Por isso penso que os nosso s NPO's quando forem incorporados, serão a "arma perfeita"
Marinha dos EUA
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Rui Elias Maltez
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Às vezes as pressas são inimigas da perfeição.
Por isso penso que os nosso s NPO's quando forem incorporados, serão a "arma perfeita"
Por isso penso que os nosso s NPO's quando forem incorporados, serão a "arma perfeita"
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Bourne
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Deve ser o USS Wolverine (nome sugestivoP44 escreveu:por falar em Porta-Aviões que tal estes movidos a rodas de pás, quais vapores do Mississipi?
http://ix-carriers.blogspot.com/
Nunca tinha ouvido falar
)http://www.modelboats.co.uk/news/article/mps/uan/47
Obs: procurei no Google
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soultrain
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Até tenho medo de postar isto aqui, alguns vão-me cair em cima, mas aqui vai:
Fotos bastante gráficas de uma pequena parte das falhas do LPD 17 San Antonio:
http://www.militarytimes.com/static/pro ... ntonio.pdf
LPD-17 Reliability Issues Surface Again
01-Dec-2008 18:20 EST
Related Stories: Americas - Other, Americas - USA, Events, Northrop-Grumman, Surface Ships - Other, Testing & Evaluation
Advertisement
“Need a tow?”
(click to view full)In March 2005, “Cost Overruns, Budget Uncertainties Hurting USN and Contractors” noted:
“With the help of a $50 million grant from the state of Louisiana, Northrop Grumman has modernized production at Avondale, and the company is now projecting completion of future amphibious ships at a much faster pace than in the past. Nevertheless, scathing Navy inspector general reviews that detailed shoddy construction and basic workmanship problems at Avondale are cause for legitimate concern in areas that will not be fixed by modernization alone.”
While some teething problems are not uncommon for first ships of a new class, LPD-17 San Antonio stands out for their number and severity. All in a ship whose costs rose from about $700 million when the program was sold to over $1.7 billion – and have stayed at that drastically elevated level through subsequent vessels. Worse, the nitial ship of class failed to complete a series of sea trials in late March 2007, and could not be sea-tested during a 5-day inspection period because one of its two steering systems completely failed. Navy inspectors found major defects in 3 of 17 categories, and the ship required millions more in repairs.
In August 2008, after 2 failed INSURV inspections and 2.5 years after the Navy officially accepted LPD 17 from the contractor, the first San Antonio Class ship was deployed on an operational mission. Whereupon it sprung oil leaks, and had to dock in Bahrain while a large team examines its problems and searches for a fix…
Fundamental Problems
LPD-17 cutaway
(click to view full)According to San Antonio Express-News, the San Antonio’s problems began on the drawing board. Specifically, in a computer design program dubbed 3D CAD, which was touted for its ability to give three-dimensional views but was reportedly not up to the task of designing an entire ship. Annual attrition rates of 35% or more during construction were also unhelpful, but the bottom line remains the ship’s quality.
That workmanship has been an issue for some time, and leads to legitimate questions concerning the Navy command’s acceptance of the ship from the contractor.
The ship failed 2 successive Navy INSURV inspections, before it was passed and readied for deployment with the Iwo Jima strike group in August 2008. Virginia Pilot’s “New Navy ship San Antonio found to be rife with flaws” has further details regarding the March 2007 testing SNAFU. On June 30/07, the paper ran a follow-up article: “Navy ship $840 million over budget and still unfinished.” Key excerpt:
LPD-17 construction
(click to view full)“The highly touted nerve center of the new, $1.8 billion amphibious ship San Antonio is fraught with computer hardware crashes that could cripple operations.
The ship lacks basic safety equipment, such as hand rails and reliable guns to battle close-in attacks.
In all, Navy inspectors found 30 major flaws aboard the San Antonio, according to an internal report obtained by The Virginian-Pilot…. The report reflects some of the same problems disclosed by The Pilot in July 2005. Two years later, the San Antonio is still incomplete and $840 million over budget [DID note: for a total of $1.7 billion – the same amount appropriated by the HASC in the FY 2008 supplemental for one more LPD-17 class ship].... Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter criticized shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems for substandard work and, in a letter last week, questioned the future of amphibious and destroyer ship programs under contract with the company.
