O LPD San António da US Navy

[luis F. Silva]

A RN vai passar a ter um grupo amfíbio constituído por 2 LPH (Ark Roya e Ocean), 2 LPD (Albion e Bulwark) e os 4 LSD da classe Bay, constituindo 2 TG formado cada um deles por 1 LPH + 1 LPD + 2 LSD. Daí eles não considerarem necessário que os LPD e LSD tenham helis organicos e consequentemente hangares.

Passam a formar unidades anfibias ao estilo da US Navy. 1 LHA, 1 LPD e um LSD (no caso dois Bay)

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Ora aí está:

Diversificação de tipologias das plataformas, sendo que cada uma tenha uma vocação especial.

[JNSA]

Ora aí está:

Diversificação de tipologias das plataformas, sendo que cada uma tenha uma vocação especial.

Ora aí está - um país de quase 300 milhões de habitantes, e com 12 forças tarefa anfíbias (ou são 10?). De momento, e no futuro mais próximo, nós só temos dinheiro e meios humanos e logísticos para uma unidade anfíbia, o que de resto corresponde às nossas necessidades.. E quando só se pode ter um, convém que esse seja polivalente, moderno e operacional.

[Rui Elias Maltez]

De acordo com a polivalência do nosso meio naval, JNSA.

O que não significa que tenha que ser o único.

É que dinheiro arranja-se, desde que vontade politica haja.

Basta que os ministérios não andem em cada 2 anos a trocar as frotas de automóveis.

E gente para entrar na Marinha também há, mesmo a pagar os vencimentos, como o resto. Logísticos é o quê?

Instalações para aportar os navios ou um AOR que faz cada vez mais falta em cada ano que passa?

Num país de 10 milhões de hab, não há gente para equipar mais que um LPD?

Como se explica o caso grego?

[JNSA]

Como se explica o caso grego?

Explica-se da mesma maneira que o caso Israelita (sendo que estes ainda beneficiam do apoio financeiro dos EUA) - trata-se de um Estado confrontado durante décadas com uma ameaça real de um inimigo muito superior demograficamente (não, nós não estamos na mesma situação com Espanha... ). Daí que tenham um orçamento para a Defesa absolutamente desproporcionado, umas forças armadas sobredimensionadas e as finanças públicas à beira do caos. Basta comparar o orçamento grego com o português e verá as diferenças óbvias, agravadas pelo facto de o Governo grego ter manipulado durante vários anos (mas sobretudo aquando dos jogos Olímpicos) as suas contas públicas de forma a fugir ao controlo da UE (sim, muito mais do que nós...).

O Rui já acha que, por exemplo, os Espanhóis, estão sobre-armados para a sua dimensão. Ora se fizermos uma comparação demográfica (nem vou comparar os PIBs, pois aí ainda seria pior para nós) destes com Portugal, chegamos à conclusão que, para os seus 2 LPD, nós deveríamos ter menos de 0,5 (e vamos ter 1 inteiro ), para as suas 12 fragatas previstas, nós deveríamos ter 3 (e ao que tudo indica, vamos ter 5), etc.

Há comparações para todos os gostos.

[JNSA]

É que dinheiro arranja-se, desde que vontade politica haja.

Pois Rui, mas infelizmente, como muito bem sabemos, não há...

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Em qualquer caso, JNSA, e neste caso concreto das forças-trarefa americanas e inglesas, eu nem me estava a referir ao caso português, mas sim comparativamente à filosofia e doutrinas de usos de forças expedicionárias destes países, se compararmos com a França por exemplo.

[JNSA]

Em qualquer caso, JNSA, e neste caso concreto das forças-trarefa americanas e inglesas, eu nem me estava a referir ao caso português, mas sim comparativamente à filosofia e doutrinas de usos de forças expedicionárias destes países, se compararmos com a França por exemplo.

É preciso ver que são países com tradições navais muito diferentes e interesses geo-estratégicos diversos. O Reino Unido, por exemplo, durante a Guerra Fria, e devido à sua posição geográfica, enfatizou muito a capacidade de luta anti-submarina. E juntamente com os EUA, apostaram na projecção de forças de forma mais intensa do que a França.

