Based on narrow-band, inefficient MMICs, a constraint imposed by the lack of a domestic supplier for more modern MMICs, the same issue that has plauged France's AESA program.) Spectra is perhaps the least crippling of the Rafale's flaws, because it could potentially be removed and replaced with a more modern system. Spectra tacks up a relatively large amount of space and power for what it offers, so a modern design could certainly do more with the same space and power supply, but France does not currently have the resources or certain key technologies to contemplate designing or building a system that would approach the power and flexibility of something like the F-35s EW system with its unparalled stealthy low power jamming modes.(and the ability to create incredibly powerful long range jamming modes if its AESA is used as a transmitter.)

So in summary, what went wrong? The Rafale was designed to match and compete with designs in operation in the early to mid 90s, but other design teams around the world were already moving ahead with generational leaps in stealth, electronic warfare, sensor fusion, and network centric concepts. By the time the Rafale design team recognized they had misjudged the direction of future designs, they lacked the resources and time to correct their mistakes. Now they are trying to find some way to obtain more money through exports so they can replace the Rafale's mid-90s radar, computers, jammers, etc so that they can at least keep pace with other 4th generation designs for a few years before being completely surpassed by 5th generation designs.

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryfor ... age25.aspx

O texto é ridiculo...

[DBader]

What is wrong with the Rafale?

I have noticed a lot of discussion on here lately about the Rafale and its inability to compete with the various other late 4th generation designs on the market today. In an effort to shed some light on this issue I have taken a moment to list some of the Rafale's major crippling flaws and their origins.

The single biggest issue with the Rafale, and the common thread throughout most of its major design flaws, is that its design team simply lacked sufficient vision of where the future of fighter aviation was heading. Throughout the Rafale's design process its designers chose to go with incremental improvements rather than generational leaps in technology. The Rafale was intended to catch up to, rather than leap ahead of, aircraft that were designed years earlier such as the F-16 and Mig-29. The end result is a somewhat refined, but badly overpriced aircraft that has struggled to even compete with the aircraft it was designed to match, and utterly lacks the potential to compete with newer designs.

The most obvious area where this lack of vision is displayed is in the Rafale's overall layout and its notable lack of signature reduction design features. The Rafale exhibits numerous features that would simply never be incorporated into any design intended to have a reduced RCS, including its prominent intakes, a huge vertical stabilizer, canards, a non-retractable refueling probe, and numerous other probes, protrusions, and other serious RCS offenders. What does this mean? Late in the Rafale's design process its engineers realized that they had failed to anticipate the key role RCS reduction would play in future designs and scambled to find ways to reduce the Rafale's RCS. With minimal experience with RCS reduction and an airframe that was already too far along in its design to be fixed, the end result was of course disappointing. Shaping is the single most important consideration in RCS reduction and the Rafale has too many major flaws to ever be considered stealthy. RAM coatings and last minute saw-tooth edge features are at best minimally effective on an aircraft that is otherwise designed all wrong from the start.

Not only that, but the Rafale's maneuverability proved to be disappointing, comparable to, but only marginally better than that already offered by earlier 4th generation designs and noticably lacking in comparison to its bigger brother, the Eurofighter. As the US/Israel found with the Lavi design, the improvement in aerodynamic performance available with such a design was insufficient to justfy the cost of creating an entire new airframe and a generational leap in performance would require a new approach.

Like its airframe, the Rafale's pit and interfaces sought to close the gap with earlier 4th generation designs. Drawing its inspiration from the US, the Rafale design team sought to replicate the hands on throttle and stick interface the US had adopted by the time the Rafale entered its design phase. While the Rafale was largely successful in matching the interfaces seen in US fighters in the early 90s, its designers failed to see the direction future designs were heading. Today the Rafale's pit and human interface are at best mediocre in comparison to those found in other aircraft in production. It lacks a helmet mounted site, a serious flaw in a WVR fight, and numerous other advanced features such as the Super Hornet's fully decoupled interfaces. Most critically, the Rafale's man machine interface lacks the defining features of a 5th generation design, such as advanced sensor fusion and sophisticated multi-purpose helmet mounted displays.