“By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets,” Winter wrote to Ronald Sugar, Northrop Grumman’s chief executive officer.
Two years after accepting the San Antonio, “the Navy still does not have a mission capable LPD ship,” Winter wrote.”
The article goes on to add:
”....In March 2006, chief of naval operations Adm. Mike Mullen also attacked Northrop Grumman over its work quality. The average cost per ship has risen 50 percent over original estimates, according to the Navy…. The worst problems were in the propulsion, auxiliary and aviation systems. Nearly two-thirds of those serious problems were discovered during an earlier inspection, reported as fixed, but still existed during the later check.
The second ship in the amphibious class, the New Orleans, has fewer problems but was still incomplete when accepted by the Navy, Winter wrote to Northrop Grumman. The company’s “inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an untenable position,” according to Winter.
He has assigned a deputy to perform quarterly reviews on the shipyard and all ships under contract with Northrop Grumman.”
A Failed First Deployment
LPD 17, Dockside USASubsequent ships of the San Antonio Class have passed inspections, though USS New Orleans [LPD 18] has noted significant issues of its own, and has yet to deploy on a mission since its March 2007 commissioning date. USS Mesa Verde [LPD 19], which was built in a different shipyard, sailed through its initial inspections with flying colors.
USS San Antonio continued its long streak of poor performance, however, during its first operational deployment to the Persian Gulf in 2008. On Oct 9th and 17th, leaks were discovered in the pipes that deliver lubricating oil to the ship’s 4 diesel engines. The fault is classified as hazardous, because the leaks drip flammable oil into open spaces. On Oct 31/08, therefore, the ship was forced into to a Bahraini shipyard for at least 2 weeks of repairs. When the ship pulled in, it was greeted by a crew of 30-40 engineers, pipefitters and welders flown to Bahrain from the U.S.
Engineers are conducting a root-cause analysis and the repair and estimating/ working on fixes, some of which require replacing whole sections of pipe. Something one might expect on a very old ship – but not on a new one. Even the Navy’s INSURV inspectors may not catch those kinds of very basic workmanship issues, unless they’re visually obvious.
Captain Jan van Tol (ret.) has commanded US Navy ships whose cruises were interrupted by major breakdowns, but said that this crew’s size was notable. Gannett’s Navy Times quotes him:
“It surprises me to see oil leaking from such major points. I associate leaks with moving parts…. What’s unusual is the sheer number of people who are going out to address what appears to be a wider-ranging problem…. Are these systemic problems in one or more of the ship’s systems and physical plant? If they are, that goes to the question of craftsmanship and why did the Navy accept the ship? Are there ship-wide problems of a similar nature of poor craftsmanship and quality assurance? Who made the decisions to allow it to reach this point?”
Former 3-star vice-admiral Rep. Joe Sestak [D-PA] looked at the verified but unofficial photos of the problem, and seems to be thinking along similar lines:
“I expected to be handed machines of war that had a certain level of readiness I then had to maintain…. Something could break. But I never expected to deploy with a machine of war, particularly a relatively new one, that had systemic problems that would take weeks at a time [to fix]... When it’s something that appears systemic to the construction… we’re giving short shrift to our warriors out there…. I’d like to go back to ‘What are the institutional processes that permitted this to happen?’.... and find out how this can be done better. I have proposed that we should have hearings on acquisition reform in the new session, with LPD 17 part of that.”
During a speech at the CSIS thin-tank, Navy Secretary Donald Winter noted that he remained unsatisfied with the USS San Antonio’s performance, and promised “an appropriate course of action ahead” without mentioning any specifics. Given the Navy’s acceptance of the ship, however, his options are limited.
HMLMS Rotterdam LPDWinter did make an invidious comparison to the quality he has seen at Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea, however, which builds over 70 civilian ships per year as well as South Korea’s destroyers and amphibious assault ships. That competitive status was contrasted with American shipbuilding’s monopsony, in which the government is often the only major buyer and market forces are not really at work.