Mas mesmo o RU e os EUA não são totalmente coincidentes na forma de estruturar os seus meios de projecção, o que se justifica plenamente, até pela diferente composição, meios e doutrinas dos seus corpos de fuzileiros.

Por isso, eu acho que as comparações são interessantes e uma forma de podermos aprender aquilo que de bom se faz nos outros países, mas a verdade é que a nossa realidade é bastante diversa de outros Estados europeus de dimensão similar (Bélgica, Grécia ou Holanda, por exemplo) o que nos deveria levar a pensar em soluções originais e adaptadas ao nosso contexto.

Só para dar alguns exemplos:
- Estados cuja costa se encontra muito próxima de inimigos prováveis podem equipar a sua Marinha com pequenas lanchas lança-mísseis e corvetas, uma vez que a autonomia e a persistência em combate não são variáveis relevantes, o que não quer dizer que estes meios se adequem totalmente à realidade portuguesa.
- Marinhas que operam em mares relativamente calmos não necessitam de construir navios com a mesma tonelagem que aqueles de que nós dependemos para operar no Atlântico.
- países com pequenas costas e ZEE's, como a Holanda, podem concentrar-se mais em unidades de superfície e meios de projecção, ao contrário de nós, que temos que dispender verbas consideráveis na criação de uma frota de patrulhas oceânicos e costeiros.

[Spectral]

A França não precisava de uma capacidade de projecção de forças tão forte porque já tinha bases nas suas regiões de influência (África). Como sempre, contar o número de navios não chega...

[JNSA]

A França não precisava de uma capacidade de projecção de forças tão forte porque já tinha bases nas suas regiões de influência (África). Como sempre, contar o número de navios não chega...

É verdade, Spectral... E podem-se ainda citar outras razões, como o facto de , depois do abandono da Indochina, a França ter deixado de manter uma presença relevante no Índico (o que diminui o número de teatros em que poderia esperar operar). Da mesma forma, os franceses não tiveram nas duas últimas duas ou três décadas, nenhuma operação semelhante à das Malvinas, o que ajudou à não criação, no seio das suas forças armadas e mesmo poder político e opinião pública, uma consciência tão forte face aos meios de projecção aero-naval de forças (o que não quer dizer que os tenha ignorado).

Por outro lado, o ênfase britânico na realização de missões ASW na Guerra Fria contribuiu para a construção de plataformas de transporte de helicópteros, que poderiam igualmente ser usadas em operações anfíbias.

A história de um país e também os seus constrangimentos económicos e geo-políticos moldam as suas forças armadas, o que faz com que comparações pouco cautelosas entre Estados possam levar a conclusões desadequadas.

[Rui Elias Maltez]

JNSA e Spectral:

Só gostaria de dizer aos colegas que apesar de raramente estarmos de acordo nas análises que fazemos ao nível de planeamento naval, não significa isso necesariamente que eu faça análises pouco cautelosas ou levianas, ou contrário das vossas, que eu reconheço serem sempre bem fundamentadas.

Mas tanto as vossas como as minhas não passam de opiniões, e constactações.

E que a partir de uma constactação, não seja impossível que se façam interpretações, e se dêm opiniões.

A França tem territórios ultramarinos nas antilhas, no Índico e na Polinésia, onde usa mais as fragatas ligeiras Floreal, tem interesses em África, quer em países marítimos, quer terrestres, e tem alguma capacidade de projecção, agora acrescida com a entrada em serviço dos 2 navios da classe Mistral, e futuramente com um meio de projecção de forças como o segundo PA.

Conta ainda com o Foudre, e apenas dispensará os velhos e pequenos Oragan e Orage.

Na verdade, a guerra das Malvinas foi um episódio na história.

O que conta é a filosofia/doutrina de uso do dispositivo militar e naval em particular por um e outro país.

[P44]

e tem alguma capacidade de projecção, agora acrescida com a entrada em serviço dos 2 navios da classe Mistral, e futuramente com um meio de projecção de forças como o segundo PA.

não esquecer a classe FOUDRE
http://www.netmarine.net/bat/tcd/foudre/index.htm



Mas é como o JNSA e o Spectral dizem, tt a França como a Inglaterra possuem territórios ultramarinos, o mesmo se passando com a Holanda (veja-se a controvérsia que está a gerar na Holanda a venda das KDs e a implicação da mm na protecção ás Antilhas Holandesas).