Probably the most famous and inexcusable design flaw in the Rafale is its unusually small and short ranged radar. While the US launched fully funded AESA programs and prepared for a generational leap in radar performance, for some reason the Rafale was designed with a PESA radar, a technological dead-end. Worse, the Rafale was simply not designed to accomodate a radar of sufficient size to operate effectively autonomously. Now, although France is working to retrofit an AESA antenna onto its PESA back-end in the Rafale, the nose of the Rafale will simply not accomodate a competitive radar. The best the Rafale can hope to do is close some of its radar performance gap with aircraft like the F-16, but will never be capable of competing with designs like the Eurofighter or Super Hornet.

Finally, one of the most critcal flaws in the Rafale's design is its widely misunderstood "Spectra" self protection jammer and RWR suite. As was done with the F-16 and Super Hornet, the Rafale design team sought to incorporate an internal self protection jammer into the Rafale to improve its survivability against radar guided threats. The major failure of Spectra was that its development cycle was far far too long and France's semiconductor and computer industry was simply incapable of providing the necessary components to create a truely cutting edge system. By the time it went from the drawing board to production, a period of over 10 years, it was barely able to match systems being offered by Israel and the United States on other 4th generation fighters. The Spectra self protection jammer simply lacks the processing power, flexibility, and diverse threat response range available on aircraft like the Super Hornet, F-16 block 60, or modern Israeli systems. Not only that, but because of nearly continual funding shortages in development, Spectra lacks now-standard features such as sophisticated towed decoys and next generation jamming waveforms that it simply lacks the processing power or antennas to produce.

Instead, what Spectra offers are relatively simplistic signals generated by its prominent but inflexible and simplistic transmitters.(Based on narrow-band, inefficient MMICs, a constraint imposed by the lack of a domestic supplier for more modern MMICs, the same issue that has plauged France's AESA program.) Spectra is perhaps the least crippling of the Rafale's flaws, because it could potentially be removed and replaced with a more modern system. Spectra tacks up a relatively large amount of space and power for what it offers, so a modern design could certainly do more with the same space and power supply, but France does not currently have the resources or certain key technologies to contemplate designing or building a system that would approach the power and flexibility of something like the F-35s EW system with its unparalled stealthy low power jamming modes.(and the ability to create incredibly powerful long range jamming modes if its AESA is used as a transmitter.)

So in summary, what went wrong? The Rafale was designed to match and compete with designs in operation in the early to mid 90s, but other design teams around the world were already moving ahead with generational leaps in stealth, electronic warfare, sensor fusion, and network centric concepts. By the time the Rafale design team recognized they had misjudged the direction of future designs, they lacked the resources and time to correct their mistakes. Now they are trying to find some way to obtain more money through exports so they can replace the Rafale's mid-90s radar, computers, jammers, etc so that they can at least keep pace with other 4th generation designs for a few years before being completely surpassed by 5th generation designs.

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryfor ... age25.aspx

O texto é ridiculo...

Isso é o máximo que você pode fazer? Nenhum argumento mais racional?

[]s,
Douglas Bader

[P44]

Sintra, especifíca

[Wolfgang]

Depois que tomar uma "paulada" do Sintra, não reclame.

[DBader]

Depois que tomar uma "paulada" do Sintra, não reclame.

Só pedi que ele fosse um pouco menos lacônico. Gostaria de entender. Fica tranquilo que eu aguento o tranco.

[]s,
Douglas Bader

[Wolfgang]

É que me soa um pouco estranha essa pergunta. A essa altura do campeonato, dá para saber quando um texto sobre determinado equipamento está enviesado pela má-fé ou não. No fundo, você não acha que o autor exagera e não demonstra o porquê de suas afirmações? Ora, cabe a ele as explicações.
Se alguém vem e laconicamente responde que o texto é ridículo é porque as argumentações do texto, apesar de verborrágicas também são lacônicas. Tenho uma tese: uma boa resposta sempre demanda uma boa pergunta. No caso, um bom texto. A resposta do Sintra foi à medida da qualidade das afirmações. Só que essas estão erradas e o Sintra, correto.