Which may indeed be part of the larger problem. Meanwhile, the Navy’s immediate problem involves resolving the quality issues with almost $4 billion worth of amphibious ships, which form a significant fraction of its future amphibious assault capability. Even as other shipbuilders around the world seem quite able to build capable, modern LPD ships at a lower price per ton.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lpd ... ain-03235/
Fotos bastante gráficas de uma pequena parte das falhas do LPD 17 San Antonio:
http://www.militarytimes.com/static/pro ... ntonio.pdf
LPD-17 Reliability Issues Surface Again
01-Dec-2008 18:20 EST
Related Stories: Americas - Other, Americas - USA, Events, Northrop-Grumman, Surface Ships - Other, Testing & Evaluation
Advertisement
“Need a tow?”
(click to view full)In March 2005, “Cost Overruns, Budget Uncertainties Hurting USN and Contractors” noted:
“With the help of a $50 million grant from the state of Louisiana, Northrop Grumman has modernized production at Avondale, and the company is now projecting completion of future amphibious ships at a much faster pace than in the past. Nevertheless, scathing Navy inspector general reviews that detailed shoddy construction and basic workmanship problems at Avondale are cause for legitimate concern in areas that will not be fixed by modernization alone.”
While some teething problems are not uncommon for first ships of a new class, LPD-17 San Antonio stands out for their number and severity. All in a ship whose costs rose from about $700 million when the program was sold to over $1.7 billion – and have stayed at that drastically elevated level through subsequent vessels. Worse, the nitial ship of class failed to complete a series of sea trials in late March 2007, and could not be sea-tested during a 5-day inspection period because one of its two steering systems completely failed. Navy inspectors found major defects in 3 of 17 categories, and the ship required millions more in repairs.
In August 2008, after 2 failed INSURV inspections and 2.5 years after the Navy officially accepted LPD 17 from the contractor, the first San Antonio Class ship was deployed on an operational mission. Whereupon it sprung oil leaks, and had to dock in Bahrain while a large team examines its problems and searches for a fix…
Fundamental Problems
LPD-17 cutaway
(click to view full)According to San Antonio Express-News, the San Antonio’s problems began on the drawing board. Specifically, in a computer design program dubbed 3D CAD, which was touted for its ability to give three-dimensional views but was reportedly not up to the task of designing an entire ship. Annual attrition rates of 35% or more during construction were also unhelpful, but the bottom line remains the ship’s quality.
That workmanship has been an issue for some time, and leads to legitimate questions concerning the Navy command’s acceptance of the ship from the contractor.
The ship failed 2 successive Navy INSURV inspections, before it was passed and readied for deployment with the Iwo Jima strike group in August 2008. Virginia Pilot’s “New Navy ship San Antonio found to be rife with flaws” has further details regarding the March 2007 testing SNAFU. On June 30/07, the paper ran a follow-up article: “Navy ship $840 million over budget and still unfinished.” Key excerpt:
LPD-17 construction
(click to view full)“The highly touted nerve center of the new, $1.8 billion amphibious ship San Antonio is fraught with computer hardware crashes that could cripple operations.
The ship lacks basic safety equipment, such as hand rails and reliable guns to battle close-in attacks.
In all, Navy inspectors found 30 major flaws aboard the San Antonio, according to an internal report obtained by The Virginian-Pilot…. The report reflects some of the same problems disclosed by The Pilot in July 2005. Two years later, the San Antonio is still incomplete and $840 million over budget [DID note: for a total of $1.7 billion – the same amount appropriated by the HASC in the FY 2008 supplemental for one more LPD-17 class ship].... Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter criticized shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems for substandard work and, in a letter last week, questioned the future of amphibious and destroyer ship programs under contract with the company.
“By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets,” Winter wrote to Ronald Sugar, Northrop Grumman’s chief executive officer.
Two years after accepting the San Antonio, “the Navy still does not have a mission capable LPD ship,” Winter wrote.”