Eu penso que um LPD para um País e uma marinha da nossa dimensão serão suficientes dado que esotu a imaginar que a maior parte do tempo o LPD estará acostado, salvo para responder a catástrofes naturais ou para um envio de uma força expedicionária no âmbito da ONU.

A meu ver , e se o LPD fôr para a frente, devia era começar a considerar-se a substituição do AOR Bérrio por um navio mais recente, mesmo em 2ª mão, que começasse a operar um pouco antes da entrada ao serviço do LPD...

que pensam vocês?

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Acho bem, P44.

Aliás, essa é um das aspirações da Marinha, já exteriorizadas pelo anterior CEMA.

Novo ou usado é imprescindível termos esse meio naval, mais recente e maior que o Bérrio.

O problema é que em termos de LPM nada está programado.

A menos que a aquisição desse meio se faça à parte dos programas inscritos em sede de LPM, e seja com as verbas normais para equipamento da Marinha, lá mais para o fim da década.

[P44]

Navy Ship $840 Million Over Budget and Still Unfinished


(Source: The Virginian-Pilot; published June 30, 2007)


The US Navy commissioned USS San Antonio, the lead ship of the LPD-17 class, despite a large number of flaws, many of which have not yet been fixed. (US Navy file photo)

( (C) http://hamptonroads.com/pilotonline/
; reproduced by permission)

By Louis Hansen


NORFOLK, VA --- The highly touted nerve center of the new, $1.8 billion amphibious ship San Antonio is fraught with computer hardware crashes that could cripple operations. The ship lacks basic safety equipment, such as hand rails and reliable guns to battle close-in attacks.

In all, Navy inspectors found 30 major flaws aboard the San Antonio, according to an internal report obtained by The Virginian-Pilot.

Despite the deficiencies, the Navy has earmarked $13 billion to purchase nine amphibious ships in the San Antonio class.

The report reflects some of the same problems disclosed by The Pilot in July 2005. Two years later, the San Antonio is still incomplete and $840 million over budget.

The LPD-17 class of ships, or landing platform dock, replaces older amphibious ships used to deliver Marines and their equipment, including aircraft, into combat. The San Antonio is the first ship in the new class.

Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter criticized shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems for substandard work and, in a letter last week, questioned the future of amphibious and destroyer ship programs under contract with the company.

“By taking delivery of incomplete ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets,” Winter wrote to Ronald Sugar, Northrop Grumman’s chief executive officer. Two years after accepting the San Antonio, “the Navy still does not have a mission capable LPD ship,” Winter wrote.

Bill Glenn, a spokesman for the company’s shipbuilding division in Mississippi, said in a statement that the San Antonio is a “revolutionary first-in-class U.S. Navy amphibious ship.”

Responding to the myriad problems found by Navy inspectors, he said the amphibious class “continues to improve and mature as lessons learned on early ships are rolled into follow ships.”

Capt. Bill Galinis, the Navy’s program manager for the LPD-17 class, said in an interview that engineering problems are common for the first ship built in a new class. “Lead ships are difficult,” he said. Despite the equipment failures, he said the ship is “absolutely safe.”

“It would not have been accepted by the Navy if the ship was not safe,” he said.

One veteran naval analyst, Norman Polmar, said other first-in-class amphibious ships have never been so flawed when they joined the fleet. “These are basically troop transport ships,” he said in an interview. “We’ve been building these ships for 65 years.”

The Navy accepted the San Antonio from the shipbuilder in July 2005. Two other ship manufacturers worked on the vessel before the companies were consolidated into Northrop Grumman.

When it reached the fleet, Navy inspectors found “poor construction and craftsmanship standards,” according to an earlier report.

In March 2006, chief of naval operations Adm. Mike Mullen also attacked Northrop Grumman over its work quality. The average cost per ship has risen 50 percent over original estimates, according to the Navy.

Polmar said “the entire program should be stopped right now.”

The San Antonio spent most of last year at sea, although it has not left for a full, six-month deployment. It is undergoing $36 million in previously scheduled Navy-funded repairs at local shipyard BAE Systems.