[P44]

É que me soa um pouco estranha essa pergunta. A essa altura do campeonato, dá para saber quando um texto sobre determinado equipamento está enviesado pela má-fé ou não. No fundo, você não acha que o autor exagera e não demonstra o porquê de suas afirmações? Ora, cabe a ele as explicações.
Se alguém vem e laconicamente responde que o texto é ridículo é porque as argumentações do texto, apesar de verborrágicas também são lacônicas. Tenho uma tese: uma boa resposta sempre demanda uma boa pergunta. No caso, um bom texto. A resposta do Sintra foi à medida da qualidade das afirmações. Só que essas estão erradas e o Sintra, correto.

além de que esse texto é de um "mero"(?) forista, que não sabemos quem é, se tem segundas intenções, se na verdade percebe alguma coisa do assunto, etc etc


Eu prefiro guiar-me pelas palavras do Sintra que já demonstrou inúmeras vezes saber do que fala

(excepto na parte que toca ao futebol mas nem toda a gente é perfeita [Benfiquista] )

[Valdemort]

Autoridades da Suécia Oferecem ao Brasil Dois Caças Pelo Preço de Um

O Globo

Autoridades da Suécia Oferecem ao Brasil Dois Caças Pelo Preço de Um

O Brasil vai poder comprar dois (caças) pelo preço de um, diz ministro sueco

BRASÍLIA – O vice-ministro da Defesa da Suécia, Hakan Jevrell, e o representante da Saab Bengt Javer, fabricante de caças naquele país, apresentaram nesta quinta-feira uma proposta de venda de aeronaves ao governo brasileiro.

A Suécia aposta no melhor preço, metade do apresentado pelos concorrentes franceses e americanos, e no compartilhamento de tecnologia para que a brasileira Embraer e a Sueca Saab fabriquem o caça Gripen NG também para países da América Latina e no resto do mundo.

- Acredito que temos um preço forte. O Brasil vai poder comprar dois (caças) pelo preço de um – disse o ministro sueco.

De acordo com o representante da Saab, as duas empresas juntas integrariam sistemas utilizando os melhores equipamentos que existem no mercado, o que daria ao Brasil liberdade de escolha para fabricar a aeronave que melhor atende às suas necessidades.

- O Gripen NG é o único que dará autonomia para a geração de caças. Oferecendo independência em vez de dependência. A Suécia está procurando um parceiro e esse parceiro é o Brasil – disse Jevrell.

A norte-americana Boeing, com o caça F-18 Super Hornet; a sueca Saab, com o Gripen NG; e a francesa Dassault, com o Rafale, são as finalistas do programa F-X2, que selecionará o novo caça da FAB.

Na semana passada, durante as comemorações do Dia da Independência, Lula divulgou nota conjunta com o presidente francês, Nicolas Sarkozy, anunciando a abertura de negociações para a compra do Rafale.

O anúncio foi amplamente visto como uma vitória do caça francês na disputa, mas, no dia seguinte, o Ministério da Defesa brasileiro divulgou comunicado garantindo que a concorrência não estava finalizada e que os três finalistas poderão entregar propostas melhoradas até 21 de setembro.

Na quarta-feira, em audiência pública na Comissão de Relações exteriores e Defesa do Senado, o ministro da Defesa, Nelson Jobim, confirmou a preferência do governo brasileiro pelos caças franceses (Rafale) e que só dependia da transferência de tecnologia.

Um pouco mais tarde, o presidente Lula afirmou que a escolha do novo caça) ainda estava indefinida. Ele disse ainda que não há previsão para a decisão final e pediu que seja evitado o “chutômetro” nessa questão

Um dia antes, executivos da Boeing Company afirmaram, em SP, que o Brasil não teria “carta branca” de seu país para, no futuro, conseguir vender caças como os que pretende adquirir para a Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB).