The article goes on to add:
”....In March 2006, chief of naval operations Adm. Mike Mullen also attacked Northrop Grumman over its work quality. The average cost per ship has risen 50 percent over original estimates, according to the Navy…. The worst problems were in the propulsion, auxiliary and aviation systems. Nearly two-thirds of those serious problems were discovered during an earlier inspection, reported as fixed, but still existed during the later check.
The second ship in the amphibious class, the New Orleans, has fewer problems but was still incomplete when accepted by the Navy, Winter wrote to Northrop Grumman. The company’s “inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an untenable position,” according to Winter.
He has assigned a deputy to perform quarterly reviews on the shipyard and all ships under contract with Northrop Grumman.”
A Failed First Deployment
LPD 17, Dockside USASubsequent ships of the San Antonio Class have passed inspections, though USS New Orleans [LPD 18] has noted significant issues of its own, and has yet to deploy on a mission since its March 2007 commissioning date. USS Mesa Verde [LPD 19], which was built in a different shipyard, sailed through its initial inspections with flying colors.
USS San Antonio continued its long streak of poor performance, however, during its first operational deployment to the Persian Gulf in 2008. On Oct 9th and 17th, leaks were discovered in the pipes that deliver lubricating oil to the ship’s 4 diesel engines. The fault is classified as hazardous, because the leaks drip flammable oil into open spaces. On Oct 31/08, therefore, the ship was forced into to a Bahraini shipyard for at least 2 weeks of repairs. When the ship pulled in, it was greeted by a crew of 30-40 engineers, pipefitters and welders flown to Bahrain from the U.S.
Engineers are conducting a root-cause analysis and the repair and estimating/ working on fixes, some of which require replacing whole sections of pipe. Something one might expect on a very old ship – but not on a new one. Even the Navy’s INSURV inspectors may not catch those kinds of very basic workmanship issues, unless they’re visually obvious.
Captain Jan van Tol (ret.) has commanded US Navy ships whose cruises were interrupted by major breakdowns, but said that this crew’s size was notable. Gannett’s Navy Times quotes him:
“It surprises me to see oil leaking from such major points. I associate leaks with moving parts…. What’s unusual is the sheer number of people who are going out to address what appears to be a wider-ranging problem…. Are these systemic problems in one or more of the ship’s systems and physical plant? If they are, that goes to the question of craftsmanship and why did the Navy accept the ship? Are there ship-wide problems of a similar nature of poor craftsmanship and quality assurance? Who made the decisions to allow it to reach this point?”
Former 3-star vice-admiral Rep. Joe Sestak [D-PA] looked at the verified but unofficial photos of the problem, and seems to be thinking along similar lines:
“I expected to be handed machines of war that had a certain level of readiness I then had to maintain…. Something could break. But I never expected to deploy with a machine of war, particularly a relatively new one, that had systemic problems that would take weeks at a time [to fix]... When it’s something that appears systemic to the construction… we’re giving short shrift to our warriors out there…. I’d like to go back to ‘What are the institutional processes that permitted this to happen?’.... and find out how this can be done better. I have proposed that we should have hearings on acquisition reform in the new session, with LPD 17 part of that.”
During a speech at the CSIS thin-tank, Navy Secretary Donald Winter noted that he remained unsatisfied with the USS San Antonio’s performance, and promised “an appropriate course of action ahead” without mentioning any specifics. Given the Navy’s acceptance of the ship, however, his options are limited.
HMLMS Rotterdam LPDWinter did make an invidious comparison to the quality he has seen at Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea, however, which builds over 70 civilian ships per year as well as South Korea’s destroyers and amphibious assault ships. That competitive status was contrasted with American shipbuilding’s monopsony, in which the government is often the only major buyer and market forces are not really at work.