Officials from the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey met the ship March 26 to 30 for its final trials in Norfolk . The ship was unable to leave its pier because of a steering failure caused by an electronic malfunction, the report said.

Inspectors detailed their observations and test results in a 45 -page report.

The worst problems were in the propulsion, auxiliary and aviation systems. Nearly two-thirds of those serious problems were discovered during an earlier inspection, reported as fixed, but still existed during the later check.

Fluid leaks, tangled wires and broken hardware were found across the ship, the report said. In fact, inspectors wrote that the “San Antonio remains an unfinished ship” – almost two years after it joined the fleet.

About 15 percent of the spaces aboard the ship need additional work in the yard, with no completion dates set.

The computer network that allows the crew to operate the ship from almost any terminal on board is common in commercial vessels but new to Navy amphibious ships.

Inspectors discovered hardware and software failures. The system sometimes crashes, hindering the crew’s ability to command and control the ship and launch Marines on air, land and sea assaults.

Replacement parts for the computer network were made by a company that has gone out of business. Often, repair parts are costly and need to be custom-made, the report said.

Serious problems also exist in the well deck, where amphibious vehicles are kept and launched.

The ship suffered from a faulty communication link between pilots and landing officers. The report recommends suspending all helicopter and tilt-rotor Osprey flight operations until the deficiency is fixed. The ship’s crew told inspectors that flight safety had been a concern for more than six months.

Inspectors also paint a picture of an uncomfortable and unsafe ship for the 360 San Antonio sailors and 700 troops that would embark on amphibious missions. A live, ungrounded cable was discovered in a berthing area; 124 of 156 auto-inflatable life preservers were missing for topside crew; equipment failures meant the ship could not make enough fresh water at sea for the crew; and the galley could struggle to cook enough food.

Galinis said many problems have been fixed since the inspection. Life preservers have been properly placed, gun mounts repaired and faulty computer parts replaced. Other issues, he said, were less serious than the report spells out.

The ship-wide network will make the ship more efficient and easier to operate, he said. The network has been overhauled and upgraded.

“We knew we were going to see some premature failures,” Galinis said. “It is in very good shape now.”

The Navy is sympathetic to the sailors aboard the San Antonio, he said. The equipment failures have “probably made a hard job more difficult,” he said.

The second ship in the amphibious class, the New Orleans, has fewer problems but was still incomplete when accepted by the Navy, Winter wrote to Northrop Grumman.

The company’s “inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an untenable position,” according to Winter.

He has assigned a deputy to perform quarterly reviews on the shipyard and all ships under contract with Northrop Grumman.

Polmar suggested that the Navy use more established ship designs used by other navies to upgrade its amphibious fleets.

The Navy also should hold the contractor and the project leadership accountable for the failures, he said. “The Navy leadership should have laid down the law,” he said.

-ends-


FONTE

[dron_pizdec]

Isso e muito engracado pra meu gosto...

This is a devastating report the The Virginia Pilot.

It is not a new story. Lead ships of every class have challenges. What is telling about this is that LPD-17 is the first of the "new" wave of ships coming online that are supposed to "transform" the Navy. Untold thousands of PowerPoint manhours, Proceedings articles written, speeches given to Sailors, and testimony given to Congress about how this brave new LPD-17, DD(X), and LCS Navy was all new. All fresh. All modern. All efficient. All manpower saving. All force multiplier. All in line to give retiring senior officers jobs at .... ... wait. I didn't write that.

We are planning to spend huge chunks of taxpayer money on a fleet that is supposed to support our national goals. Cost per unit is critical as it will tell you how many ships you can buy; how many shipyards you can keep going to be there when - not if - the next major global conflict happens. And all of a suddent you have to flesh a 1st Fleet, a 4th Fleet, an 8th Fleet.....

Past is often prologue. What happens to LPD-17 should show us what is going to happen to DD(X) and LCS (BTW, LCS is a stupid thing to name a ship. Beltway bullshit. Call it a frigate or a corvette.)

All the PowerPoint briefs, FITREP bullets, and Miss Mary Sunshine briefs don't mean balls once the ship leaves the pier. Let's see what happened, and have a little tough love talk.