Detalhes da proposta sueca não estão fechados

A proposta que será entregue a Jobim ainda está sendo detalhada, mas significaria que 40% do trabalho de produção dos caças seria feito no Brasil.

A Suécia também promete instalar um centro, com laboratório, para testar o sistema a ser integrado no Brasil em parceira com a Suécia. Neste centro haveria simuladores e todo o equipamento necessário para integração de armamento, sensores, computadores, software e radares.

[P44]

vender 2 caças inexistentes, pelo preço de um caça inexistente? assim tb eu!

- O Gripen NG é o único que dará autonomia para a geração de caças. Oferecendo independência em vez de dependência

cof...cof...

an admitted 35 per cent of the Gripen being made up by American components and systems,

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/09/ex ... ck-on.html

[Wolfgang]

É que me soa um pouco estranha essa pergunta. A essa altura do campeonato, dá para saber quando um texto sobre determinado equipamento está enviesado pela má-fé ou não. No fundo, você não acha que o autor exagera e não demonstra o porquê de suas afirmações? Ora, cabe a ele as explicações.
Se alguém vem e laconicamente responde que o texto é ridículo é porque as argumentações do texto, apesar de verborrágicas também são lacônicas. Tenho uma tese: uma boa resposta sempre demanda uma boa pergunta. No caso, um bom texto. A resposta do Sintra foi à medida da qualidade das afirmações. Só que essas estão erradas e o Sintra, correto.

além de que esse texto é de um "mero"(?) forista, que não sabemos quem é, se tem segundas intenções, se na verdade percebe alguma coisa do assunto, etc etc


Eu prefiro guiar-me pelas palavras do Sintra que já demonstrou inúmeras vezes saber do que fala

(excepto na parte que toca ao futebol mas nem toda a gente é perfeita [Benfiquista] )

Quem tem mais de uma semana no fórum sabe que em termos de informações sobre caças (espcialemente o Phoon) o Sintra é imbatível.

[Alcantara]

Pessoal, diante das reviravoltas desde do dia 07 de setembro e tendo em vista a pressão por todos os lados e por fim, considerando estas propostas anunciadas pela SAAB (logicamente se estiver escrito no papel), não seria interessante para o Brasil anunciar Rafaele e Gripen como vencedores (?). Falo isso pois a maioria das Forças Aéreas operam mais de um vetor, um de alto desempenho, O RAFALE, e o Gripen como segunda linha.
O que acham?

Bem, se ao menos os dois usassem o mesmo motor...
Instrumentos, sistemas, armas, a gente padroniza (ainda mais no Gripen, de arquitetura bem aberta), agora, se pudesse usar o mesmo motor...


Abraços!!!

[P44]

Quem tem mais de uma semana no fórum sabe que em termos de informações sobre caças (espcialemente o Phoon) o Sintra é imbatível.

é isso

é pena é ser osga

[Wolfgang]

Pessoal, diante das reviravoltas desde do dia 07 de setembro e tendo em vista a pressão por todos os lados e por fim, considerando estas propostas anunciadas pela SAAB (logicamente se estiver escrito no papel), não seria interessante para o Brasil anunciar Rafaele e Gripen como vencedores (?). Falo isso pois a maioria das Forças Aéreas operam mais de um vetor, um de alto desempenho, O RAFALE, e o Gripen como segunda linha.
O que acham?

Bem, se ao menos os dois usassem o mesmo motor...
Instrumentos, sistemas, armas, a gente padroniza (ainda mais no Gripen, de arquitetura bem aberta), agora, se pudesse usar o mesmo motor...


Abraços!!!

Infelizmente, não há nenhum país fora UK (with a little help from their friends, parafraseando os Beatles) na Europa a fornecer um motor com a potência do F414G do NG.

[Wolfgang]

Osga? Em tuganês o que significa, Prepe?