Which may indeed be part of the larger problem. Meanwhile, the Navy’s immediate problem involves resolving the quality issues with almost $4 billion worth of amphibious ships, which form a significant fraction of its future amphibious assault capability. Even as other shipbuilders around the world seem quite able to build capable, modern LPD ships at a lower price per ton.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lpd ... ain-03235/
"O que se percebe hoje é que os idiotas perderam a modéstia. E nós temos de ter tolerância e compreensão também com os idiotas, que são exatamente aqueles que escrevem para o esquecimento"
NJ
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P44
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
seu comuna, como ousas falar mal dos navios perfeitos dos deuses do hemisfério norte!
venezuelano!
venezuelano!
Triste sina ter nascido português 
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cabeça de martelo
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Isso não é uma noticia antiga? É que eu ia jurar que já tinha lido essa noticia. 
De qualquer maneira não é só isto que está a dar/deu problemas na US Navy.
De qualquer maneira não é só isto que está a dar/deu problemas na US Navy.
"Lá nos confins da Península Ibérica, existe um povo que não governa nem se deixa governar ”, Caio Júlio César, líder Militar Romano".
O insulto é a arma dos fracos...
O insulto é a arma dos fracos...
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P44
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- Registrado em: Ter Dez 07, 2004 6:34 am
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
cabeça de martelo escreveu:Isso não é uma noticia antiga? É que eu ia jurar que já tinha lido essa noticia.
De qualquer maneira não é só isto que está a dar/deu problemas na US Navy.
já tem algum tempo, já, eu já tinha esse PDF em finais do ano passado
Triste sina ter nascido português
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cabeça de martelo
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- Agradeceram: 2847 vezes
Re: Marinha dos EUA
Se calhar até foste tu a enviar-me isto.
"Lá nos confins da Península Ibérica, existe um povo que não governa nem se deixa governar ”, Caio Júlio César, líder Militar Romano".
O insulto é a arma dos fracos...
O insulto é a arma dos fracos...
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soultrain
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Isto arrasta-se desde a entrega do San Antonio em 2006....
Um navio que custa 800M USD, ter problemas desses...
[[]]'s
Um navio que custa 800M USD, ter problemas desses...
[[]]'s
"O que se percebe hoje é que os idiotas perderam a modéstia. E nós temos de ter tolerância e compreensão também com os idiotas, que são exatamente aqueles que escrevem para o esquecimento"
NJ
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P44
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- Mensagens: 55256
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- Localização: O raio que vos parta
- Agradeceu: 2752 vezes
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
neste tópico devem existir diversos posts dedicados a este tema
Triste sina ter nascido português
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PRick
Re: Marinha dos EUA
Esse pessoal foi treinado no Programa do F-18E, passou ser a nova marca de qualidade total da US Navy.soultrain escreveu:Isto arrasta-se desde a entrega do San Antonio em 2006....
Um navio que custa 800M USD, ter problemas desses...
[[]]'s
Dizem por aqui, que isso é problema de JUNTA! Junta tudo e joga fora.
![[018]](./images/smilies/018.gif){kind=small}
[]´s
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P44
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Navy fails to free warship grounded at Hawaii
Sat Feb 7, 5:17 pm ET
HONOLULU – An attempt to pull a $1 billion warship free after it ran aground off the coast of Honolulu was unsuccessful Saturday, but the Navy planned to try again after lightening the vessel's weight.
Navy tugboats and a salvage ship, the USS Salvor, tried to tow out the USS Port Royal at high tide early Saturday, but the guided missile cruiser remained stuck on the sandy, rocky bottom, said Pacific Fleet spokeswoman Agnes T. Tanyan.
Navy officials now plan to remove the ship's fuel and water supplies in an effort to lighten the vessel and make it easier to refloat, she said.
Tanyan said the time of the next attempt had not been determined.
The crew remained on board.
The 9,600-ton warship ran aground Thursday night about a half-mile offshore from Honolulu International Airport. It was on its first sea trials after finishing routine maintenance in dry dock.
The ship, which is based at Pearl Harbor and has a crew of 320, got stuck as it was transferring shore-based officials, including a rear admiral, to a smaller boat to take them to shore.
An oil-recovery vessel, the Clean Islands, was positioned behind the warship as a precaution but no oil leak had been detected, Coast Guard Lt. John Titchen said.