Two years late and more than $400 million over its original budget, (the Navy's newest) amphibious ship .... is plagued by bad wiring, inadequate ventilation, corrosion and an array of other problems that reflect “poor construction and craftsmanship standards,” according to Navy inspectors.
Looks like the Shoes learned a few things from the MV-22 program, and here is why I say "No Excuses." We have already plowed and extra $400 million EXTRA into this ship on top of what was budgeted. This thing should smell like Lilly-of-the-Valley during sea trials. Every Sailors rack should have a built in DVD. Affectionate 19 yr old tri-athlete Swedish masseuses named Helga should be manning the rails. This ship shouldn't act like a Nigerian Navy cast-off.

The San Antonio, ... “is an incomplete ship,” the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey said.
Not a good FITREP bullet.

“Safety deficiencies exist throughout,” the inspectors reported in a July 8 memo sent to the Navy’s top admiral ...

San Antonio is the first of 12 such ships the Navy has ordered to represent the future of amphibious warfare.

Inspectors found ladders that were improperly constructed or missing handrails, unventilated spaces housing toxic chemicals, a crash-prone engineering control system, and more than four dozen systems that must be re tested after the Navy takes charge of the ship.
Sounds like the folks that Personal Property hired to move my stuff last PCS also worked on the LPD-17. Here is a question at your next "Ask the Admiral" meet and greet; how many of these problems are going to be thrown on the back of Skippers and Sailors to fix, a la USS Kennedy, and then blame them when they can't get blood out of a turnip?

Among the major problems cited by inspectors:

- “San Antonio will be plagued by electrical (and) electronic cable plant installation deficiencies throughout its entire service life if currently-planned corrective actions are not complete.”

- Poor wire installation and cable-pulling practices have led to a “snarled, over-packed, poorly-assembled and virtually uncorrectable electrical (and) electronic cable plant.”

- “Watertight integrity is compromised throughout the ship by numerous multi-cable transits that may never achieve watertightness.”
This is a brand new, state of the art ship. New design technology, etc..... Are you seeing where I am going here? All the technology in the world is no good if you lack experienced and talented engineers and craftsmen to execute a design plan; and uniformed, accountable leaders that are making sure it happens and not just focus on "I'll let my relief handle that." Let's smell some more.

The eight-page memo reads like a failing report card, summarizing more than 15,000 deficiencies uncovered in sea trials conducted by shipbuilder Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in late June and during an in-port inspection by Navy officials that ended July 5.

The inspectors said the Navy should accept the ship only if Northrop Grumman corrects a series of specific problems or the chief of naval operations decides to waive those shortcomings.
I respectfully request that it not be the later.
In the meantime, the report adds, the San Antonio “is not ready for the ship’s force to be moved aboard.”

On some new ships, the crew takes up residence a year or more before delivery, so sailors have time to learn about ship systems and arrange their work and berthing spaces.

However, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) [in a early WordPerfect, or was it WordStar, spell checker, it would recommend you spell NAVSEA NAUSEA], which is overseeing the program, said Tuesday that San Antonio’s crew could move onto the ship next month.
I want to play against NAVSEA's football team. Mmmmm. The playbook; "Up the middle, up the middle, up the middle, PUNT."
The ship is being built at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss.

The company on Tuesday deferred questions about the inspectors’ report to Navy officials, but issued a statement that it is “proud of the skills and determination our workforce has demonstrated in completing this first-of-class ship.”
Great. The Navy's version of "Outcome Based Education" and "Social Promotion."
The statement added that new technologies being installed on the ship “have brought programmatic and budgetary challenges”
BAWAAHHAHAH!! Read, "It doesn't work regardless of how much money we throw at it, and nothing is working like the builders said it would."
and linked problems in the ship’s wiring to design changes made after the start of construction.

Meanwhile, NAVSEA officials said Tuesday they expect to receive authorization later this month to accept delivery of the ship. Problems not fixed by then will be addressed in a post-delivery maintenance period.
Skipper's heads on pikes and Sailors backs. That is what that means.
“Throughout the build process quality issues were identified, solutions determined and scheduled for accomplishment,” a NAVSEA statement said.
Balloon juice.
The critical report on the San Antonio comes against a backdrop of congressional complaints about the Navy’s shipbuilding program, which is marked by rapidly increasing costs and producing too few ships to sustain the fleet at current levels.

The House of Representatives voted in May to slap a $1.7 billion cost cap on each ship in the Navy’s DDX destroyer program; the service says the first ship in the series could cost more than $3 billion but that DDX is the proving ground for a new electric propulsion plant that will be applied in other ships and ultimately could power high-energy laser weapons.
$1.7-3 billion is not a destroyer. It's something, but a destroyer isn't one. That is what you get when you put all your eggs in a pipedream PowerPoint basket. We did not go from the battleships of the Great White Fleet to the USS Iowa overnight with no other ships built in between; but that is what we are trying to do here. Arrogance gets you killed in battle, and your fleet destroyed in the budget cycle.
At 684 feet and nearly 25,000 tons, the San Antonio is the first ship designed to accommodate the Marines’ new tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey transport aircraft, a new amphibious assault vehicle, the AAAV; and the landing craft air cushion, or LCAC .

The ship – also known by its hull number of LPD-17 – is to carry a crew of 360, along with about 700 Marines.

While its keel was laid in December 2000 and delivery was scheduled for September 2003, funding delays and cost overruns have pushed the price tag from just over $800 million to around $1.3 billion, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

The Navy said Tuesday the final cost of the ship, including expenses related to the design and to solving problems identified in the latest inspection, could reach $1.85 billion. The ship’s original price tag was about $830 million, although that figure did not include design costs.

The sea service expects to build 12 of the LPD-17 ships and plans to use them to replace four classes of transport ships now in the fleet. The new ships will be relatively lightly armed but were to be designed to evade detection by enemy radar.
I want everyone to scroll up to the top of the page and look at that ship. Do you honestly think with this and next generation IR/EO/imaging radar and satellite ocean surveillance technology you are going to be able to hide this ship and the Expeditionary Strike Group is will be with? With a deck of MV-22 and assorted helos? Maybe older, simple radars. Me no thinky you buying all that much....especially when you don't have the fundamentals down right....like waterproofing and ventilation. But that's just me.
Inspectors said cost cuts have forced elimination of some features intended to reduce the ship’s radar cross-section, however. And the ship now has a series of suspected radar “hot spots,” which could make it easier to locate, the report said.
Duh. "We didn't put those in the initial design because they didn't look cool on the mock-up and we thought technology would "take care of that problem."
Still, early in the report the inspectors said the San Antonio “is a highly capable platform with great potential for future useful service to the fleet.”
Ummmm, that DOES NOT read well on a FITREP.
And they added that it is not unusual, especially in the first ship of a class, to see shipbuilders facing significant challenges .

But they also pointed out that of the 943 spaces in the ship, only 25 are accepted by the Navy and 286 are either not inspected or incomplete. The rest are in various stages of inspection.Nice. Room to grow then.Inspectors also faulted Northrop Grumman for not providing enough training for the crew. Builders of the Ticonderoga cruiser class and the Arleigh Burke destroyer class of ships each provided at least 25 crew training courses at the shipyard.

Only six familiarization courses have been provided for San Antonio crew members, the report said.
Off to a great start I see. Here is what I would like to see briefed. Take all the officers CDR and above that have been involved in the LPD-17 and show me what their promotion track has been compared to those who were taking back to back sea duty. Just curious. Will anyone be fired? Will anyone be held accountable, or will the Navy go back to the taxpayer with our Dixie Cup asking for more cash like a bad kid who spent all his money on crack and now wants Mom and Dad to pay his tuition bill, promising "I'll try real hard to do better this time?"

How often in the last 5 years has a three or four-star made a trip to M-eye-crooked letter-crooked letter-eye-crooked letter-crooked letter-eye-humpback-humpback-eye without warning with only his Aide in tow, put on a set of coveralls, pop on a hard hat, put his maglite in his teeth and gone to get the ground truth? Watched the guys welding and pulling cable? Put on some civilian cloths and get a couple of beers on a Friday night at at bar the workmen hang out in? If you are a Shoe and do not know a good weld when you see one; do not know what a good cable pull should look like, don't understand ventilation systems, but you are on your third DC tour; use your AP on something else but ships. Can't we do better? Shouldn't we expect better? Just a question.

Fonte: http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2005_ ... chive.html