The cause of the grounding and the extent of damage to the vessel were under investigation.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090207/ap_ ... ding/print
With the port of Honolulu in the foreground, the USS Port Royal, a Navy guided missile cruiser, sits grounded atop a reef about a half-mile south of the Honolulu airport's reef runway, Friday, Feb. 6, 2009 in Honolulu. Navy tugs tried early Friday to nudge the 9,600-ton warship away from the spot it hit but were unsuccessful.
(AP Photo/Marco Garcia)
http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/ ... =AR&Show=0
Sat Feb 7, 5:17 pm ET
HONOLULU – An attempt to pull a $1 billion warship free after it ran aground off the coast of Honolulu was unsuccessful Saturday, but the Navy planned to try again after lightening the vessel's weight.
Navy tugboats and a salvage ship, the USS Salvor, tried to tow out the USS Port Royal at high tide early Saturday, but the guided missile cruiser remained stuck on the sandy, rocky bottom, said Pacific Fleet spokeswoman Agnes T. Tanyan.
Navy officials now plan to remove the ship's fuel and water supplies in an effort to lighten the vessel and make it easier to refloat, she said.
Tanyan said the time of the next attempt had not been determined.
The crew remained on board.
The 9,600-ton warship ran aground Thursday night about a half-mile offshore from Honolulu International Airport. It was on its first sea trials after finishing routine maintenance in dry dock.
The ship, which is based at Pearl Harbor and has a crew of 320, got stuck as it was transferring shore-based officials, including a rear admiral, to a smaller boat to take them to shore.
An oil-recovery vessel, the Clean Islands, was positioned behind the warship as a precaution but no oil leak had been detected, Coast Guard Lt. John Titchen said.
The cause of the grounding and the extent of damage to the vessel were under investigation.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090207/ap_ ... ding/print
With the port of Honolulu in the foreground, the USS Port Royal, a Navy guided missile cruiser, sits grounded atop a reef about a half-mile south of the Honolulu airport's reef runway, Friday, Feb. 6, 2009 in Honolulu. Navy tugs tried early Friday to nudge the 9,600-ton warship away from the spot it hit but were unsuccessful.
(AP Photo/Marco Garcia)
http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/ ... =AR&Show=0
Triste sina ter nascido português
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Luís Henrique
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Não sei se ja foi postado no passado, mas achei alguns dados no site da Navy interessantes:
Navy Personnel
Active Duty: 331,702
Officers: 51,223
Enlisted: 276,054
Midshipmen: 4,425
Ready Reserve: 121,194 [As of 08 Dec]
Selected Reserves: 67,909
Individual Ready Reserve: 53,285
Reserves currently mobilized: 6,147 [As of 03 Feb ]
Personnel on deployment: 56,021
Navy Department Civilian Employees: 185,259
Ships and Submarines
Deployable Battle Force Ships: 283
Ships Underway (away from homeport): 121 ships (43% of total)
On deployment: 97 ships (34% of total)
Attack submarines underway (away from homeport): 28 submarines (51%)
On deployment: 18 submarines (33%)
Ships Underway
Carriers:
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) - 5th Fleet
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) - East China Sea
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) - Atlantic Ocean
Amphibious Warfare Ships:
USS Essex (LHD 2) - Gulf of Thailand
USS Boxer (LHD 4) - Philippine Sea
USS Bataan (LHD 5) - Atlantic Ocean
Aircraft (operational): 3700+
Navy Personnel
Active Duty: 331,702
Officers: 51,223
Enlisted: 276,054
Midshipmen: 4,425
Ready Reserve: 121,194 [As of 08 Dec]
Selected Reserves: 67,909
Individual Ready Reserve: 53,285
Reserves currently mobilized: 6,147 [As of 03 Feb ]
Personnel on deployment: 56,021
Navy Department Civilian Employees: 185,259
Ships and Submarines
Deployable Battle Force Ships: 283
Ships Underway (away from homeport): 121 ships (43% of total)
On deployment: 97 ships (34% of total)
Attack submarines underway (away from homeport): 28 submarines (51%)
On deployment: 18 submarines (33%)
Ships Underway
Carriers:
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) - 5th Fleet
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) - East China Sea
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) - Atlantic Ocean
Amphibious Warfare Ships:
USS Essex (LHD 2) - Gulf of Thailand
USS Boxer (LHD 4) - Philippine Sea
USS Bataan (LHD 5) - Atlantic Ocean
Aircraft (operational): 3700+
Su-35BM - 4ª++ Geração.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
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Luís Henrique
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Também achei muito interessante a classificação dos meios navais na US Navy:
Aircraft Carriers - allowing the mobile projection of Naval Air Power across the globe.
Amphibious Assault Ships - deploy and support U.S. ground forces in remote locations
Battleships - heavily armed and armored warships designed to engage other warships and provide shore bombardment
Cruisers - multi-mission warships capable of engaging multiple simultaneous targets and employed in force support or independent action
Destroyers - fast warships providing multi-mission offensive and defensive capability, independently or in fleet support
Frigates - warships designed to protect other ships and as anti-submarine warfare combatants
Submarines - capable of underwater operations and designed to carry out research, rescue, or specific wartime missions
----
Uma curiosidade, pela Navy, as nossas fragatas de 6.000 T seriam consideradas Destroyers???
Aircraft Carriers - allowing the mobile projection of Naval Air Power across the globe.
Amphibious Assault Ships - deploy and support U.S. ground forces in remote locations
Battleships - heavily armed and armored warships designed to engage other warships and provide shore bombardment
Cruisers - multi-mission warships capable of engaging multiple simultaneous targets and employed in force support or independent action
Destroyers - fast warships providing multi-mission offensive and defensive capability, independently or in fleet support
Frigates - warships designed to protect other ships and as anti-submarine warfare combatants
Submarines - capable of underwater operations and designed to carry out research, rescue, or specific wartime missions
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Uma curiosidade, pela Navy, as nossas fragatas de 6.000 T seriam consideradas Destroyers???
Editado pela última vez por Luís Henrique em Ter Fev 17, 2009 1:43 pm, em um total de 2 vezes.
Su-35BM - 4ª++ Geração.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
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Luís Henrique
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
Tb achei interessante que os destroyers americanos tem, praticamente, o mesmo peso dos cruzadores e a força é composta, PRIORITARIAMENTE, de destroyers.
Contei, cerca de 20 cruzadores, 30 fragatas e 60 destroyers.
Contei, cerca de 20 cruzadores, 30 fragatas e 60 destroyers.
Su-35BM - 4ª++ Geração.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
Simplesmente um GRANDE caça.
-
P44
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Re: Marinha dos EUA
U.S. Navy Plan Suffers Deficiencies
Aerospace daily and defense report , 22.02.2009
The U.S. Navy’s aggressive 30-year shipbuilding and modernization plan suffers from serious deficiencies and could become a victim of its own ambition, according to highly regarded Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) analyst Robert Work.
Named for the number of ships the Navy wants by fiscal 2020, the so-called 313-ship fleet plan would leave the service lacking in important capabilities to meet the operational demands of current strategic challenges, Work says in his new report. “Specifically, [the Navy] lacks the range to face increasingly lethal, land-based, maritime reconnaissance-strike complexes or nuclear-armed regional adversaries,” Work wrote. “Moreover, it does not adequately take into account the changing nature of undersea warfare, or the potential prospect of a major maritime competition with China.”
The former Marine Corps colonel also says the Navy’s plans are “far too ambitious” given likely future budget constraints. According to Work, between FY ’03 and ’08, the Navy spent an average $11.1 billion per year on new ship construction. But the Congressional Budget Office projects that cost will nearly double, to between $20 billion and $22 billion. And those costs do not factor in the funds required to build 12 replacements for the current strategic ballistic missile submarine force. “It seems clear, then, that the Navy needs to scale back its current plans,” Work wrote.
Recommendations
Work offers numerous recommendations, including:
• After completing the ongoing midlife refueling cycle for the first 12 of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, immediately reduce the strategic deterrent fleet to its final target of 12 boats and start work on the SSBN(X) design immediately;
• Begin a concerted research-and-development program for small, manned undersea vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles and other unmanned underwater systems, as well as a new generation of littoral anti-submarine warfare weapons;
• Slow the production rate of nuclear-powered carriers (CVNs) from one every four years to one every five years, and consider accelerating the current unmanned combat air system (UCAS) demonstration program and planned operational debut;
• Halt production of DDG-1000 destroyers at three ships and restart the DDG-51 production line in FY ’10 while putting the futuristic CG(X) cruiser off until at least FY ’15;
• Ramp up production of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to four per year; and
• Build six Joint Multimission Submersibles as rapidly as possible.
Work also suggests a variety of additional detailed recommendations covering naval special warfare/Navy Expeditionary Combat Command ships and craft, naval maneuver and maneuver-support ships, joint sealift ships and combat logistics force and support ships.
The Navy’s ship plan has been criticized on Capitol Hill and elsewhere almost since the moment it was unveiled three years ago. The plan, which already acknowledged risk-taking with fewer subs and aircraft carriers than apparently required at times, was an attempt by the sea service to bring order and predictability to its shipbuilding for the Pentagon, Hill and especially industry. But congressional auditors have repeatedly reported on underfunding and disputed accounting methods.
militarium.eu
Aerospace daily and defense report , 22.02.2009
The U.S. Navy’s aggressive 30-year shipbuilding and modernization plan suffers from serious deficiencies and could become a victim of its own ambition, according to highly regarded Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) analyst Robert Work.
Named for the number of ships the Navy wants by fiscal 2020, the so-called 313-ship fleet plan would leave the service lacking in important capabilities to meet the operational demands of current strategic challenges, Work says in his new report. “Specifically, [the Navy] lacks the range to face increasingly lethal, land-based, maritime reconnaissance-strike complexes or nuclear-armed regional adversaries,” Work wrote. “Moreover, it does not adequately take into account the changing nature of undersea warfare, or the potential prospect of a major maritime competition with China.”
The former Marine Corps colonel also says the Navy’s plans are “far too ambitious” given likely future budget constraints. According to Work, between FY ’03 and ’08, the Navy spent an average $11.1 billion per year on new ship construction. But the Congressional Budget Office projects that cost will nearly double, to between $20 billion and $22 billion. And those costs do not factor in the funds required to build 12 replacements for the current strategic ballistic missile submarine force. “It seems clear, then, that the Navy needs to scale back its current plans,” Work wrote.
Recommendations
Work offers numerous recommendations, including:
• After completing the ongoing midlife refueling cycle for the first 12 of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, immediately reduce the strategic deterrent fleet to its final target of 12 boats and start work on the SSBN(X) design immediately;
• Begin a concerted research-and-development program for small, manned undersea vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles and other unmanned underwater systems, as well as a new generation of littoral anti-submarine warfare weapons;
• Slow the production rate of nuclear-powered carriers (CVNs) from one every four years to one every five years, and consider accelerating the current unmanned combat air system (UCAS) demonstration program and planned operational debut;
• Halt production of DDG-1000 destroyers at three ships and restart the DDG-51 production line in FY ’10 while putting the futuristic CG(X) cruiser off until at least FY ’15;
• Ramp up production of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to four per year; and
• Build six Joint Multimission Submersibles as rapidly as possible.
Work also suggests a variety of additional detailed recommendations covering naval special warfare/Navy Expeditionary Combat Command ships and craft, naval maneuver and maneuver-support ships, joint sealift ships and combat logistics force and support ships.
The Navy’s ship plan has been criticized on Capitol Hill and elsewhere almost since the moment it was unveiled three years ago. The plan, which already acknowledged risk-taking with fewer subs and aircraft carriers than apparently required at times, was an attempt by the sea service to bring order and predictability to its shipbuilding for the Pentagon, Hill and especially industry. But congressional auditors have repeatedly reported on underfunding and disputed accounting methods.
militarium.eu
Triste sina ter nascido português